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Ceciel Meiborg and Sjoerd van Tuinen
paspas do passe passiopassion do 
ne do ne domi ne passi ne dominez pas 
ne dominez pas vos passions passives ne 
ne domino vos passio vos vos 
ssis vos passio ne dodo vos 
vos dominos d’or 
c’est domdommage do dodor 
do pas pas ne domi 
pas paspasse passio
 — Ghérasim Luca, “Passionnément”1 
In recent years the humanities, the social sciences, and neu-
roscience have witnessed an “affective turn,” especially in dis-
courses around post-Fordist labor, the economic and ecological 
crisis, populism and identity politics, mental health, and politi-
cal struggle.2 This new awareness of affect remains unthinkable 
without the pioneering work of Gilles Deleuze, who, following 
Baruch Spinoza, displaced the traditional opposition of reason 
1 Ghérasim Luca, “Passionnément,” Le chant de la carpe (Paris: Le Soleil 
Noir, 1986), 87.
2 See for example Patricia Ticineto Clough and Jean Halley, eds., The Affec-
tive Turn: Theorizing the Social (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007) 
and Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth, ed., The Affect Theory Reader 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2010).
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and emotion with the new opposition between sad and joyful 
passions which diminish or increase our capacity to think and 
act. He thus replaced judgment with affect as the very move-
ment of thought. While classical rationalism implies a moral 
judgment over and against emotions, the new one is an ethical 
evaluation of the rationality of emotions themselves. As Spinoza 
already put it: “we neither strive for, not will, neither want, nor 
desire anything because we judge it to be good; on the contrary, 
we judge something to be good because we strive for it, will it, 
want it, and desire it.”3 
For Spinoza, affect constitutes the bare activity of the world. 
An affect occurs when two finite modes of being (bodies or 
ideas), each defined by its conatus or its striving for persistence, 
encounter each other, leading to either an increase or a decrease 
of their respective powers to affect and to be affected. Affects, 
then, are collective becomings, i.e., processes or passages of de-
sire individuated by the manner in which beings seek to aug-
ment their power to engage with others. They are primordial 
to, albeit inseparable from, sensations, emotions, feelings, tastes, 
perceptions, beliefs, meanings, and all other forms of cognition. 
Whereas the more articulated and exchangeable forms of feeling 
and cognizing are already individuated and personalized “affec-
tions,” affects cannot be reduced to the different ways in which 
they are embodied and the intellectual states in which they are 
interpreted. Rather, they contain a transformative potential. For 
Deleuze, affective becomings make up the ontological element 
of a transcendental empiricism, a differential element of forces 
(Friedrich Nietzsche) or tendencies (Henri Bergson) that is au-
tonomous, neutral and eternal. Thought, or the problem of how 
to orient ourselves within this element, is a matter of empirically 
and experientially learning to compose with affects. 
Spinoza distinguishes passive affects that are prompted by 
an exterior force, and active affects that stem from an internal 
cause. Ideas or bodies are active when their actions follow only 




from themselves, whereas they are passive to the extent that they 
depend on other bodies and ideas. Passion, as Spinoza puts it, is 
“a part of Nature which cannot be perceived clearly and distinct-
ly through itself.”4 Because of its finitude, however, no mode is 
purely active. All activity is embedded in the lived world along 
the lines of passions. Whereas the Cartesian “clear and distinct” 
offers an image of autonomous thought (“I think”) as immedi-
ately self-transparent consciousness of self-evident (true) ideas, 
in reality thought — the active-passive becoming of ideas — is 
never separable from the obscure and the confused, in other 
words, the “unconscious.” This is why Deleuze redistributes the 
rationalist economy of light, even if he does so in a way more 
indebted to the Leibnizian theory of the unconscious than Spi-
noza: whereas active affects are distinct but obscure, passions 
are clear but confused.5 Adequate ideas distinctly express their 
immanent causality (pure immanence), but as actions or events 
their visibility amounts only to little glimmerings in the night. 
Consciousness or clear perception, by contrast, is of the order 
of effects; it is composed of passions (impure immanence) that 
express the powers of others and ourselves confusedly. 
The trajectory of liberation that defines Spinoza’s Ethics is the 
movement of learning by which thought, born in bondage and 
confusion, passes into the adequate comprehension of affect and 
acquires its full potential (the state of beatitude). In practice, 
then, thought always begins with the passions. These are the be-
liefs, perceptions, representations, and opinions that attach us 
to the world and that, by giving us an initial orientation, force 
and enable us to think. From language to consciousness, every-
thing finds its basis in passion, which makes up the very mate-
rial of which our lives and thoughts are composed. As soon as 
we are confronted with empirical knowledge and human affairs, 
no matter whether this concerns emotions in psychology and 
sociology, sensation in art, passion in theology, or the struggle 
4 Ibid., III P3.S.
5 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994), 196–98, 208–14.
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with opinion in philosophy, we are always dealing with passive 
affects. Rather than being a philosophy of passions, we should 
therefore say that Deleuze’s philosophy puts passion at the core 
of thought. It is through passion that we acquire our power of 
action and thus a power to produce concepts or what Spinoza 
calls common notions, which are adequate expressions of our 
communal being. The philosophical task for Deleuze is not one 
of banning the passions from thought, but rather a question of 
“How do we extend the passions, give them an extension that 
they do not have of themselves?”6 To become free is to socialize 
the passions in a political body. “The people must be individual-
ized, not according to the persons within it, but according to the 
affects it experiences simultaneously or successively.”7
The liberation of thought is a becoming active of passion, 
which always involves joy, since “there is a necessary joy in 
creation.”8 Joyful passions bring us closer to our volition, while 
sad passions, on the contrary, weaken our power, binding de-
sire to the illusions of consciousness and separating us from our 
power to act. Put differently, joyful passions augment our power, 
while sad passions enslave us. Instead of truth as ultimate cri-
terion of judgment, the only principle according to which af-
fective becomings can be selected and evaluated is the extent 
to which they proliferate joy. “A mode of existence is good or 
bad, noble or vulgar, complete or empty, independently of Good 
and Evil or any transcendent value: there are never any criteria 
other than the tenor of existence, the intensification of life.”9 If 
it takes a lot of inventiveness or imagination to become able to 
diagnose our present becomings, however, this is because be-
6 Gilles Deleuze, Desert Islands and Other Texts: 1953–1974, ed. David Lapou-
jade, trans. Michael Taormina (Los Angeles/New York: Semiotext(e), 
2004), 167.
7 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Min-
nesota Press, 1987), 341.
8 Deleuze, Desert Islands, 134.
9 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tom-




comings are always composite. Desire is a heterogeneously de-
termined mixture, like a line of experimentation traversing a 
plane on which becomings find their consistency: “there is no 
desire but assembling, assembled, desire.”10 Upholding the em-
piricist principle of the externality of relations, Deleuze claims 
that within an assemblage “the relations themselves are assigned 
a sense, a direction, an irreversibility, and an exclusivity accord-
ing to the passions.”11 Thus in an assemblage there are always 
paradoxical factors at work. Health, as Nietzsche has shown, 
is not so much the absence of sickness, but rather a composi-
tion of contrasting tendencies that leads toward less sickness 
and more health.12 Likewise, Deleuze discovers in Primo Levi 
or Yasser Arafat — but also in philosophy itself — a kind of glory 
that only occurs in relation to the shame that constitutes their 
initial motivation.13 In each case, the relation between the terms 
(health/sickness, glory/shame) is never a simple opposition, as 
if their difference was already analytically included in them. In-
stead, this difference depends on a whole constellation of exte-
rior forces, on “the dominant affective tonality” which recruits 
desire to increase its power.14 
Spinoza shows how the recruitment of desire traditionally 
takes place through the tyrants and priests who inspire sad pas-
sions in us, just as Karl Marx demonstrates how in capitalism 
enslavement primarily takes place through employment rela-
tions. As Frédéric Lordon has pointed out, Fordism, marking 
capitalism’s earlier stages, is based on a passionate servitude 
that instigates and feeds off the fear of starvation when one 
10 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 399.
11 Deleuze, Desert Islands, 166.
12 Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann, pub-
lished together with On the Genealogy of Morals, ed. Walter Kaufmann, 
trans. Walter Kaufmann and Reginald J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1989), 222–3.
13 Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 107, and Gilles Deleuze, “The 
Grandeur of Yasser Arafat,” trans. Timothy S. Murhpy, Discourse 20, no. 3 
(1998): 30–33.
14 Frédéric Lordon, Willing Slaves of Capital: Spinoza & Marx on Desire, 
trans. Gabriel Ash (London/ New York: Verso Books, 2014), 24.
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would quit working in the assembly line.15 Similarly, the work 
of Deleuze and Guattari on capitalism and schizophrenia can 
be read as an encyclopedia of the passions that constitute the af-
fective infrastructure of the socius of contemporary capitalism. 
These include sad passions such as shame, spite, guilt, stupid-
ity, mistrust, weariness, fatigue, fatalism, cynicism, ignorance, 
hope, anguish, disgust, contempt, cowardice, hatred, laziness, 
avidity, regret, despair, mockery, malversation, and self-abase-
ment. Whereas the deterritorializing forces of capital constantly 
demand from us a “passional betrayal” of the dominant social 
structure, these same passions need to be controlled on the level 
of our private lives (i.e., the Oedipal triangle). This is why in the 
formation of a well-emancipated individual the priestly origins 
of western subjectivity can still be clearly discerned. The con-
temporary culture of health and abstinence, as Slavoj Žižek has 
famously pointed out, is a culture of safe sex, smoking bans, cof-
fee without caffeine, intolerance for misogynic jokes, wars with-
out casualties, and so forth.16 But capitalism could not exist if it 
did not also inspire joy, love, courage, and perhaps even beati-
tude. Fordism already compensated for fear by installing a hope 
for more consumption. Today we witness “the spectacle of the 
happily dominated” of the managerial class, the flex worker, the 
citizen-consumer, the bean-roasting hipster, the homo economi-
cus, and the self-managed team.17 It is only in late capitalism 
that individuation takes place primarily in the form of the self-
centered subject that is working for his or her self-realization. 
With the rise of the self-entrepreneur we can perhaps speak for 
the first time, despite the manifest oxymoron, of a veritable vol-
untary servitude, in which enslavement is immediately fulfilled 
by joyful passions. 
Philosophy, the passion of doing philosophy, is far from in-
nocent in this respect. It represses the creative act of thinking by 
15 Lordon, Willing Slaves of Capital, 23–28.
16 Slavoj Žižek, Demanding the Impossible, ed. Yong-june Park (Cambridge: 




enslaving thought to that haggard image of self-sufficient and 
self-gratifying rationality that it inevitably produces of itself. As 
Deleuze and Guattari ask us: “Is there anything more passional 
than pure reason? Is there a colder, more extreme, more self-in-
terested passion than the Cogito?”18 This explains why Deleuze 
hardly lives up to the caricature of the affirmative thinker of 
spontaneous happiness that still dominates his legacy.19 There is 
joy in destruction, especially in the destruction of Reason. Spi-
noza already pointed at the common disregard for passions of 
the thinkers of his era, claiming that “they attribute the cause of 
human impotence and inconstancy, not to the common power 
of Nature, but to I know not what vice of human nature, which 
they therefore bewail, or laugh at, or disdain, or (as usually hap-
pens) curse.”20 Working along the naturalist axis of Lucretius-
Spinoza-Nietzsche and extending it into a Humean “empiricist 
conversion,” Deleuze equally maintains that the inseparability of 
reason and passion is in no sense anti-intellectualist or irration-
alist. Rather, their inseparability is critical, since it protects rea-
son from its self-imposed stupidity (bêtise) by relating it to the 
unthought, i.e. the distinct but obscure forces that condition it. 
And it is clinical, since for the naturalist, it is here that thought 
becomes possessed by a “power of aggression and selection.”21 
A thought only reaches consistency and prominence in “iso-
lated and passionate cries” that deny what everybody knows 
and what nobody can deny. At the beginning of thought, we 
discover not a transparent self, but a self dissolved in the inter-
stices of its passions, a veritably schizophrenic thought-drama: 
“There is always another breath in my breath, another thought 
in my thought, another possession in what I possess, a thousand 
18 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 130.
19 “Reading Deleuze is like a Bacardi Rum advertisement. It is an adver-
tisement without body: one never sees Bacardi rum; one only sees that 
everybody is happy” (Boris Groys, seminar “Immaterial Communication,” 
in Concepts on the Move, eds. Annette W. Balkema and Henk Slager, 50–67 
[Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi, 2002], 65).
20 Spinoza, Ethics, III Preface.
21 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, xx.
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things and a thousand beings implicated in my complications: 
every true thought is an aggression.”22
Sharing Hegel’s question of how thought finds its way into 
the world and vice versa, Deleuze discerns an answer in Antonin 
Artaud and his concept of the theater of cruelty. The destruc-
tion of the established image of thought involves a laborious 
ploughing through thick layers of passion. Only on the brink 
of exhaustion, where thought risks to be entirely submerged, do 
bursts and leaps appear that uncover a glimpse of spontaneous, 
non-prefigured, and non-subjugated thought-desire. Every true 
philosophical concept comes into being as a passionate cry. The 
philosopher faces a schizophrenic task, which “is less a question 
of recovering meaning than of destroying the word, of conjur-
ing up the affect, and of transforming the painful passion of the 
body into a triumphant action, obedience into command […].”23 
This is where philosophy and literature meet, in defamiliarizing 
the familiar, not by taking a “philosophical distance” from the 
world, but by the full immersion of thought in the world and 
its material, i.e., passional reality. Ghérasim Luca’s “Passionné-
ment,” for that matter, is not so much an act carried out on the 
mere surface of language, but rather an engagement with the 
limits of language. By stretching and condensing, by having it 
bear the weight of what it is not, language abandons its lofty 
Olympian throne of dialectical reason judging over the world 
in clear and distinct propositions, and affirms both itself and 
the world in the production of a new intensity. Or in the words 
of Deleuze: “The entire language spins and varies in order to 
disengage a final block of sound, a single breath at the limit of 
the cry, JE T’AIME PASSIONNÉMENT (“I love you passionately”).”24
22 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. Mark Lester (New York: Colum-
bia University Press, 1990), 298. 
23 Ibid., 88.
24 Gilles Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, trans. Daniel W. Smith and 




It is well-known that Deleuze finds in Hegel the ultimate betray-
al of this naturalist practice of philosophy. With thinkers such as 
Jean Wahl, Jean-Paul Sartre, Alexandre Kojève, and Jean Hyp-
polite, the philosophical landscape of his formative years was 
dominated by Hegelianism. But as Moritz Gansen points out in 
his contribution, the unhappy consciousness that drives Hegel’s 
philosophical system is a thorn in the flesh of philosophy. Fol-
lowing Nietzsche, Deleuze considers the unhappy conscious-
ness “only the Hegelian version of the bad conscience,” that in-
ternalized guilt and restlessness which multiplies and glorifies 
sad passions. The endeavor of escaping the totalizing tendencies 
of the Hegelian dialectics has defined his entire oeuvre.
In his philosophical pursuit of joy and creativity, Deleuze 
seeks to circumvent the dialectical pursuit of reason, which 
“represents our slavery and our subjection as something supe-
rior which makes us reasonable beings.”25 Samantha Bankston 
demonstrates how a shift from a philosophy of judgment to a 
philosophy of affect implies a more radical shift from Being to 
becoming than the movement of the Hegelian concept allows 
for. Traditionally, reason forces upon thought the categories of 
Being, which are analogy, identity, opposition, resemblance. To 
accommodate for the transformative potential of a philosophy 
of affect, Deleuze develops a new, twofold concept of becom-
ing. Sensory becoming refers to the immanent logic that makes 
up the composite nature of assemblages. Absolute becoming 
amounts to the becoming active, a “counter-effectuation” of the 
image of thought.
Adopting the Nietzschean project of inverting Platonism 
and tracing the dialectic to its Socratic roots, Deleuze returns to 
the Greek dramatic setting of the agon with its rivalry between 
the claimants of truth. The first time he systematically takes up 
the theme of distinguishing “the true pretender from the false 
25 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 92–93.
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one,”26 is in the treatment of jealousy in Proust and Signs. As 
Arjen Kleinherenbrink demonstrates, the jealous lover can only 
distinguish himself from the other claimants and rightfully 
claim his beloved one if he reaches her true essence. The passion 
of jealousy enables him to become active, to make a difference. 
It does not, however, lead him to her true essence, but rather 
to the truth that her essence will keep on escaping him. Or, as 
Deleuze later puts it: “[D]oes not this passionate search for true 
opinion lead the Platonists to an aporia,” the gray zone in which 
truth and falsity become indiscernible?27
Sjoerd van Tuinen further develops Deleuze’s method of 
dramatization by staging the priest and the philosopher as the 
two competing claimants to the concept of ressentiment. They 
embody respectively a nihilistic sense of the concept of ressenti-
ment and a speculative sense. The priest moralistically judges 
others because of their ressentiment, while the philosopher im-
manently affirms ressentiment, rather than opposing it. Histori-
cally speaking, this difference leads to a parting of the ways in 
the discourse on ressentiment after Nietzsche. By psychologizing 
ressentiment and fixating it as the secretive emotion of guilty in-
dividuals, authors such as Max Scheler and René Girard have in-
strumentalized the concept of ressentiment to turn it against the 
voices of minorities. Deleuze, by contrast, is a genealogist who 
affirms ressentiment as an inherently political passion open to 
a drama of divergent becomings. Ultimately, the difference be-
tween the priest and the philosopher is not a question of truth, 
but of passion. As conceptual personae, they are two passions 
of thought and thus two different powers of imagination and 
becoming. Whereas the priest judges on the basis of empirical 
facts, only the philosopher — Nietzsche’s philosopher-legisla-
tor — possesses the transcendental right to wield the concept of 
ressentiment.
Likewise, Jason Read points out that a philosophy of affect 
always carries the risk of interiorization, in which the intimate 




takes precedence over the social and the social is reduced to a 
set of individuals. Combining Spinoza’s inherently political ac-
count of affect with Gilbert Simondon’s theory of individuation, 
Deleuze and Guattari in the Capitalism and Schizophrenia se-
ries put forward two different ways in which this risk can be 
avoided. Anti-Oedipus provides a history of the dominant af-
fects that determine the structure of feeling, while focusing on 
resisting reductive accounts of the social, with Sigmund Freud 
as its polemical target. A Thousand Plateaus, on the other hand, 
reaches beyond the historical determinations of affect by tracing 
the affects of capitalism that pass between the dominant pas-
sions, indicating possible lines of flight.
Following Deleuze and Guattari, Benoît Dillet argues that 
ideology critique is ineffective since it merely critiques a system 
of beliefs, rather than diagnosing the passions that are at the ba-
sis of capitalism. The strict separation of psycho-social passions 
and economic interests in ideology critique reinforces a mecha-
nism of neutralization of the joyful passions, because it denies 
the desire that is at the very core of capitalism. Instead, Deleuze 
and Guattari propose to expand the project of ideology critique 
to the project of noology critique, which refers to the study of 
the images of thought and their historicity. This means that the 
materiality and the passionate infrastructure that preconditions 
the dogmatic image of thought is taken into account.
Louis-Georges Schwartz points out that the image regimes 
as presented by Deleuze in his books on cinema emerge dialec-
tically from the labor-capital relations (formal versus real sub-
sumption of labor under capital). With the full subsumption of 
labor — when labor itself and being available for labor become 
indiscernible — the image regime of the twenty-first century is 
what Schwartz calls Cinema Hostis. This regime pivots upon an 
antagonism; characters become each other’s enemies and the 
camera is the enemy of all. Just as each of Deleuze’s two im-
age regimes expresses affects in its own signs and forms, with 
Cinema Hostis affects become weaponized molar ready-mades 
and lose their transhuman and deterritorializing character, im-
mobilizing their creative potential.
20
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David Liu takes up the theme of the possibility of escape in 
asking us: When Deleuze jumped out of the window, toward 
his death — just as Luca jumped into the Seine one year earli-
er — did he deframe or reframe the passions? Should we con-
sider Deleuze’s suicide a line of flight or a line of death, or both 
at the same time?28 The Spinozist division between joyful and 
sad passions forces a binary logic upon thought, which denies 
the fundamentally paradoxical and heterogenous nature of 
becoming. This dichotomy is only intensified in capitalism, in 
which you are either productive or unproductive, happy or sad. 
Deleuze may have escaped this capitalist dualism with his pub-
lic suicide, which enabled him to affect and be affected at once. 
While implying his irrevocable death, his suicide also forces us 
to think about how life always carries death within it.
With Liu we see how even Deleuze’s death impassions our 
thinking. To return to Deleuze’s question “How do we extend the 
passions?” we can maintain that he has indicated many open-
ings for doing so. With this volume we aim to provide a system-
atic study of Deleuze’s taxonomy of the passions and their im-
portance for a thinking that reaches beyond itself, whether this 
is effectuated by tracing the sad passions that Deleuze tries to 
escape (Gansen, Bankston) or by engaging with strategies that 
integrate sad passions with joyful passions (Kleinherenbrink, 
Van Tuinen), by diagnosing the passions that make up the affec-
tive infrastructure of capitalism (Dillet, Read, Schwartz) or by 
questioning the dichotomy of the joyful and sad passions alto-
gether (Liu). We hope that, between the lines, you will read the 
passion that made us compose this volume, that this book will 
move you, and equip you with tools to extend this movement.
28 Cf. “This, precisely, is the fourth danger: the line of flight crossing the wall, 
getting out of the black holes, but instead of connecting with other lines 
and each time augmenting its valence, turning to destruction, abolition 
pure and simple the passion of abolition. Like Kleist’s line of flight, and the 
strange war he wages; like suicide, double suicide, a way out that turns 




“Everywhere There Are Sad Passions”: 
Gilles Deleuze and the Unhappy 
Consciousness
Moritz Gansen
Hegel… Hegel? Quoi, qu’est-ce que c’est ça?
— Gilles Deleuze1
Philosophical sensibility
From the very beginning of his philosophical career, Gilles 
Deleuze defined philosophy as the “creation of concepts.”2 Such 
creation, however, was never a matter of “pure” philosophy, 
“‘pure’ theory,” at least if philosophy and theory were to be un-
derstood in a “traditional,” in a reflexive and rationalist sense, in 
1 Gilles Deleuze, “Spinoza: Session 4,” lecture, Université Paris-VIII, Paris, 
France, January 6, 1981, http://www2.univ-paris8.fr/deleuze/article.
php3?id_article=9, accessed September 28, 2016.
2 While this definition is most famously presented in What Is Philosophy? 
(Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, trans. Hugh 
Tomlinson and Graham Burchell [New York: Columbia University Press, 
1994], passim), Deleuze used it from very early on. In 1956, for instance, he 
opened an essay on Bergson with the assertion that “[a] great philosopher 
creates new concepts” (Gilles Deleuze, Desert Islands and Other Texts: 
1953–1974, ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Michael Taormina [Los Angeles: 
Semiotext(e), 2004], 22).
22
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the sense of a “dogmatic image of thought.”3 Instead, the philo-
sophical creation of concepts was always mediated by certain 
affects, by passions, passing through the non-philosophical. Ac-
cordingly, what Deleuze said about the late Michel Foucault was 
equally true of himself: “Thinking was never a matter of theory. 
It was to do with problems of life. It was life itself.”4
This vital conception of thinking, one might say, constitutes 
Deleuze’s very own image of thought, and it conditions his “phil-
osophical sensibility.”5 After all, at least in hindsight, his interest 
in specific philosophers seems to be guided by an implicit sys-
tem of affects, organized around the main coordinates of “joy” 
on the one hand and “sadness” on the other. For Deleuze, phi-
losophy, considered as a matter of life, had to be “joyful.” As he 
told Jeanette Colombel in an interview in 1969, the true power 
of philosophy, even where it is critical and destructive, “springs 
from affirmation, from joy, from a cult of affirmation and joy, 
from the exigency of life against those who would mutilate and 
mortify it.”6 Consequently, his writings on the history of philos-
ophy focused on authors whom he considered a challenge to a 
philosophical tradition marked by rationalism on the one hand 
and negativity on the other. Among them were Lucretius, David 
Hume, and Henri Bergson, but “all tended,” as he explained, “to-
ward the great Spinoza-Nietz sche identity.”7
This attention for a supposed countercurrent in the history of 
philosophy,8 championing an affirmative and vital understand-
ing of philosophy, was paired with a determined rejection of 
3 On the “image of thought,” cf. Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 
trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 129–67.
4 Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations 1972–1990, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: 
Columbia University Press), 105, trans. modified.
5 Deleuze, “Spinoza: Session 4.”
6 Deleuze, Desert Islands, 144.
7 Deleuze, Negotiations, 135, trans. modified; cf. ibid., 5–7.
8 Despite his appeals to a clandestine counter-lineage, one should not forget 
that Deleuze, as Giuseppe Bianco points out, “essentially wrote about 
the authors whom his professors had taught.” Among these professors 
were, most notably, Ferdinand Alquié, Georges Canguilhem, Maurice de 
Gandillac, Jean Hyppolite and Jean Wahl (François Dosse, Gilles Deleuze, 
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philosophy in its present state, evidently governed by a taste for 
negativity. For Deleuze, as for many others, this taste for nega-
tivity was paradigmatically embodied in the prevalence of a par-
ticular French Hegelianism, which, under the name of Georg 
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel himself, became the target of an of-
ten relentless critique, a critique that to some may have seemed 
excessive. As for instance Jean Wahl remarked in his generally 
favorable review of Nietz sche and Philosophy, one could get the 
impression that there was, “in the author, a sort of ressentiment 
toward Hegelian philosophy, which sometimes dictates him pas-
sages of great rigor, but sometimes also risks to deceive him.”9 
And indeed, in his letter to Michel Cressole, Deleuze admitted 
that his persistent anti-Hegelianism was doubtlessly a matter of 
affects: “What I most detested,” he explained, “was Hegelianism 
and dialectics.”10
However, given that affects are inevitably intertwined with 
philosophy as a matter of life, Deleuze’s passionate plea against 
Hegelianism is more than an idiosyncratic expression of person-
al preference. It needs to be understood in terms of a systematic 
philosophical “symptomatology” and “typology.”11 Approaching 
Deleuze’s critique precisely from the standpoint of such an affec-
tive symptomatology, the present essay offers a — by no means 
exhaustive — reconstruction of an important aspect of the his-
torical and systematic conditions of Deleuze’s anti-Hegelianism, 
arguing that his rejection of Hegel on the grounds of a theory 
of affects draws upon a particular figure of an inherently “sad” 
mode of thinking, the “unhappy consciousness,” which was 
introduced into French philosophy by Deleuze’s teacher Jean 
Wahl. It is precisely against the backdrop of a Hegelianism con-
and Félix Guattari: Intersecting Lives, trans. Deborah Glassman [New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2010], 109–10).
9 Jean Wahl, “Nietz sche et la philosophie,” Revue de Métaphysique et de Mo-
rale 68.3 (1963): 352–79, at 353. Unless indicated otherwise, all translations 
of passages cited from French editions are mine.
10 Deleuze, Negotiations, 6.
11 Gilles Deleuze, Nietz sche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 75.
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sidered as an “enterprise of ressentiment and the unhappy con-
sciousness” that Deleuze seeks to develop and highlight, with 
the help of his readings of Baruch Spinoza and Friedrich Nietz-
sche, his own affirmative conception of philosophy.12
A Hegelian horizon
In 1968, in his preface to Difference and Repetition, Deleuze 
suggested that his book should be read in light of a current of 
“generalized anti-Hegelianism,” a valorization of difference and 
repetition over identity, negativity, and dialectics, which, ac-
cording to him, was indicated in Martin Heidegger, in struc-
turalism, in the contemporary novel, and so on.13 At the time, 
however, Hegel had only recently been fully naturalized within 
French academic philosophy. In 1967, for example, Jean Hyp-
polite, arguably the most important French Hegel scholar of his 
generation,14 was planning to establish a “Center for Hegelian 
Studies” at the Collège de France (a plan thwarted by his death 
a year later), and in 1968 Hegel appeared on the syllabus for 
the written agrégation for the first time.15 After a long process 
of rehabilitation, even revaluation, Hegel had become ubiqui-
tous, and, as Deleuze’s colleague and friend François Châtelet 
asserted, he had been found to determine
a horizon, a language, a code, within which we still are today 
[sc. in 1968]. Hegel, by this fact, is our Plato: the one who 
12 Deleuze, Desert Islands, 144, translation modified.
13 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, xix.
14 Most notably, Hyppolite accomplished the first French translation of He-
gel’s Phenomenology of Spirit in 1939 and prepared an extensive commen-
tary, published in 1946, Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s Phenomenology of 
Spirit, trans. Samuel Cherniak and John Heckman (Evanston: Northwest-
ern University Press, 1974).
15 Cf. Alan Schrift, “The Effects of the Agrégation de Philosophie on Twenti-
eth-Century French Philosophy,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 46.3 
(2008): 449–73, at 458.
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delimits — ideologically or scientifically, positively or nega-
tively — the theoretical possibilities of theory.16
There was hence an entire generation of young French intellec-
tuals who were formed within these (neo-)Hegelian limits, and 
many of them seemed compelled to question, in one way or an-
other, the authority of the alleged master thinker and his latest 
disciples. As Foucault noted in his homage to Hyppolite — his 
teacher at the Lycée Henri-IV and predecessor at the Collège de 
France — there was an “entire epoch, whether in logic or epis-
temology, whether in Marx or Nietz sche, […] trying to escape 
from Hegel,” never quite sure whether he was not already wait-
ing for them, behind another dialectical ruse, “immobile and 
elsewhere.”17
Perhaps Foucault wrote these lines with Deleuze in mind. 
The latter had also been Hyppolite’s student in the 1940s, both 
at the Lycée Henri-IV and at the Sorbonne, and he was (and he 
had been for quite some time) indubitably trying to escape from 
Hegel, indeed, among others, through Nietz sche. As a student, 
Deleuze had inevitably been exposed to Hegelian thinking, to 
the “Hegelian triads” that Hyppolite, as he recalled, “pounded 
out […] with his fist.”18 Therefore, one can assume that he “knew 
his Hegel,” despite the fact that he did not “admire” him and his 
thinking, and hence had “no reason to write about [him].”19 In 
16 François Châtelet, Hegel (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1968), 13.
17 Michel Foucault, “The Order of Discourse,” trans. Ian McLeod, in Untying 
the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader, ed. Robert Young, 51–77 (London: 
Routledge, 1981), 74.
18 Gilles Deleuze, quoted in Giuseppe Bianco, “Jean Hyppolite et Ferdinand 
Alquié,” in Aux sources de la pensée de Gilles Deleuze, ed. Stéphan Leclerc, 
91–101 (Paris: Vrin/Sils Maria, 2006), 92n2; translated in Dosse, Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari, 95. Alain Badiou has remarked that “there was 
within him [Hyppolite] a subterranean negativity, a primordial ‘no’ about 
which we knew little but which was constantly at work” (Alain Badiou, 
Pocket Pantheon: Figures of Postwar Philosophy, trans. David Macey [Lon-
don: Verso, 2009], 53).
19 Deleuze, Desert Islands, 144.
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this sense, to be more precise, Deleuze’s attitude is perhaps best 
rendered in a short passage he wrote about Nietz sche:
It has been said that Nietz sche did not know his Hegel. In the 
sense that one does not know one’s opponent well. On the 
other hand we believe that the Hegelian movement, the dif-
ferent Hegelian factions were familiar to him.20
The Hegelian movement familiar to Deleuze was, as mentioned 
before, a very particular one. As Foucault summarized much 
later, when looking back upon the years of his philosophical 
formation in a long interview with Duccio Trombadori, the pre-
vailing French Hegelianism around the middle of the twentieth 
century was “permeated with phenomenology and existential-
ism, centered on the theme of the unhappy consciousness.”21 
Precisely this is the context of Deleuze’s “affective” critique of 
Hegel.
The unhappy consciousness
The notion of the “unhappy consciousness” became prominent 
in France in the wake of the reintroduction of Hegel into French 
philosophy in the mid and late 1920s. After Hegel had for a long 
time, and especially in the context of the Franco-Prussian War 
and its aftermath, been considered the architect of a deadening 
and totalizing, a panlogicist and even Pan-Germanist system,22 
20 Deleuze, Nietz sche and Philosophy, 8.
21 Michel Foucault, “Interview with Michel Foucault,” trans. Robert Hurley, 
in The Essential Works of Michel Foucault, 1954–1984: Power, ed. James D. 
Faubion, 239–97 (New York: The New Press, 2000), 246.
22 For a particularly striking example, cf. Henri Bergson, “Discours en séance 
publique de l’académie des sciences morales et politiques,” in Henri Berg-
son, Mélanges, ed. André Robinet (Paris: Presses Universitaire de France, 
1972), 1113, where Bergson links a Hegelian taste to the German invasion 
of Belgium in 1914, declaring that contemporary German philosophy was 
“simply the intellectual transposition of its [Germany’s] brutality, of its 
appetites, and of its vices. […] Germany, having definitely become a preda-
tory nation, refers itself to Hegel, like a Germany taken by moral beauty 
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he was now being rediscovered following the publication of the 
so-called Early Theological Writings (Theologische Jugendschrif-
ten) in 1907. Philosophers like Wahl and Alexandre Koyré sud-
denly began to see a different Hegel, one who seemed to exhibit 
very little of what previous readers had so fiercely criticized.23 
Read in productive conjunction for instance with the works of 
Søren Kierkegaard and Heidegger, these theological writings 
were reconnected to the Phenomenology of Spirit and interpret-
ed in terms of a philosophy of concrete subjective experience, a 
philosophy, in other words, of existence. Before and beneath the 
systematic endeavors of the later years, Wahl and Koyré found 
a “human, vibrant, suffering Hegel.”24 “Behind the philosopher,” 
they discovered, as Wahl put it, “the theologian, and behind the 
rationalist the romantic.”25 The young Hegel, it seemed, had ac-
tually anticipated the existential critique of his older self,26 he 
had “in some measure,” as Hyppolite would claim, “foreseen 
Kierkegaard.”27
Within this new reading, the unhappy consciousness came 
to be assigned an absolutely central role, most extensively devel-
oped in Wahl’s Le malheur de la conscience dans la philosophie 
de Hegel. If the Phenomenology of Spirit formed a propaedeutic 
to the system, the unhappy consciousness, already conceptually 
present in the early theological writings, embodied a kind of 
would declare itself faithful to Kant or as a sentimental Germany would 
invoke Jacobi or Schopenhauer.”
23 Cf. especially Jean Wahl, Le malheur de la conscience dans la philosophie 
de Hegel, 2nd ed. (Paris: Presses Universitaire de France, 1951); Alexandre 
Koyré, “Hegel à Iéna” and “Note sur la langue et la terminologie hégé-
liennes,” in Études d’histoire de la pensée philosophique (Paris: Gallimard, 
1961), 135–204; moreover Jean Hyppolite, “Les travaux de jeunesse de 
Hegel d’après des ouvrages récents,” Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 
42.3 (1935): 399–426 and 42.4: 549–78; Jean Hyppolite, “Vie et prise de 
conscience de la vie dans la philosophie hégélienne d’Iéna,” Revue de Méta-
physique et de Morale 45.1 (1938): 45–61.
24 Koyré, “Hegel à Iéna,” 137.
25 Wahl, Le malheur de la conscience dans la philosophie de Hegel, v.
26 Ibid., vii.
27 Jean Hyppolite, “Discours d’introduction,” Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 3 (1966): 
11–13, at 11.
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atavism within it, an expression of an “existential vibrato”28 that, 
according to Wahl, subtended Hegel’s philosophy as a whole. 
In order to have become philosophically graspable, or con-
ceivable, the unhappy consciousness must have had its specific 
truth in an actual crisis in Hegel’s own concrete subjective (i.e., 
biographical) experience: the experience of an unattainable re-
mainder that, although the object of the most profound desire, 
must forever, and constitutively, remain out of reach. Where 
Hegel’s project grows into a striving for the creation of a philo-
sophical system, it is at its core, for Wahl, “an effort toward the 
rationalization of a ground [fond] that reason does not attain,”29 
a sublimation, in other words, of an absolutely insuperable ten-
sion. And since the experience of an absolute unattainability, as 
an experience that leaves the subject grounded in nothing but its 
own despair, is here also a fundamentally religious experience,30 
Hegel is easily approximated to Kierkegaard, the “true” philoso-
pher of the unhappy consciousness, who is himself, “against the 
system,” “an unhappy consciousness.”31 Hegel’s notion of the un-
28 Châtelet, Hegel, 11.
29 Wahl, Le malheur de la conscience dans la philosophie de Hegel, 108.
30 Wahl and Hyppolite have pointed out that the unhappy consciousness, 
besides being a determinate moment in the Phenomenology of Spirit, 
can also be read as an adaptation of Hegel’s earlier theological writings. 
Although he does not explicate this in the Phenomenology, it can be said 
that the dialectic of the unhappy consciousness presents a phenomenology 
of religious experience in three historical stages. Its first stage, then, is the 
positing of an infinite immutable essence beyond the reach of a changing, 
inessential consciousness: Judaism, or the “reign of the Father.” Its second 
moment is the realization of the contradiction, the immediate incarnation 
of the immutable, which, in its immediacy, remains just as unattainable: 
Christ, or the “reign of the Son.” In its third moment, finally, the unhappy 
consciousness develops “to the point of complete self-negation,” toward 
“actual sacrifice,” in order to overcome its unhappiness: the Church, or the 
“reign of Spirit” (Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s Phenomenol-
ogy of Spirit, 190–215; cf. also Wahl, Le malheur de la conscience dans la 
philosophie de Hegel, 10–118).
31 Jean Wahl, Études kierkegaardiennes (Paris: Aubier, 1938), 112. According 
to Wahl, there is, in the young Hegel and in Kierkegaard, “the same revolt 
against concepts, the same affirmation of subjective feeling on the one 
hand and being on the other, insofar as both are irreducible to concepts, 
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happy consciousness is understood as prefiguring the Kierkeg-
aardian notion of existential despair:32 “As long as consciousness 
does nothing but produce a beyond that it endeavors to attain in 
vain, spirit cannot find its peace.”33 It is in this existential experi-
ence, then, according to Wahl, that we discover the root of the 
dialectic in a consciousness of internal tension and contradic-
tion.
In Hegel’s Phenomenology, the narrative of the process of the 
appearance of spirit, the unhappy consciousness follows upon 
the stoic and the skeptic consciousness in the problematic de-
velopment of the freedom of self-consciousness, which in turn 
follows upon the more famous formation of self-consciousness 
in the dialectic of lord and bondsman.34 The stoic self-conscious-
ness, first of all, finds its abstract freedom in its perfect reclusion 
into the “simple essentiality of thought,”35 entirely “turned away 
from the independence of things.”36 The skeptic consciousness, 
and the idea that in religion there is an absolute ‘being-one’ of two natures 
at the inside of the divine being and at the inside of the believing soul” 
(Ibid., 153).
32 Cf. “In all of Hegel’s systematic works there is one section that discusses 
the unhappy consciousness. […] The unhappy one is the person who in 
one way or another has his ideal, the substance of his life, the plenitude of 
his consciousness, his essential nature, outside himself. The unhappy one 
is the person who is always absent from himself, never present to himself. 
[…] The whole territory of the unhappy consciousness is thereby ad-
equately circumscribed. For this firm limitation, we thank Hegel, and now, 
since we are not only philosophers who view this kingdom at a distance, 
we shall as natives consider more closely the various stages contained 
therein.” (Søren Kierkegaard, Either/Or: Part I, eds. and trans. Howard V. 
Hong and Edna H. Hong [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987], 
222).
33 Wahl, Le malheur de la conscience dans la philosophie de Hegel, 116.
34 For a more in-depth discussion of the notion of the unhappy conscious-
ness, see for instance Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s Phenom-
enology of Spirit, 190–215; for Hegel’s own description of the unhappy 
consciousness, see §§206–30 of the Phenomenology of Spirit.
35 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. 
Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), §199. In order to facilitate 
navigation across different editions, all references to the Phenomenology of 
Spirit are given as paragraph numbers.
36 Ibid., §200.
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then, denouncing the deceptive stability and unity of stoicism, 
turns toward radical negation. Within this negation, however, 
it is doubled and becomes internally contradictory, torn apart 
in its unconscious confusion: “At one time it recognizes that its 
freedom lies in rising above all the confusion and contingency 
of existence, and at another time equally admits to a relapse 
into occupying itself with what is unessential.”37 The skeptic 
consciousness hence constantly moves from one extreme to the 
other at will, experiencing its contradictions as mere child’s play. 
It is, as Hegel puts it, no more than “the squabbling of self-willed 
children.”38 Only the unhappy consciousness, finally, is able to 
acknowledge the torment that is entailed by this state of split 
and internal contradiction. It is “consciousness of itself as a dou-
bled, merely contradictory being [Wesen],”39 a being that is sus-
pended in continuous oscillation between inside and outside, 
immanence and transcendence, singularity and universality, the 
finite and the infinite, this world and a world beyond, the hu-
man and the divine. The unhappy consciousness is thus haunted 
by an inherent restlessness; whenever “it believes itself to have 
achieved victory and restful unity,” in one way or another, it is 
immediately expelled from its apparent repose.40
In the Phenomenology of Spirit, the unhappy consciousness is 
dialectically overcome thanks to an “actual sacrifice,” the “sur-
render of one’s own will” for the sake of a “universal will” that 
leads toward the realization of reason.41 The knowledge of the 
absolute, or absolute knowledge, designates the direction of a 
final “reconciliation with itself.”42 Wahl, however, extrapolates 
from the moment of the unhappy consciousness and conceives 
37 Ibid., §205.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid., §206, translation modified. It is, in other words, “for itself the 
doubled consciousness of itself as self-liberating, unchangeable, and self-
identical, and of itself as absolutely self-confusing and self-inverting — and 
it is the consciousness of this contradiction within itself.”
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of it as a universal structure of existential subjectivity (a gesture 
later repeated by Alexandre Kojève, who draws upon the dialec-
tic of lord and bondsman, of master and slave, to provide a uni-
versal structure of historical human subjectivity).43 The unhap-
py consciousness is thus understood, in short, as “consciousness 
as subject” tout court.44 As Wahl puts it elsewhere, much later: 
“There is only unhappy consciousness.”45 Dialectics, then, is no 
guarantee for reconciliation,46 and in this existential reading of 
the conditions of Hegel’s rationalism, the absolute itself remains 
“unhappy,” so to speak, internally “strained,” a juxtaposition of 
irresolvable contradictions.47 All hope for reconciliation is ulti-
mately deferred to mystical experience, and it is clear that in the 
last instance all consciousness must remain tragic.48
Throughout the remainder of the century, and still today, 
many readers of Hegel have continued to focus on this tragic 
aspect of subjectivity, rejecting the idea of reconciliation and a 
closed system.49 As Hyppolite noted, many of his contemporar-
ies preferred
43 Cf. Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on 
the Phenomenology of Spirit, ed. Allan Bloom, trans. James H. Nichols, Jr. 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980).
44 Wahl, Le malheur de la conscience dans la philosophie de Hegel, 112.
45 Jean Wahl, Human Existence and Transcendence, trans. William C. Hackett 
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2016), 54; emphasis mine.
46 Here Wahl parts ways with Hegel: Although he stresses the importance of 
negativity and dialectics (with Plato remaining the better dialectician as 
compared to Hegel), he strongly opposes the idea of a closed system and 
defends the role of immediacy; cf. for instance Jean Wahl, “Itinéraire on-
tologique,” in Les philosophes français d’aujourd’hui par eux-mêmes: Auto-
biographie de la philosophie française contemporaine, eds. Gérard Deledalle 
and Denis Huisman (Paris: Centre de Documentation Universitaire, 1963), 
58–59. For a helpful overview of Wahl’s biography and work, cf. the editors’ 
introduction “Existence, Experience, and Transcendence: An Introduc-
tion to Jean Wahl” in Jean Wahl, Transcendence and the Concrete: Selected 
Writings, eds. Alan D. Schrift and Ian Alexander Moore, 1–31 (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2016).
47 Ibid., 113.
48 Ibid.
49 Cf. Bruce Baugh, French Hegel: From Surrealism to Postmodernism (New 
York: Routledge, 2003).
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what Hegel calls “unhappy consciousness” to what he calls 
“spirit.” They take up Hegel’s description of self-certainty 
which fails to be in-itself but which, nonetheless, exists 
only through its transcendence toward that in-itself; but 
they abandon Hegel when, according to him, specific self-
consciousness — subjectivity — becomes universal self-con-
sciousness — thingness — a movement through which being 
is posed as subject and subject is posed as being. They accept 
Hegel’s phenomenology but reject his ontology.50
As the terminology indicates, this characterization was perhaps 
most importantly directed at Jean-Paul Sartre, for whom, in Be-
ing and Nothingness, and with direct reference to Wahl (for both 
Hegel and Kierkegaard), the unhappy consciousness remained 
crucial; according to him, subjectivity is precisely a structure of 
perpetual unhappiness — “[h]uman reality […] is by nature an 
unhappy consciousness with no possibility of surpassing its un-
happy state.”51 The unhappy consciousness can hence be read as 
an (ultimately theological) figure located at the very core of the 
philosophies of existence, where the “refusal of synthesis” turns 
it into the archetypal form of subjectivity, “a condition from 
which there is no escape.”52
“Why not Hegel?”
It was arguably the ubiquity of this idea of an unhappiness with-
out escape — whether in Wahl, Sartre or Hyppolite — that pro-
voked Deleuze’s “mercilessness” toward Hegel.53 If Hegel was, at 
50 Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, 204–5.
51 Cf. Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenologi-
cal Ontology, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 
1956), 90. As a young man, Deleuze was, together with his friend Michel 
Tournier, an ardent reader of Sartre, and despite a certain rift he still con-
sidered him his “teacher” even in later years; cf. Deleuze, Desert Islands, 
77–80; also cf. Giuseppe Bianco, “Deleuze before Deleuze: Humanism and 
Anti-Humanism (1943–1948),” forthcoming in Critical Enquiry.
52 Baugh, French Hegel, 6.
53 Cf. Deleuze, Desert Islands, 144.
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that precise moment of his reception, a thinker of the unhappy 
consciousness, of negativity, of contradiction, as far as Deleuze 
was concerned, there could be no compromise, not even some 
kind of monstrous progeny, as with Kant and Bergson; Hegel 
remained the cypher for a philosophical “enterprise to ‘burden’ 
life” in all possible ways and “to inscribe death in life.” “Some-
body,” Deleuze explained, “has to play the role of traitor.”54
It is of course true that there are other important and perhaps 
more prominent aspects of Deleuze’s rejection of Hegel and He-
gelianism, including the critique of monism and the internal-
ity of relations in Empiricism and Subjectivity (itself adopted, by 
the way, from Wahl),55 the general critique of the dialectic of 
opposition, contradiction, and negation in the review of Hyp-
polite’s Logic and Existence,56 the polemic against a negative 
conception of desire in the (Kojèvian) dialectic of master and 
slave in Nietz sche and Philosophy,57 and the critique of infinite 
representation in Difference and Repetition.58 And yet it can be 
argued that it is the interpretation of Hegelianism as a philoso-
phy of the unhappy consciousness, although only found in a few 
scattered remarks, that necessitated the other critiques. From 
the perspective of Deleuze’s ethics of affects, Hegelianism pre-
sented a particular philosophical pathology, a triumph of sad 
passions in thought that entailed an entire “becoming-reactive 
54 Ibid. Regarding “monstrous” offspring, cf. Deleuze, Negotiations, 6.
55 Gilles Deleuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume’s Theory 
of Human Nature, trans. Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1991). It was in this regard that Deleuze would later praise 
Wahl as “the one who led the reaction against the dialectic when Hegel was 
in full vogue at the university” (Deleuze, quoted in Dosse, Gilles Deleuze 
and Félix Guattari, 110).
56 Deleuze, Desert Islands, 15–18; regarding this review and its contribution 
to the project of an “ontology of difference,” cf. Nathan Widder, “Thought 
after Dialectics: Deleuze’s Ontology of Sense,” The Southern Journal of 
Philosophy 41 (2003): 451–76.
57 Cf. Deleuze, Nietz sche and Philosophy, passim.
58 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 52–71; cf. also Henry Somers-Hall, 
Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation: Dialectics of Negation 
and Difference (Albany: SUNY Press, 2012).
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of the universe.”59 Sadness, according to Deleuze, formed the 
affective basis of Hegelianism and the dialectic, subtending its 
logic and development: “Everywhere,” he claimed, “there are sad 
passions; the unhappy consciousness is the subject of the whole 
dialectic.”60
Sad passions: From unhappy consciousness to bad conscience
In this context, one can understand why Deleuze asserted, in 
Nietz sche and Philosophy, that “[t]he discovery dear to the dia-
lectic is the unhappy consciousness, the deepening, the re-so-
lution and glorification of the unhappy consciousness and its 
resources,”61 even though Nietz sche himself never mentions the 
term. In perfect agreement with Wahl’s reading, Hegel is un-
derstood as interpreting existence “from the standpoint of the 
unhappy consciousness,” which, according to Deleuze, “is only 
the Hegelian version of the bad conscience.”62 Thanks to a ho-
monymy in French, Deleuze can carry out, almost by sleight of 
hand, a conceptual shift from a Hegelian conscience malheureuse 
to a Nietz schean mauvaise conscience. Though bold, this shift is 
very useful for gaining a better understanding of Deleuze’s cri-
tique of Hegelianism on the grounds of its “sad passions.”
“Bad conscience,” according to Deleuze, “is the conscience 
that multiplies its pain,” the conscience “which has found a 
technique for manufacturing pain by turning active force back 
against itself: the squalid workshop,” or the workshop, one 
might add, of the labor of the negative.63 It is an apparatus for 
the production of a particular form of subjectivity, the unhappy 
consciousness, which in turn implies a specific invention, the 
invention of a “new sense,” “an internal sense, an inward sense.”64 
This sense, as that of an abyss, an irreducible tension at the core 
59 Deleuze, Nietz sche and Philosophy, 196.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid., 159.
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of the subject, is ultimately a sense for pain, its “multiplication” 
and “internalization.”65 As Hegel wrote, the unhappy conscious-
ness (or in fact self-consciousness as such) is “only the pain or 
grief of Spirit that struggles, but without success, out towards 
objectivity.”66 And while Hegel, once again, conceived of this 
pain, this grief, this suffering, as no more than a passing stage 
in the (auto-)biography of spirit, after Wahl it remained the un-
surpassable internal tension or contradiction that formed the 
condition of all subjectivity.
For Deleuze, this form of subjectivity, constituted at the 
surface of a strange economy of sad passions in which “pain is 
healed by manufacturing yet more pain, by internalizing it still 
further,” remains invariably passive, even reactive, constantly 
slipping toward the inaction of ressentiment.67 The unhappy 
consciousness, part and parcel, then, of a genealogy of moral-
ity, seems utterly “powerless to create new ways of thinking and 
feeling” — with the exception, of course, of new forms of pain 
and ways of suffering.68 Wallowing in its despair, its suspension 
between the singular and the universal, it cannot but perpetu-
ally encounter itself as an other, and an other as itself; its basic 
structure is constituted by “bad encounters” with itself and/as 
an other, as something that “do[es] not agree with it and tend[s] 
to decompose it, to destroy it.”69 What results is the existential 
despair of an existence that is essentially painful.
At this point, Deleuze’s anti-Hegelian Nietz sche merges with 
his somewhat peculiar Spinoza,70 and it becomes clear that he 
studies the unhappy consciousness — and with it the (quite 
abstract) whole of Hegelianism — from an ethical perspective, 
65 Ibid., 132.
66 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, §673, trans. modified.
67 Deleuze, Nietz sche and Philosophy, 130. Deleuze refers to Friedrich Nietz-
sche, Genealogy of Morals, III.15.
68 Ibid., 159.
69 Gilles Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, trans. Robert Hurley (San 
Francisco: City Lights Books, 1988), 100.
70 Cf. ibid., 17, where Deleuze speaks of Spinoza’s “major resemblances with 
Nietz sche.”
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which boils down to a generalized ethology that is predomi-
nantly interested in “the compositions of relations or capaci-
ties between different things,”71 their collective “capacities for 
affecting and being affected,” in short: their power of acting.72 
Unhappiness, and this has been implicit throughout the present 
text, is here treated as synonymous with sadness, and sadness, 
according to Spinoza and Deleuze, is nothing other than “the 
diminution of the power of acting.”73 Within the dual frame-
work of a philosophical symptomatology and an ethics of af-
fects, then, Hegelianism appears as a clinical case. A movement 
ostensibly based on the irreducible unhappiness of an individu-
al consciousness, an existential ontology rooted in sad passions, 
is considered inherently incapacitating; “sad passions,” Deleuze 
declares, “always amount to impotence.”74
This impotence, moreover, a pathology that testifies to the 
subjection to a reign of sad passions, a reign of the negative, 
has political implications. “There is no unhappy consciousness 
which is not also man’s enslavement”75:
Everything that involves sadness serves tyranny and oppres-
sion. Everything that involves sadness must be denounced as 
bad, as something that separates us from our power of acting: 
not only remorse and guilt, not only meditation on death, 
but even hope, even security, which signify powerlessness.76
From Deleuze’s point of view, a philosophy, an ethics, a life 
based on the sad passions of the unhappy consciousness was 
tantamount to a form of death and had to be avoided and re-
71 Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, 126.
72 Ibid., 124.
73 Ibid., 50. Cf. also Gilles Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, 
trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 1990), 274.
74 Ibid., 28.
75 Deleuze, Nietz sche and Philosophy, 190.
76 Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, 72. Deleuze refers to Baruch Spino-
za, Ethics, IV.P67 and IV.P47; cf. also Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy, 
270.
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sisted. Hegelianism became the target of his polemic precisely 
because it was presented as a “monstrous enterprise to submit 
life to negativity, the enterprise of ressentiment and unhappy 
consciousness.”77 His own philosophical enterprise, on the other 
hand, was thus committed to learning how not to fall prey, as so 
many of his contemporaries did, to such a “philosophy of death,” 
as Kojève called it,78 a form of metaphysical melancholia due to 
which “[o]ur power is immobilized, and can no longer do any-
thing but react.”79
Joyful passions
Accordingly, Deleuze, as mentioned before, sought to propose 
a vital and affirmative conception of philosophy. Philosophers, 
like artists, had to be “civilization’s doctors,” according to Nietz-
sche,80 and hence it was their task to find, to invent a remedy 
for an unhappy philosophy based on sad passions inhibiting 
action. This remedy was of course a philosophy of joyful pas-
sions that catalyzed action. If sadness was “the diminution of the 
power of acting,” joy had to be, according to another Spinozist 
formulation, “the increase of the power of acting.” For Deleuze, 
therefore, “only joy is worthwhile, joy remains, bringing us near 
to action, and to the bliss of action.”81 It should be clarified, how-
ever, that this joy is the joy of association, always transversal, the 
joy of becoming as opposed to the sadness of being (which is 
ultimately the sadness of the impossibility of mere being). Within 
Deleuze’s Spinozist and Nietz schean “clinic,” a joyful existence 
hence presents an antidote to the apparent sickness and sadness 
of the dialectic and the unhappy consciousness. It is only by vir-
77 Deleuze, Desert Islands, 144, translation modified.
78 Alexandre Kojève, Introduction à la lecture de Hegel: Leçons sur la Phéno-
ménologie de l’Esprit professées de 1933 à 1939 à l’École des Hautes Études, 
ed. Raymond Queneau (Paris: Gallimard, 1947), 539. The shortened Eng-
lish translation does not contain this expression.
79 Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, 101.
80 Deleuze, Negotiations, 141.
81 Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, 28.
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tue of joyful passions that “our power expands, compounds with 
the power of the other, and unites with the loved object;”82 be-
cause of joyful passions we might eventually pass from passion 
to action, and only then can “we ourselves become causes of 
our own affects and masters of our adequate perceptions,” only 
then will “our body [gain] access to the power of acting, and 
our mind to the power of comprehending, which is its way of 
acting.”83 Joy, in this specific sense, is presented as a way out of 
the sadness of enslavement, out of the enslavement of sadness.
Deleuze’s critique of the unhappy consciousness and of He-
gelianism more generally is therefore, once again, not at all a 
purely theoretical endeavor. It is a particular and historically 
specific intervention regarding the way in which philosophy is 
practiced. Philosophy, according to Deleuze, should never be a 
mournful matter of contradiction and negation, lost in the cir-
cuits of representation. If the philosophy of French mid-century 
Hegelianism was, according to Foucault, “presented as the way 
to achieve a rational understanding of the tragic as it was ex-
perienced by the generation immediately preceding ours, and 
still threatening for our own,” the new philosophy sought af-
ter by Deleuze was to be a joyful concern, a “gay science,” to 
use Nietz sche’s term, a question of life, of affirmation and of 
difference.84 But this particular intervention on behalf of a dif-
ferent philosophy (a philosophy of difference) was also rooted 
in a particular conception of ethics. For Deleuze, thought and 
speculation were, despite their indisputable autonomy, insepa-
rable from the milieu that provided their conditions on the one 
hand and the habitat that they shaped on the other. Therefore, 
the great question regarding the operations of philosophy had 
to be posed in terms of ethics as ethology, and was, in this sense, 
82 Ibid., 101. Deleuze refers to Spinoza, Ethics, IV.P18.
83 Ibid., 104.
84 Cf. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, xxi: “The time is coming when it 
will hardly be possible to write a book of philosophy as it has been done 
for so long: ‘Ah! the old style…’ The search for new means of philosophical 
expression was begun by Nietz sche and must be pursued today in relation 
to the renewal of certain other arts, such as the theatre or the cinema.”
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also a pragmatic question.85 Even when it came to an allegedly 
theoretical practice like philosophy, Deleuze was at least im-
plicitly concerned with its non- and meta-philosophical impli-
cations, with what it enables to do and what it prevents from 
doing. Philosophy was thus conceived not as the guardian of a 
truth given in advance (for instance the truth of reconciliation 
or of its impossibility), but as a field of experimentation and of 
the production of new powers (Spinoza), values (Nietz sche), or 
forms of life (Foucault). “Concepts are inseparable from affects, 
i.e., from the powerful effects they exert on our life, and per-
cepts, i.e., the new ways of seeing or perceiving they provoke in 
us.”86 This phrase, though taken from a much later text, reaches 
to the very core of Deleuze’s philosophy of philosophy, and it 
is from this point of view that one can understand the critique 
of Hegelianism throughout his work. His philosophical argu-
ments against Hegel, whether directed against monism and 
internal relations, against negativity and contradiction, against 
the dialectic of master and slave, against infinite representation, 
or finally, as in this case, against the unhappy consciousness, 
formed part of a resistance against the implicit and explicit poli-
tics and ethics (or morality) of a particular Hegelian philosophy. 
For Deleuze, they were part of a search for a different form of 
life, a form of life that refuses to let itself be closed in, a form 
of life shaped through an affirmation of difference. Hence the 
“practical problem” that Deleuze identified when distinguish-
ing Spinoza’s Ethics from a morality: “How does one arrive at a 
maximum of joyful passions?, proceeding from there to free and 
active feelings (although our place in Nature seems to condemn 
85 On the relation between speculation and practice in Deleuze’s philosophy, 
cf. Sjoerd van Tuinen, “Deleuze: Speculative and Practical Philosophy,” in 
Genealogies of Speculation: Materialism and Subjectivity since Structural-
ism, eds. Armen Avanessian and Suhail Malik, 93–114 (London: Blooms-
bury, 2016).
86 Gilles Deleuze, Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975–1995, 
ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Ames Hodges and Michael Taormina (New 
York: MIT Press, 2006), 238.
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us to bad encounters and sadnesses).”87 The world may indeed 
be full of tensions, as Wahl asserted with the young Hegel, or full 
of forces, but those must be thought outside of the ultimately 
representational logic of sadness in order to be made creative. 
Like art and life, philosophy, for Deleuze, was a matter of experi-
mentation and creation, of the creation of concepts of course, 
but also of joyful passions.
87 Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, 28.
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To Have Done with Judgment of “Reason”: 
Deleuze’s Aesthetic Ontology
Samantha Bankston
Friedrich Nietz sche, in “‘Reason’ in Philosophy” from Twilight 
of the Idols, alerts us to the pitfalls of a metaphysical history that 
grounds itself on a fundamental error of temporality:
Change, mutation, becoming in general were formerly taken 
as proof of appearance, as a sign of the presence of something 
which led us astray. Today, on the contrary, we see ourselves 
as it were entangled in error, necessitated to error, to precisely 
the extent that our prejudice in favor of reason compels us to 
posit unity, identity, duration, substance, cause, materiality, 
being; however sure we may be, on the basis of a strict reck-
oning, that error is to be found here.1
These errors of Reason — unity, identity, mechanistic causality, 
and permanence — erect a tradition of judgment in the history 
of philosophy. The fundamental error of Reason is temporal in 
nature, where discontinuous states of Being supplant continuous 
processes of becoming. For Nietz sche, this amounts to a subor-
dination of sense to a moralistic framework that never shakes 
1 Friedrich Nietz sche, Twilight of the Idols, trans. Michael Tanner (London: 
Penguin Classics, 1990), 47. 
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off the onto-theological hangover of the Ancient Greeks, save 
Heraclitus.2 Reason in the history of philosophy is a mortifica-
tion of thought — concepts are lifeless artifacts of the past. If we 
eradicate Reason from philosophy, then what are we doing? As 
Gilles Deleuze exclaims, “We’re looking for ‘vitality.’”3 Deleuze 
takes seriously the errors of Reason, as outlined by Nietz sche, 
and rather than do away with metaphysics, he shatters the 
pillars of Reason with his critique of the dogmatic “image of 
thought.” Just as the Signifier dies along with God, judgment in 
philosophy dies along with Reason. In this essay, I will illumi-
nate the concept of becoming that Deleuze uses to reconfigure 
the history of metaphysics along the lines of Nietz sche’s critique 
of Reason. As the temporal logic of becoming in Deleuze splits 
into the becoming of pure events and the becoming of sensa-
tion, a philosophy of affects corrects the errors which arose 
from Reason. Ultimately, Deleuze creates a metaphysical system 
beyond good and evil, replacing the dogmatic errors of Reason 
with the aesthetic potential of the new.
Using the centrifugal force of the eternal return of difference, 
Deleuze’s philosophical collage of the likes of Spinoza, Hume, 
Leibniz, Borges, Proust, Bergson, Simondon, Duns Scotus, and 
others forms a universe of immanence that is at base a meta-
physical system in concert with Nietz sche’s thought. The posi-
tive formulation of Nietz sche’s critique of Reason is a pre-indi-
vidual world of affects where all identities are merely an effect of 
the unconditioned flux of force. In the beautiful aphorism that 
closes The Will to Power, Nietz sche depicts his anti-philosophi-
cal world at odds with the history of metaphysics. When he asks, 
2 “Philosophy in the only way I still allow it to stand, as the most general 
form of history, as an attempt somehow to describe Heraclitean becoming 
and to abbreviate it into signs (so to speak, to translate and mummify it 
into a kind of illusory being).” Friedrich Nietz sche, Writings from the Late 
Notebooks, ed. Rüdiger Bittner, trans. Kate Sturge (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 26. 
3 Gilles Deleuze, Desert Islands and Other Texts: 1953–1974, ed. David Lapou-
jade, trans. Michael Taormina (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2004), 142.
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“And do you know what ‘the world’ is to me?”4 we discover a 
play of forces in contradiction, both one and many, perpetually 
in-between, and eternally recurring without a goal but the act of 
recurrence itself.
Nietz sche begins the description of his Dionysian world with 
an “AND,” where the power of the false breaks with the logic of 
identity, the principle of sufficient reason, the law of excluded 
middle, and the law of non-contradiction. Furthermore, nega-
tion and nothingness play no role in Nietz sche’s world, for all 
forms, structures, institutions, and things are undone through 
the eternal return of difference and the unhinging of efficient, 
formal, material, and final causation. Pre-subjective forces form 
multiplicities that are always in-between, “anchoring” all indi-
viduation in chaotic flux, painting an aesthetic ontology of pure 
intensities beyond the reifying logic of Reason. After Nietz sche, 
it becomes unthinkable to do metaphysics in the same way. To 
invent a new and rigorous metaphysics requires the elaboration 
of a complex set of processes and (anti-)logic that systematizes 
all of the features of Nietz sche’s Dionysian world without resort-
ing to mechanisms of transcendence, and this is precisely what 
Deleuze accomplishes. The first step in developing a new image 
of thought is holding all processes to the light of becoming, to 
maintain the primacy of the unconditioned as the driving force 
of a new metaphysics.
When Deleuze attacks the four shackles of representational 
thought (analogy, opposition, resemblance, and identity), he si-
multaneously opens the way for an alternative image of thought. 
Each of the shackles can be traced to a fundamental temporal 
error: the attempt to conceive of change as a structural deriva-
tive of the immutable. Henri Bergson and Nietz sche converge 
on the criticism of mechanistic causality and its employment 
of “reason” to freeze pure flux in order to construct an image 
of becoming. Deleuze connects these criticisms and asks how 
4 Friedrich Nietz sche, The Will to Power, ed. Walter Kaufmann, trans. Walter 
Kaufmann and Reginald J. Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 1967), 
549–50.
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a counter-causal process appropriate to the concept of becom-
ing might be created. Of the list of errors in reason provided by 
Nietz sche: unity is replaced by multiplicity; identity is replaced 
by difference, while essences are replaced by assemblages or 
haecceities; duration (which means something akin to perma-
nence for Nietz sche) is replaced by instantaneity; substance is 
replaced by virtual relation; mechanistic causality is replaced by 
quasi-causality; materiality is replaced by intensity; and, throw-
ing all the features of this new anti-reason in motion: being is 
replaced by becoming.5
In accordance with Nietz sche’s critique of Reason, Deleuze 
enlists artists and philosophers who shake the very foundation 
of a philosophical history which is plagued by temporal distor-
tion. In “On Nietz sche and the Image of Thought” he states, 
“Hume, Bergson, and Proust interest me so much because in 
their work can be found profound elements for a new image 
of thought. There’s something extraordinary in the way they 
tell us: thinking means something else than what you believe.”6 
All of the thinkers invoked in Deleuze’s revolutionary image of 
thought radically rethink temporality. They agree that Under-
standing cannot produce an encounter with becoming — it is 
only through encounters in sensation that we are thrown into 
its chaotic flux. In Deleuze’s temporal collage, David Hume 
provides the system of relations arising from a new image of 
thought; this is the principle of exteriority, which encourages 
the conjunctive proliferation of pre-individual intensities below 
the logic of the Same seen in re-presentation. In this revised, 
pre-individual, nomadic image of thought Deleuze announces 
the pitfalls of representation and its reified structure of time, 
and categorical conditions are cast aside in favor of an explo-
ration of the unconditioned. The reading that Deleuze gives to 
Nietz sche’s philosophical project in the following passage can 
also be applied to Deleuze: “For Nietz sche, it is about getting 
something through in every past, present, and future code, 
5 Ibid. 
6 Deleuze, Desert Islands, 139.
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something which does not and will not let itself be recoded.”7 
That which repeats throughout past, present, and future, yet es-
capes all coding, is difference, the new, in short: becoming.
Nietz sche’s Dionysian world directly contends with Reason 
and the use of judgment in representational Being. In Differ-
ence and Repetition, the categorical application of judgment is 
decried through its two uses of distribution and hierarchization. 
Distribution partitions concepts through the use of common 
sense, hierarchization measures subjects through primary or 
good sense.8 Difference is neutralized through categorical dis-
tribution, and all categorical thought — that of Aristotle, Kant, 
and even Hegel — implies the philosophy of judgment. Subse-
quently, it is impossible to think of the unconditioned, or the 
uncoded, when employing judgment, since judgment retains 
identity in the concept by using analogy to relate to being.9 The 
error in judgment emerges from the immobilizing mechanisms 
of chronological, homogeneous time, which reifies becoming in 
an attempt to categorize it. Consequently, an aesthetic ontology 
is needed to counter the categorical logic of judgment, and this 
is accomplished through the construction of a concept of be-
coming that deploys the generative “both/and” in its process of 
individuation. 
Deleuze’s concept of becoming is pivotal to his metaphysics, 
yet it is often misunderstood or invoked in a vague sense that 
conflates its divergent processes. Mapping “becoming” across 
Deleuze’s works involves wading through terminological vari-
ance (e.g., becoming, difference, becomings, Aion, becoming-
mad, becoming-woman, eternal return of difference, becoming-
imperceptible, blocs of becoming), tracking the regional logics 
that form the ontological neighborhoods in his texts, and track-
ing the points of convergence between being and time. With 
respect to the latter, Deleuze’s thought pushes ontology to the 
7 Ibid., 253.
8 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994), 33.
9 Ibid.
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limit, even farther than Martin Heidegger, causing the distinc-
tion between ontology and temporality to collapse. This collapse 
is admitted outright by Deleuze in an interview with Jean-Noël 
Vuarnet: “Yes, I finished the book — on repetition and differ-
ence (they’re the same thing) as the actual categories of our 
thought.”10 In an ontology premised by absolute becoming, that 
which was an “is” necessarily becomes an “and,” becomes tem-
porality itself.
In other work11 I have delineated Deleuze’s revolutionary no-
tion of becoming as it deploys two divergent modes of becom-
ing, which he hints at in What Is Philosophy?: sensory becoming 
and absolute becoming, the latter Deleuze and Félix Guattari 
term “conceptual becoming.”12 Sensory becoming falls under an 
umbrella of terms throughout his canon: at the beginning of his 
career his use of sensory becoming is often referred to simply as 
“becoming,” and later it is known as “becomings,” “a becoming,” 
“becoming-mad,” “sensory-bloc,” and so on. Having mapped 
the processes of becoming across Deleuze’s works, the double 
nature of becoming is made clear. Not only is every instant dis-
tributed into the opposing streams of the past and the future, 
there are two distinct modes of becoming at work in Deleuze’s 
ontology. 
Sensory becoming functions through what he calls “a molec-
ular memory, but as a factor of integration into a majoritarian or 
molar system.”13 This mode of becoming pertains to sensation, 
and is an appropriation of late Bergsonian duration (duration 
without consciousness), yet endowed with the telescoping pow-
er of sensation witnessed in Proustian reminiscence. Deleuze 
10 Deleuze, Desert Islands, 142, emphasis in original.
11 Samantha Bankston, Deleuze and Becoming(s) (London: Bloomsbury 
Publications, 2015).
12 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tom-
linson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 
177.
13 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Min-
nesota Press, 1987), 294.
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follows Bergson in distinguishing duration from becoming. In 
Bergsonism, Deleuze notes that duration is a mode of becom-
ing when he states that duration is “a becoming that endures, a 
change that is substance itself.”14 By combining an enduring be-
coming and substance, Deleuze redefines the materiality of the 
present according to the Bergsonian model of internal change, 
and consequently, he redefines substance as a relationship in the 
process of becoming; substance is replaced by intensive process 
in materiality. Thus through Bergsonian duration, or what later 
is termed sensory becoming, Deleuze replaces the notion of sub-
stance with the self-differing relation. Not only is becoming the 
vehicle that produces what we perceive as substance in the lived 
present, but Deleuze also leaves us a clue pertaining to the mul-
tiplicity of the concept of becoming by writing “a becoming.”15 
This mode of becoming subverts the chronological present by 
retaining a molecular memory that disorients all organization, 
and forms blocs of coexistence within sensation. Sensory be-
coming is a virtual multiplicity that expresses the logic of as-
semblages. In other words, it is the subversive temporality of the 
depth of bodies. For Deleuze, duration signifies the ontological 
memory of the pure past. In the chapter entitled “1730: Becom-
ing-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible” in A 
Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari prankishly interpose 
“memory” and “becoming,” and then they reveal that “[w]her-
ever we used the word ‘memories’ in the preceding pages, we 
were wrong to do so; we meant to say ‘becoming,’ we were saying 
becoming.”16 This intentional erasure distinguishes molar from 
molecular memory. Sensory becoming is not anti-memory, only 
anti-molar-memory. Becomings endure, cohering through on-
tological memory, which is at the level of the molecular. The 
individuating process of ontological memory — the memory 
of becomings — is expressed by Deleuze in terms of Proustian 
14 Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habber-
jam (New York: Zone Books, 1991), 37.
15 Emphasis is mine.
16 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 294.
48
deleuze and the passions
reminiscence and is a supplemental entrance into Bergson’s and 
Marcel Proust’s notion of the pure past. Deleuze writes, “to re-
member is to create, is to reach that point where the associative 
chain breaks, leaps over the constituted individual, is transferred 
to the birth of an individuating world.”17 The process of creation 
that arises from ontological memory is the code breaking logic 
(or “antilogos”) of sensory becoming whose molecular dura-
tions ignite individuation beneath the representation of entities, 
subjects, and objects. This is not the memory of a molar subject, 
one constructed by an act of re-presentation. Opposed to what 
he calls “molar subjects,” the differenciated becoming in sensa-
tion is a pre-subjective molecular collectivity and is consistent 
with Deleuze’s re-appropriation of the multiplicity of duration.18 
When Deleuze speaks in terms of a becoming, or becomings, he 
is speaking of a concept of becoming that unfolds serially along 
the points of molecular duration. As opposed to sensory becom-
ing, absolute becoming is the immaterial mode of becoming, 
the eternal return of difference. As was the case with sensory 
becoming, absolute becoming is subject to terminological vari-
ance across Deleuze’s works. The most common formulations of 
the concept appear as either “the eternal return,” “the pure and 
empty form of time,” or “Aion.” The temporal logic of absolute 
becoming differs in kind from sensory becoming precisely on 
the axis of memory. 
When developing the notion of the eternal return, Deleuze 
explains that it is the being of becoming. He, of course, does 
not mean Being, as understood in Nietz sche’s errors of Reason, 
17 Gilles Deleuze, Proust and Signs, trans. Richard Howard (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 111.
18 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 275. Sensory becoming 
involves a molecular composition that defies the effectuated causality of 
representation. Molecular becoming is connected to the “pathology of 
duration,” whereby the relationship established between two things en-
courages the exchange of their intensive features, or their molecules. “Yes, 
all becomings are molecular: the animal, flower, or stone one becomes are 
molecular collectivities, haecceities, not molar subjects, objects, or form 
that we know from the outside and recognize from experience, through 
science, or by habit.”
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but something else entirely. For Deleuze and Nietz sche, Being is 
overturned by becoming, and the eternal return is the uncoded 
virtual relation that is in-between being. Throughout Deleuze’s 
works, but particularly in Nietz sche and Philosophy, it is clear 
that what returns is the act of returning itself. The eternal return 
as the pure and empty form of time is the being of becoming, 
fusing temporality and ontology. Deleuze himself remarks, “As 
we have seen, the condition of the action by default does not 
return; the condition of the agent by metamorphosis does not 
return; all that returns, the eternal return, is the unconditioned 
in the product.”19 The unconditioned in the product is not itself 
a product; instead of being static, it is the differential relation 
and pure process. Furthermore, it is the selectivity of the eternal 
return that keeps the first two syntheses, present and past, from 
returning. Building upon his elaboration of the eternal return in 
Difference and Repetition, Deleuze describes absolute becoming 
in Desert Islands as follows: 
It is the law of a world without being, without unity, without 
identity. Far from presupposing the One or the Same, the eter-
nal return constitutes the only unity of the multiple as such, 
the only identity of what differs: coming back is the only “be-
ing” of becomings.20
Thus, absolute becoming fractures identity, substance, perma-
nence, and materiality along Nietz sche’s Dionysian lines. Noth-
ing that existed in actual form returns in the third synthesis of 
time: the future — neither partially nor wholly. All associative 
chains of memory break, enacting a repetition of ontological 
forgetting.
Deleuze accentuates the necessity of active forgetting in the 
dissolution of identities through absolute becoming. He takes 
note of Pierre Klossowski’s interpretation of the eternal return, 
19 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 297.
20 Deleuze, Desert Islands, 124.
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which moves from the act of willing to becoming-other.21 The 
chain of duration (molecular memory) is broken through the 
movement of the eternal return, which is the dissimulation of 
absolute becoming. Deleuze implicates the forgetfulness of ab-
solute becoming when he states that the eternal return consti-
tutes the only unity of the world in its repetition and is “the only 
identity of a world which has no ‘same’ at all except through 
repetition.”22 He agrees with Klossowski’s (and Michel Fou-
cault’s) assessment that the death of God necessarily implies 
the death of the self, which is revealed through the active for-
getfulness of becoming. The dissolution of identities ignites the 
break of durational becoming through active forgetfulness at 
the ontological level. Ontological forgetfulness is not restricted 
to consciousness, or to the selectivity of thought, but is an inte-
gral aspect of becoming. Klossowski claims that “[f]orgetting 
thus raises eternal becoming and the absorption of all identity 
to the level of being.”23 The forgetfulness of becoming is a neces-
sary condition for the enactment of the eternal return, as well as 
its dissolution of forms and identities. Deleuze appropriates the 
representational forgetfulness on the surface level of forgetting 
in Klossowski and injects it into the pre-individual movement 
of absolute becoming. The ontological forgetfulness of absolute 
becoming mimics Nietz sche’s call toward active forgetting in the 
affirmative creation of the future.
21 The following passage on Klossowski demonstrates the confluence of the 
will to power and the eternal return as effectively undoing the opposition 
between the one and the many. The connection to willing and becoming-
other reappears in Deleuze’s ontology as the relationship between the 
manifest levels of the eternal return in willing and the latent levels of the 
return in pre-subjective chaos. “It is in this sense that Mr. Klossowski 
wanted to show us a world of intense fluctuations in the Will to power, 
where identities are lost, and where each one cannot want itself without 
wanting all the other possibilities, without becoming innumerable ‘others,’ 
without apprehending itself as a fortuitous moment, whose very chance 
implies the necessity of the whole series” (ibid., 122).
22 Ibid., 123.
23 Pierre Klossowski, “Nietz sche’s Experience of the Eternal Return,” in The 




In addition to its primordial features of active forgetting and 
selectivity of being, Deleuze formulates absolute becoming (or 
the eternal return) in terms of intensive quantity. Rejecting in-
terpretations of Nietz sche that ascribe purely qualitative read-
ings to force, Deleuze posits a notion of intensive quantity as 
early as Nietz sche and Philosophy. Rather than forfeit quantity 
to chronometric homogeneous measure, he argues for the ex-
istence of intensive quantity in Nietz sche’s thought. Thus ab-
solute becoming is understood to be the differential relation 
of intensive quantities. A theory of intensive quantity installs a 
precise mathematical model into the notion of force in Nietz-
sche’s philosophy. Whenever Nietz sche criticizes the tendency 
of science to reduce qualitative difference to extensive quantities 
of equal measure, he is calling for an understanding of force as 
quantitative difference. Qualitative difference always includes a 
quantitative difference, and this notion of intensive quantitative 
difference is central to Deleuze’s theory of absolute becoming: 
“Difference in quantity is the essence of force and of the relation 
of force to force.”24 Conceiving of difference through processes of 
intensive quantity opens up a theory of becoming that is prem-
ised on relations and not fixed terms. This is the point at which 
Deleuze enlists Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz into his elaboration 
of absolute becoming. He restructures the Leibnizian calculus 
through processes of immanence and thus provides a founda-
tion for a quantitative theory of absolute becoming, using a re-
vised theory of Nietz schean force. Because Deleuze articulates 
this force as intensive quantity, he is able to plug intensities 
into differential equations, restructuring the concept of becom-
ing — both sensory and absolute — through the infinitesimal 
calculus. In Deleuze’s Leibniz, transcendence and harmony are 
replaced with immanence and chaos, thus deploying the power 
of the false, whereby Deleuze provides a Nietz schean reading 
of Leibniz via Jorge Luis Borges. Where incompossibilities are 
able to exist in the same world, virtually, the eternal return of 
24 Gilles Deleuze, Nietz sche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 43.
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absolute becoming produces a garden of forking paths. Borges’ 
“The Garden of Forking Paths,” where the protagonist is able to 
activate infinite unselected potential futures that exist in the vir-
tual realm simultaneously, serves as a model of incompossible 
lines of becoming, or divergent syntheses of time.25 Absolute be-
coming is the process of bifurcation that splits the past and the 
future, causing time to fork virtually, simultaneously subverting 
the chronological present in a mad process of material becom-
ing in sensation.
In terms of Deleuze’s appropriation of Leibniz’s infinitesimal 
calculus, absolute becoming refers to the differential relation, 
while sensory becoming refers to the integration. As Simon 
Duffy explains, integration is not only the summation of dif-
ferentials, but also the inverse of the differential relation.26 In 
a stroke of brilliance, Deleuze formulates both modes of be-
coming as inversions of one another with respect to Leibniz’s 
differential calculus. Absolute becoming as the model of the 
differential relation has zero duration and is the paradoxical 
sidestepping of the present in its nomadic distribution of sin-
gularities throughout the virtual. Meanwhile, sensory becoming 
is the model of integration, the summation of differentials of 
molecular memory in sensation. The question then arises as to 
how these two ontological mirrors interact, what are the vir-
tual processes that connect them? Clearly, any form of causality 
elaborated in the history of metaphysics will be inadequate to a 
purely immanent ontology. Instead of dismissing causality as an 
illusory production in representational thought that expels dif-
ference, Deleuze seeks to reconstruct causality according to the 
heterogeneous features of becoming.27 He elaborates his theory 
25 Jorge Luis Borges, “The Garden of Forking Paths,” in Labyrinths, trans. 
Donald A. Yates (New York: New Directions Publishing, 2007), 19–29.
26 Simon Duffy, “The Logic of Expression in Deleuze’s Expressionism and 
Philosophy: Spinoza: A Strategy of Engagement,” International Journal of 
Philosophical Studies 12, no. 1 (March 2004): 47–60.
27 Friedrich Nietz sche, The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an 
Appendix of Songs, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 
1974), 172. In this sense, Deleuze’s innovative counter-effectuating causality 
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of quasi-causality in The Logic of Sense, and the notion hardly 
appears elsewhere. The quasi-cause is the untimely operator be-
tween absolute becoming of the eternal return and sensory be-
coming of molecular memory. Quasi-causality differs from oth-
er forms of causality in its distributive power of difference and 
its ability to create an ultimate divide between the cause and the 
effect. It does not function along the lines of material, formal, 
efficient, or final causes. Furthermore, as pointed out by Daniel 
W. Smith, quasi-causality differs from the medieval categories 
of emanative and transitive causalities.28 Deleuze borrows the 
notion of immanent causation from Spinoza, but maintains a 
Nietz schean critique of substance in the process. Smith explains 
this appropriation when he says, 
In Spinoza’s immanent causality, not only does the cause re-
main in itself, but its effect remains “immanate” within it, 
rather than emanating from it. The effect (mode) remains in 
its cause no less than the cause remains in itself (substance).29 
However, as Smith points out, Deleuze eliminates Spinoza’s sub-
stance, making ontology purely modal. A modal, or differential, 
world forces Deleuze to re-conceptualize the content of imma-
nent causation. Since there is no God, no transcendental signi-
fier, difference is immanent to the cause itself, which results in 
can be seen as a tribute to Nietz sche. Deleuze reconstructs causality to 
correct the criticisms launched by Nietz sche. The imagistic construction 
of causality, and its elimination of difference and becoming, is absorbed 
into an anti-causal causality in Deleuze. Nietz sche ruthlessly critiqued the 
retroactive projection of cause and effect into the flux of nature. We see 
this salient criticism often in his works, particularly in The Gay Science. 
“We have uncovered a manifold one-after-another where the naïve man 
and inquirer of older cultures only saw two separate things ‘Cause’ and ‘ef-
fect’ is what one says; but we have merely perfected the image of becoming 
without reaching beyond the image or behind it.” 
28 Daniel W. Smith, “The Doctrine of Univocity: Deleuze’s ontology of 
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a distributive destruction of the logic of identity. Deleuze paints 
a universe that repeats the unconditioned of the cause in the 
effect when he eliminates all transcendence in immanent causa-
tion. As he explains, “The autonomy of the effect is thus defined 
initially by its difference in nature from the cause; in the second 
place, it is defined by its relation to the quasi-cause.”30 The effect 
is synonymous with the event and is bestowed full autonomy 
by the operation of the counter-causal process. There are no 
longer real causes in the virtual, only effects. As the effect dif-
fers in kind from corporeal bodies in mixture, it is independent 
of the cause in the classical sense and is impenetrable, impas-
sive, neutral, and devoid of qualitative distinction. Despite the 
impassibility of events (also called singularities, extraordinary 
points of inflection), they perpetually resonate with other events 
through the series of effects produced in the nexus of becom-
ing. The paradoxical series, or lines, proliferated through the 
absolute becoming of Aion, fragment the separation between 
past and future, where the quasi-cause nomadically distributes 
singularities in no fewer than two temporal series. 
In an attempt at speculation, Deleuze presents the inner me-
chanics of a virtual, immanent plane as the resonance of diverg-
ing and converging series produced through the proliferating 
force of becoming. The quasi-cause illuminates a system con-
nected through difference. Events do not have external causes, 
and they communicate not through admixture but through 
the differential distribution of nomadic singularities. Deleuze’s 
complex concept of quasi-causality retains the Dionysian world 
of sensation and rejects the immobilizing categories of Being. 
All relations occur externally through the operation of the qua-
si-cause, rather than internally, which would lead to the static 
mechanism inherent to the logic of identity.
As such, the quasi-cause extracts singularities from the pass-
ing present and distributes them in a double movement that 
30 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, ed. Constantin V. Boundas, trans. Mark 




constructs events. Since absolute becoming functions accord-
ing to the logic of the paradoxical instant — the self-eluding 
moment that is never present — it is simultaneously more con-
tracted than the smallest unit of actual time and more elongated 
than the entire circle of actuality. The present instantaneously 
gives rise to the event, and the truth of the event doubles — as 
a phantasm of the broken present (the past), and as the con-
stellation of singularities that may be actualized in the present 
(the future). That is not to say that the event, once actualized, 
resembles its virtual counterpart, but rather that its movement 
is automatically doubled in the extracting moment of the qua-
si-cause. Deleuze remarks on the distancing mechanism of the 
quasi-cause when he writes, 
But the event nonetheless retains an eternal truth upon the 
line of the Aion, which divides it eternally into a proximate 
past and an imminent future. The Aion endlessly subdivides 
the event and pushes away past as well as future, without ever 
rendering them less urgent.31
It is important to recall that the pure event never happens but is 
a confluence of forces, or jets of singularities that are perpetu-
ally displaced by the instantaneous machine of becoming. The 
garden of forking paths in Borges serves as a model for the line 
of Aion. Eternally proliferating incompossible series continue 
to fork as the empty form of time: the future. Depending upon 
the neighborhoods of proximity, one may initiate a line of flight 
that activates, say, a Karl Marx effect, which is actualized in a 
way that was never actually lived by Marx himself. The indi-
viduation of singularities along the line of Aion informs actual 
effects, which in turn reorients their virtual counterparts. The 
genesis of virtual events is static, as it divests all singularities of 
memory trace, while the virtual relations in sensation are char-
acterized by a spatiotemporal dynamism of molecular duration. 
Meanwhile, both modes of becoming contingently destabilize 
31 Ibid., 63.
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individuated forms in the actual. And although Deleuze and 
Guattari focus more on the depth of bodies, or sensory becom-
ing, in A Thousand Plateaus, it is essential to understand the 
integral relationship between the becoming of events, or what 
they will later discuss as “conceptual becoming,” and the becom-
ing of sense. Too often, these two divergent processes of becom-
ing are conflated in the secondary literature, which results in an 
“otherworldly” misreading of Deleuze. This very conflation is 
the central error in both Slavoj Žižek’s and Alain Badiou’s mis-
characterization of Deleuze as a philosopher of the One. The 
absence of negation and lack does not result in monism. The 
processes of becoming diverge, whether they involve sensation 
or concepts, and although absolute flux applies to both, this 
plays out in vastly different ways. Think of the ritornello, a con-
cept invented by Deleuze and Guattari, which is the eternal re-
turn oriented toward sensation, where baroque whirls and folds 
repeat as a matter of expression. Therefore, in sensation, the 
Nietz schean world of intensities unfettered by causal relations 
is maintained. Nietz sche’s disavowal of “causality” is also meta-
physically maintained in absolute becoming, the appropriation 
of Nietz sche’s eternal return for the sake of difference. The two 
opposing temporal features of memory and forgetting are differ-
ent tendencies of the same concept of becoming, since becom-
ing is a multiplicity that corresponds to the plane upon which it 
is operating. In the realm of materiality we have the subversive 
sensory becoming of ontological memory; in the realm of ideas 
we have absolute becoming of ontological forgetting, yet the two 
are inexorably co-generative. 
Deleuze makes forgetfulness ontological by posing it against 
the category of negation in representational thought. The eter-
nal return escapes the trappings of negation through the force 
of active forgetting. Nietz sche, and therefore also Deleuze, 
posit forgetfulness against the memory complexes of duration 
to sidestep the act of negation, which relies upon the identity 
of essence in its operation. Without memory, there is noth-
ing, or no “thing,” to negate. We are left with intensities, and 
ultimately, singularities that have lost all chains of association, 
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even at the molecular level. To reconnect to Leibniz’s calculus, 
this is the differential equation, where dy/dx forces the terms to 
infinitely approach 0, always-already vanishing, while the rela-
tion itself remains determinable. The differential mechanism is 
the quasi-cause, and the molar memory of actual forms is ex-
pelled through the infinite splitting of the past and future in the 
self-differing eluded present. Absolute becoming, the function 
of counter-causality, creates a gap between the future and the 
past. It makes a ghost of duration and divides the past from the 
future in perpetuum, forcing all three syntheses of time to be-
come according to the logical planes of their operation, whether 
in sensation or ideational events. An ordinate of the circle, the 
moment unwinds the circle of the past as a synthesis of the fu-
ture. This is the portrait of Deleuze’s eternal return that is most 
prevalent in the secondary literature: the broken circle of time 
stretched out in a straight line. The third synthesis of time, or 
the future, finds its most exhaustive exposition in Difference and 
Repetition. The future is emptied of content, including all dura-
tion; it is the repetition of the unconditioned. By usurping the 
ground of the pure past, the third synthesis of time expresses 
the death of God and man, and appropriately, the destruction 
of all identity. The result is a metaphysical system, Nietz schean 
to the core, whereby aesthetic ontology replaces the judgment 
of Reason. Through the use of quasi-causality, the two inverted 
modes of becoming — sensory becoming and absolute becom-
ing — constitute a world of pre-individual singularities, without 
negation, binary structures, or any of the trappings of Being. 
Unity, identity, duration (permanence), substance, cause, and 
materiality are unhinged from Reason in philosophy. In the end, 
Deleuze invents a logic of becoming that produces an aesthetic 




Closed Vessels and Signs: 
Jealousy as a Passion for Reality
Arjen Kleinherenbrink
Gilles Deleuze’s Proust and Signs is a philosophical investigation 
of Marcel Proust’s In Search of Lost Time revolving around the 
concept of jealousy. According to Deleuze, Proust expands the 
experience of jealousy into a veritable “logic of jealousy” which 
discloses that reality is “a schizoid universe of closed vessels.”1 
Deleuze explicates this logic by tracing how the Proustian lov-
er’s jealousy fuels an apprenticeship in which a beloved is suc-
cessively experienced in terms of four signs: “material signs” 
of worldliness, love, and sensuous qualities, and “immaterial 
signs” of art. At each stage, the lover learns not just something 
about the beloved, but also about things in general. The signs, 
however, do not refer to four kinds of entities or experiences. 
There is only a formal distinction between them, and together 
they constitute a theory of the experience and essence of any 
entity whatsoever, be it a love, a memory, a person, a madeleine, 
or cobblestones.
Reconstructing Deleuze’s analysis is interesting for two rea-
sons. First, probing a seemingly banal feeling for philosophi-
cal riches far surpassing its specificity as a contingent passion 
1 Gilles Deleuze, Proust and Signs, trans. Richard Howard (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 140, 175. 
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strongly resonates with the analyses of anxiety, boredom, and 
nausea in the respective philosophies of Søren Kierkegaard, 
Martin Heidegger, and Jean-Paul Sartre. Jealousy, however, is 
not among the usual states investigated by such existentialists 
and phenomenologists, making it a relatively fresh ground to 
cover. Second, the “schizoid” universe to which jealousy leads us 
will be one of individual entities! This is, at the very least, quite 
surprising from a thinker so often considered to propagate the 
abolition of individual things in favor of more primordial inten-
sities and fluxes of desire. 
Material signs
But we must start at the beginning. The lover initially experi-
ences “worldly signs.”2 These are our everyday experiences of 
things in terms of colors, sounds, sizes, positions, and so on. 
They are the qualities we usually treat as being the objects to 
which they belong: “the worldly sign does not refer to some-
thing, it ‘stands for’ it, claims to be equivalent to its meaning.”3 
After all, we say that madeleines are sweet, cobblestones are 
heavy, and the beloved is a lover’s beloved. These signs char-
acterize the world of habitual recognition, and a non-jealous 
lover is precisely one who trusts that the beloved is only what 
she shows him, assuming an identity between her being and his 
experience of her affections. He believes to truly be part of her 
world as well, being present to her just as he is. This natural atti-
tude toward things is what Deleuze calls “objectivism”: “To refer 
a sign to the object that emits it, to attribute to the object the 
benefit of the sign, is first of all the natural direction of percep-
tion or of representation.”4 Objectivism, however, is illusory. It 
makes us believe qualities are out there in the object, rather than 
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secrets of the signs it emits.”5 Objectivism is false because the 
same object can sustain contrary qualities. It can be experienced 
as bright, dull, and ugly now, but as dark, exciting, and beautiful 
later while nevertheless remaining this entity. A friend we have 
not seen in years may have changed completely, but it remains 
her. As Deleuze reminds us, the frivolous nature of qualities al-
ready moved Plato to dismiss them as merely superficial.6 The 
same object can even sustain contrary qualities simultaneously, 
as being bigger than something is always also being smaller than 
something else, and being to the left of this is always also being 
to the right of that.
For Deleuze objectivism is our natural way of looking at 
things, deeply ingrained in memories, practical activities, per-
ceptions, passions, and thoughts.7 Hence interrupting our ob-
jectivist habits requires a violent shock to thought, which is 
what jealousy provides. It makes a lover think that an entity (the 
beloved) is not the qualities in terms of which he experiences it 
(her). No matter what he experiences her saying or doing, none 
of it can be trusted, all of it could be lies and deceptions! Poi-
sonous suspicions rear their heads: if she is not how I experi-
ence her, then neither am I how she experiences me. So how 
can I be part of her world? And if she does not coincide with 
the affections she gives me, then others may share her affections 
as well! Since everything is usually known by its worldly signs, 
their sudden unreliability makes the jealous lover suspect that 
he does not really know anything! As Proust writes: “his merci-
less jealousy places him […] in the position of a man who does 
not yet know.”8
Jealousy then makes the lover encounter “signs of love.”9 
These are the same signs as before, but apprehended differently. 
5 Ibid., 32.
6 Ibid., 101.
7 Ibid., 27, 29.
8 Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time, Volume I: Swann’s Way, trans. 
Charles Kenneth Scott Moncrieff and Terence Kilmartin (New York: The 
Modern Library, 1992), 502–3.
9 Deleuze, Proust and Signs, 7.
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Qualitative experience is no longer assumed to coincide with 
its object, but taken as a sign of something hidden within it: 
“[T]o love is to try to explicate, to develop these unknown worlds 
that remain enveloped within the beloved.”10 The lover discovers 
that things are always in excess over and above the qualities they 
display: “Names, persons, and things are crammed with a con-
tent that fills them to bursting.”11 He realizes he does not love the 
beloved’s superficial qualities, but rather the multiplicity which 
they translate or transmute: “[L]ove does not concern only […] 
loved beings, but the multiplicity of souls or worlds in each of 
them.”12 Readers familiar with Deleuze will immediately recog-
nize this theme. All his works affirm that “relations are external 
to terms,” meaning that the being of an entity (the term) is never 
directly present in how it is experienced (the relation).13 In Dif-
ference and Repetition, the virtual Idea of a problematic being 
cannot be reduced to its actualization in qualified extension. In 
The Logic of Sense, a body’s singularities engender experienced 
sense-events from which they differ in kind. The body without 
organs of Anti-Oedipus has its desire which animates how it op-
erates as a desiring-machine, but machines experience one an-
other in terms of partial objects and qualified flows according to 
their capacities, never in terms of desire as such. Despite chang-
es in terminology, Deleuze’s recurring thesis is that an entity is 
neither what it is made of, nor how it is experienced, nor what 
it does, did, or will do. It is what it can do, so that it is always 
fundamentally in excess over all its actualizations.
The lover’s suspicions are thus confirmed: she is not his. How 
he experiences her is a real expression of her being, but never 
this being itself. According to Deleuze, this is the bitter truth of 
jealousy. The jealous lover keeps longing for full possession of 
the beloved and for a world in which her affections are purely 




13 Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and 
Barbara Habberjam (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 55.
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this cannot be the case. The beloved always has an excessive 
world of her own, and at any moment she remains fully capable 
of dedicating herself to others. Moreover, as the same excessive 
being applies to all beings, this works both ways: he is excluded 
from her as she is excluded from him: “the truth of love is first 
of all the isolation of the sexes.”14 Everything has its own world 
and one can only experience according to what one can do given 
one’s varying desire, singularities, or puissance. All possible ex-
perience can only contain translations or caricatures of other 
entities, never their raw desire, singularities, or excess itself. 
Therefore whoever interprets love’s signs is an interpreter of lies 
and deceptions, though these terms have no moral connotation 
here. The point is merely that thinking we can be fully present 
to the beloved has turned out to be illusory. If love “makes it a 
principle to renounce all communication” it is because the be-
loved, by definition, never truly appears to us as such.15
The lover, however, does not abide. Jealousy has taken hold 
of him, with all its relentless suspicions, its betrayals perceived 
everywhere, and its compulsion to possess and exhaust, to “im-
prison the beloved, immure her, sequester her in order to ‘expli-
cate’ her, that is, to empty her of all the worlds she contains.”16 
Despite realizing that what he loves in her is her excessive being, 
the jealous lover can neither tolerate that the beloved cannot be 
reduced to his relation to her, nor accept that her world may not 
revolve around him. As Deleuze puts it: “nothing is ever paci-
fied by a philia.”17 What will be the jealous lover’s next move? He 
will stubbornly dissect his experience of the beloved in order 
to isolate those features which characterize her most intimately. 
Deleuze suggests this is what any subject will attempt after con-
cluding that fleeting qualities cannot be the essence of any ob-
ject. We can accept that “heavy” and “sweet” are not the essence 
of cobblestones or madeleines, but our usual response is to look 
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for other knowable qualities which would capture the essence 
anyway. We act as if worldly signs can be separated into two 
groups, the first consisting of lies and deceptions, the second 
consisting of truthful signs which communicate the essence of 
an object to a subject. A Lockean hunt for primary qualities thus 
ensues. As it is subjects who will have to study their object in 
order to decide which qualities belong to which group, Deleuze 
calls this “subjective compensation”:
[W]e are disappointed when the object does not give us 
the secret we were expecting. […] How is this disappoint-
ment, in each realm, to be remedied? On each line of the 
apprenticeship, the hero undergoes an analogous experience, 
at various moments: for the disappointment of the object, he 
attempts to find a subjective compensation. […] What is to 
be done except to compensate for the disappointment? To 
become personally sensitive to less profound signs that are 
yet more appropriate […].18
Subjective compensation is a tremendous increase in effort, a 
heroic attempt to know and control the beloved’s most profound 
qualities, to get closer and become more intimate than any pos-
sible rival, to strip away all her accidental features in order to 
unveil what distinguishes her from everything else. As Deleuze 
keeps repeating throughout Proust and Signs, it is the attempt 
to encircle and isolate the beloved’s typical talents and traits, so 
that the jealous lover can say that only he truly knows and de-
serves her. One could say the lover becomes a passionate Hus-
serlian, trying to isolate and apprehend the eidos or most inti-
mate self-being of an individual.19
As an example of subjective compensation, Deleuze reminds 
his readers of a scene in Proust involving an actress, Berma, who 
18 Ibid., 34–35, 36.
19 Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phe-
nomenological Philosophy I, trans. Fred Kersten (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1982), 
7.
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through the act of subjective compensation is found to have a 
strikingly intelligent vocal style. In isolating such a quality, one 
may think to have found something that truly characterizes her. 
At last, something “deep” presents itself in experience, some-
thing that cannot possibly be a merely superficial and fleeting 
quality! A jealous lover will try to uncover a set of such quali-
ties, both to prove to himself that he knows the beloved better 
than anyone else, and to gain data for his plans to isolate her for 
himself. At first sight, then, it seems he can solve his problem by 
becoming a master interpreter of signs of love. Whenever “deep” 
qualities are found, however, it turns out that “the moment of 
compensation remains in itself inadequate and does not provide 
a definitive revelation.”20 Despite the lover’s efforts, subjective 
compensation again results in objective disappointment, in a 
failure to grasp the essence! What has happened? The jealous 
lover has discovered that something stands between him and 
the beloved, that there is always something interfering in the 
relation between a subject and an object. He discovers a third 
group of signs which will teach him that encircling and isolat-
ing the beloved’s essence is impossible in principle: “nothing can 
prevent the disappointment.”21
The third group of signs are what Deleuze calls “sensuous 
impressions or qualities.”22 Again these are the same signs as be-
fore, but again they are apprehended differently. Think of what 
the jealous lover is doing. He is trying to identify the beloved’s 
most intimate traits, those which deeply resonate with her and 
that truly make her flourish when “activated.” He is constantly 
imagining or trying to realize situations in which she will truly 
“shine forth,” hoping that if he offers her these situations, she 
will elect to reside in them, together with him and in all sincer-
ity. Have not all of us at some point fantasized about the ultimate 
gesture and the perfect collision of interests that would unite us 
with the beloved once and for all, like Bonny and Clyde united 
20 Deleuze, Proust and Signs, 36.
21 Ibid., 52–3, 35.
22 Ibid., 11.
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in a passion for crime or the Curies united in a passion for sci-
ence? The jealous lover, however, learns that such situations are 
sources of defeat instead of victory. Even if he manages to create 
and sustain them he will not have the beloved’s essence, but only 
her manifestations at a certain place and time! It does not matter 
that those would be situations in which she is “at home” or “at 
her best.” She will still manifest only as a caricature or transmu-
tation and he will only love her according to circumstances. The 
very fact that “deep” qualities are only actualized in very specific 
situations and that the jealous lover must fantasize or realize 
even more circumstances in which to “reactivate” them, teaches 
him that there is no quality independent of circumstance. There 
is no such thing as an eidos or primary quality belonging just to 
the object! The jealous lover discovers that “[T]he reasons for 
loving never inhere in the person loved but refer to ghosts, to 
Third Parties, to Themes that are incarnated in himself accord-
ing to complex laws.”23 Or in less poetic terms: “[T]he quality no 
longer appears as a property of the object that now possesses it, 
but as the sign of an altogether different object that we must try 
to decipher, at the cost of an effort that always risks failure.”24 The 
lover finds himself confronted with a necessary consequence of 
relations being external to terms: there is no universal medium 
through or ground upon which relations can be forged. If there 
would be, all relations and terms would be internal to one term: 
the medium or ground (its historical guises are famous: Apei-
ron, God, Nature, Spirit, and so on). Instead, the ground is al-
ways a contingent entity, with the ground as well as what relates 
on it remaining irreducible to one another. There is no medium, 
there are “various media.”25 As Deleuze says in an early seminar 
on the problem of grounding:
The ground is the third, because it is neither the claimant, 
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the claimed yield to the claimant. The object in itself is never 
subjected to the claim. The demand and the claim always 
come to the object from the outside. Example: in making 
a claim to the hand of the girl, what can one appeal to? As 
arbiter we use the father who is the third, the ground. But 
the father can say: complete a test, slay the dragon. What 
grounds is then the test. [He] can also say that it depends on 
her. There is then still a third. The love the girl experiences 
is not like her being itself, but the principle which makes her 
being yield to the claim. There is always a third and it has to 
be sought out […].26
Subjective compensation fails. Isolating eidetic qualities and 
tailoring a situation to them does not yield possession of the 
beloved. To his horror, the lover realizes that any sign or experi-
ence is a mere translation of his beloved’s fundamental excess 
over all relation, and also that the experience of his beloved’s 
qualities is irrevocably characterized and colored by the con-
tingent third thing in which experience happens. We are wrong 
in thinking that we can be subtle or even scientific enough to 
accurately isolate the essence of an object and bring it into the 
light of day. Returning to the example of the actress, our hero 
discovers that her remarkable qualities manifest only in the role 
of Phèdre that Berma plays.27 They belong not just to Berma, 
but to Berma on stage and in character. This is why Deleuze 
associates Third Parties with involuntary memories “rising up,” 
as with Combray for the madeleine and Venice for the cobble-
stones: any entity whatsoever can only be experienced as tinged 
by some medium in which it appears. There is simply no other 
way. If relations are external to terms, a third thing must bring 
them together. Even if Combray or Venice would not rise up, 
the madeleine or the cobblestones would still be experienced in 
something else. Even after the father’s blessing and the dragon’s 
26 Gilles Deleuze, What is Grounding?, trans. Arjen Kleinherenbrink (Grand 
Rapids: &&& Publishing, 2015), 22–23.
27 Deleuze, Proust and Signs, 37.
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death, the claimant and the girl only have each other accord-
ing to their love. Any qualitative experience is thus common to 
two things: a “present” of the object at hand and a “past” of that 
in which it appears.28 In Proust and Signs Deleuze describes the 
third thing in terms of “rising up.” In The Logic of Sense, it is the 
paradoxical entity which “runs through” any two series. In Anti-
Oedipus, it is the body without organs which ‘falls back onto’ 
production wherever two machinic entities establish a connec-
tion. No pure appearance is possible, which is why signs of love 
“anticipate in some sense their alteration and their annihilation” 
and “love unceasingly prepares its own disappearance [and] acts 
out its dissolution.”29
What keeps the jealous lover from grasping the belov-
ed in her unique essence? The previous three signs are “too 
material.”30 “Material” does not mean “made of physical stuff,” 
but “in something else”: “[A]ll the signs we meet in life are still 
material signs, and their meaning, because it is always in some-
thing else, is not altogether spiritual.”31 The three material signs 
always concern the experience of something in terms of what it 
is not. This is to say they are relational. Worldly signs relate enti-
ties to general concepts and generic qualities which can always 
be the same as or like those of other entities. Signs of love relate 
the excessive powers or singularities of an entity to their transla-
tion into sensible experience: “[they] are inseparable from the 
weight of a face, from the texture of a skin, from the width and 
color of a cheek.”32 Finally, sensuous signs are inextricably mixed 
with the third thing, the ground or circumstance in and accord-
ing to which an entity is experienced. Nevertheless, even though 
progressing through the first three signs teaches him a great deal 
about reality, the jealous lover who keeps failing to grasp the 
beloved’s essence considers them waste of time. In each case, her 




31 Ibid., 41, emphasis added.
32 Ibid., 85.
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choice, but […] chosen according to data that remain external 
to it.”33
The jealous lover thus cannot stop “the Search.” First, be-
cause he loves her and not how she appears. Second, because 
his jealousy forces him to seek out the truth of her essence, not 
its translations. He remains haunted by the thought of being an 
observer who up to now “saw things only from without, that 
is to say, who saw nothing.”34 His jealousy is a passion for her 
reality. Even if he acknowledges that all ways of having her and 
of being had by her are only ever treacherous transmutations, 
and even if this is true for all lovers and beloveds, he must still 
find the essence of which these transmutations are translations. 
In Deleuze’s words: “At the end of the Search, the interpreter 
understands […] that the material meaning is nothing without 
an ideal essence that it incarnates. The mistake is to suppose that 
the hieroglyphs represent ‘only material objects.’”35 The lover will 
take one last step, going beyond the previous signs and toward 
her essence. And since jealousy fuels his need to know what it 
is he loves and wants to possess, “jealousy is deeper than love, it 
contains love’s truth.”36 
Immaterial signs
Materiality is operation in or according to something else. If 
the lover wants to discover what incarnates itself in material 
signs, he needs to bracket all (his) ways of putting his beloved 
in relations: “The beloved woman conceals a secret, even if it is 
known to everyone else. The lover himself conceals the beloved: 
a powerful jailer.”37 He needs to think her internal reality, her 
33 Ibid., 64.
34 Proust, In Search of Lost Time, 532.
35 Deleuze, Proust and Signs, 13. “Hieroglyphs” is a synonym for “signs” 
throughout the book. “Only material objects” paraphrases “[…] they 
regarded aesthetic merits as material objects which an unclouded vision 
could not fail to discern […]” (Proust, In Search of Lost Time, 207).
36 Deleuze, Proust and Signs, 9.
37 Ibid., 79.
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immaterial essence external to all relation. Deleuze calls imma-
terial essences “signs of art”: “the world of art is the ultimate 
world of signs, and these signs, as though dematerialized, find 
their meaning in an ideal essence.”38 Why art? Because art al-
lows us to see that an entity is never what it relates to, neither 
its component parts nor its observers. The Mona Lisa is not re-
ducible to the paint and canvas from which it emerges (even 
though it needs both to survive), to how it is experienced, to 
whom created it, nor to who it depicts. This is the lover’s epiph-
any: the beloved has an essence irreducible to all relation. Art 
is what can “stand up on its own”; it is the exception teaching 
us the truth for all cases.39 Yet what is this essence? It is a unity: 
“[A]rt gives us the true unity: unity of an immaterial sign and of 
an entirely spiritual meaning. The essence is precisely this unity 
of sign and meaning as it is revealed in the work of art.”40 What is 
the bond between this immateriality and spirituality? “It is a dif-
ference, the absolute and ultimate Difference. Difference is what 
constitutes being […].”41 This difference is not “an empirical dif-
ference between two things or two objects, always extrinsic.”42 It 
does not concern a relation of one entity with another. Instead, 
it is the intrinsic difference constituting the internal reality of 
an entity. But what is this internal reality? Deleuze tells us that 
essence is an “Idea,” but also that Proust is Leibnizian in that 
essences are “veritable monads.”43 These two statements are the 
key to understanding signs of art, because it indicates that the 
essence of an entity has two aspects.
The Idea was already encountered earlier: “when we have 
reached the revelation of art, we learn that essence was already 
38 Ibid., 13.
39 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tom-
linson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 
164.
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there.”44 It is that of which signs of love were translations: the 
fundamental excess of the being of the beloved. Her Idea is her 
desire, her puissance, her singularities, her virtuality, that which 
she can do. Since every worldly sign is a sign of love as well, an 
entity’s Idea is always subsisting in how we actually experience 
it: “the Idea is already there in the sign, in the enveloped and 
involuted state, in the obscure state of what forces us to think.”45 
And if Deleuze famously takes up the Nietzschean challenge to 
invert Platonism, it is not just by making Ideas interior essences. 
He also makes Ideas malleable. His is not a Platonic theory in 
which “the Idea as the goal of reminiscence is the stable Es-
sence,” but one in which Ideas are subject to “qualitative transi-
tion” and “mutual fusion.”46 Essence is neither fixed nor directly 
knowable. This is why the entire book puts so much emphasis 
on learning. Not just because the jealous lover undergoes an ap-
prenticeship, but also because the Idea of an entity can change, 
depending on its encounters, best exemplified by learning in 
human beings.
But an essence is not just an Idea. Essence is a unity of an 
Idea with what Deleuze calls “the hidden thing,” “the concealed 
thing,” found to “dwell in dark regions.”47 In terms of his other 
works: each plastic Idea is wedded to its problem, singularities 
are always tied to a body in a depth, and wherever there is desire 
there is a body without organs. This is why essences are veritable 
monads. The Leibnizian monad in itself is a bond between the 
absolute simple spiritual substance and its real qualities.48 It is 
also why essences are “viewpoints.”49 Each entity, after all, can 




47 Ibid., 47, 100.
48 Each monad must have real qualities, otherwise they would not be dis-
tinct. See Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, “The Principles of Philosophy, or, 
The Monadology,” in Philosophical Essays, trans. and eds. Roger Ariew and 
Daniel Garber (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 1989), §8, 213–24.
49 Deleuze, Proust and Signs, 161.
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experience and do. Of course this seems strange: is Deleuze not 
the thinker of free-floating intensities, flows of desire, rhizomes, 
and a chaos of infinite speeds? The point is nevertheless that 
while entities are always already enmeshed in complex networks 
and fluid intersections with countless others, nothing can take 
away the fact that every entity is irreducible, even though its 
essence may change over the course of its existence. Deleuze 
is first and foremost a thinker of individual entities, even if he 
always thinks them in their becomings. And indeed, a hidden 
“realm” of permeating intensities or throbbing desire is not at all 
what the jealous lover finds. The lover and the beloved are not 
just “physically” separated while “really” being together as free 
flows somewhere else. Because what does the jealous lover find 
once he has reached the essence? By discovering the essence of 
the beloved, he discovers any given entity is essentially a sealed 
or closed vessel, one closed by definition, a point Deleuze keeps 
repeating.50 The essence of an entity is thus the tension between 
its monadic simplicity as a closed vessel and its malleable Idea 
determining what it can do. This is the meaning of “difference in 
itself ” and “internal difference,” because it constitutes absolute 
heterogeneity within a single entity. As Deleuze insists in Proust 
and Signs, essences are “imprisoned” in a state of “complication, 
which envelops the many in the One and affirms the unity of 
the multiple.”51 Finally, then, the jealous lover has reached the 
Real, and “this ideal reality, this virtuality, is essence […].”52 He 
at last discovers the root cause of things, an essence irreducible 
to a psychological state, a transcendental subjectivity, or any de-
rivative thereof: “[T]he final quality at the heart of a subject; but 
this quality is deeper than the subject, of a different order. […] 
Essence is not only individual, it individualizes.”53 Now, it is easy 
to see why essence individualizes. The individual beloved and 
all her individual qualities and actions are mere actualizations of 
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her virtual essence as translated in terms of both circumstance 
(remember the sensuous signs) and the Idea or capacities of the 
lover. Any actual experienced individual is always a translated 
blend of the object perceived and that in which the object is per-
ceived, based on the capacities of the perceiver. At the same time 
that essence is incarnated in a substance, “the ultimate quality 
constituting it is therefore expressed as the quality common 
to two different objects, kneaded in this luminous substance, 
plunged into this refracting medium.”54 Hence any actual event 
is grounded in essences, the latter being the veritable causes of 
all previous signs:
It is only on the level of art that the essences are revealed. But 
once they are manifested in the work of art […], we learn 
that they already incarnated, that they were already there in 
all these kinds of signs […].55
Schizoid universe
The jealous lover does not find a solution, but a reason. He learns 
why it is impossible to truly possess the beloved. The beloved, 
like each entity, is the immaterial unity of a closed vessel wedded 
to a malleable Idea, only appearing in relation by being trans-
lated or transmuted, by being co-constituted by the essences of 
other entities. Essences can only be thought, never made pre-
sent: “in the case of the signs of art, pure thought as the faculty 
of essences becomes the interpreter.”56 Or put differently: “The 
intelligence dreams of objective content, of explicit objective 
significations that it is able, of its own accord, to discover or to 
receive or to communicate.”57 Note that this is not ontotheology. 
The jealous lover knows that entities are sealed vessels wedded 




57 Ibid., 29, cf. “only intelligence extracts truth” (ibid., 23). 
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pear in relations without being transmuted, he can never know 
precisely what exists and what something can do. Hence “there 
is no intersubjectivity except an artistic one,”58 because every re-
lation will always already be the result of a styling of experience. 
Deleuze’s famous mantra states that we know not what a body 
can do, and the jealous lover discovers why: “jealousy is […] the 
discovery of the unknowable world that represents the beloved’s 
own viewpoint […].”59 
The Search culminates in the grand thesis that reality is “a 
schizoid universe of closed vessels, of cellular regions, where 
contiguity itself is a distance […].”60 Not just for us, but as such. 
Being is not ontologically split into subjects and objects; rather, 
both of them are equals in being sealed vessels or bodies: “nei-
ther things nor minds exist, there are only bodies.”61 The world 
itself “has become crumbs and chaos.”62 It is a world in which 
each “part is valid for itself, [and] there is no other part that cor-
responds to it, no totality into which it can enter, no unity from 
which it is torn and to which it can be restored.”63 
It follows that entities must be thought as contingent alli-
ances between heterogeneous, irreducible parts, with each part 
consisting of further such parts, each with a body and desire of 
its own: 
We can form a complex group, but we never form it without 
its splitting in its turn, this time as though into a thousand 
sealed vessels. […] [A]nd in each vessel is a self that lives, 
perceives, desires, and remembers, that wakes or sleeps, that 
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This is why the relation of parts to a whole is never one of 
exhaustion, totalization, or “natural place,” but instead “the co-
existence of asymmetric and noncommunicating parts.”65 This is 
no less the case for the hydrogen and oxygen in water than it is 
for two lovers in love. Nothing can truly lock anything in place: 
“Even [a] painting by Vermeer is not valid as a Whole because 
of the patch of yellow wall planted there as a fragment of still 
another world.”66 The essence of an entity cannot be reduced 
to that in which it appears: “a content [is] incommensurable 
with the container.”67 For example, when drinking tea “the true 
container is not the cup, but the sensuous quality, the flavor.”68 
The content is the tea qua tea, and the flavor is the container 
into which it is translated, the tea being destined to subsist in it 
without ever appearing as it is itself. An essence is always impli-
cated in how it is explicated, but that which is explicated cannot 
become the explication itself. In being experienced by another 
entity, a “sealed vessel” is treated as an “open box,” but this never 
happens without a fundamental distortion.69
The jealous lover has thus discovered a “galactic structure” as 
the truth of jealousy.70 It turns out that objectivism is not wrong 
because objects would not exist, but because it misunderstands 
what objects are: “objectivity can no longer exist except in the 
work of art, […] solely in the formal structure of the work, in its 
style,” style being “a matter of essence.”71 So wherever there is a 
whole, it is not a totality which exhausts or naturalizes its parts. 
Instead, parts are always only “violently stuck together despite 
their unmatching edges,”72 whether they are parts of a percep-
tion, Venice, a memory of Combray, a Madeleine, the beloved, 
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totalities do not exist and “this is what the closed vessels signify: 
there is no totality except a statistical one that lacks any pro-
found meaning.”73 Nothing is ever locked in place, everything 
in any relation can in principle escape and deterritorialize: there 
are only “aberrant communications between the noncommuni-
cating vessels, transversal unities between the boxes that resist 
any totalization […].”74
The world thus discovered revolves around “force.”75 Every-
thing, ranging from simple perception, to forging an amorous 
relation, to keeping one’s parts in place, is a matter of struggle 
between parts that have no natural place, no reason as such to be 
anywhere as anything. This is the necessary consequence of the 
“astonishing pluralism” Deleuze finds in Proust.76 If nothing has 
a natural place, if nothing can be related to as such, then relating 
to anything at all requires work, force, effort, translation, deceit, 
maintenance, strategy, and luck. Moreover, learning becomes 
the highest task:
To learn is first of all to consider a substance, an object, a be-
ing as if it emitted signs to be deciphered, interpreted. There 
is no apprentice who is not “the Egyptologist” of something. 
One becomes a carpenter only by becoming sensitive to the 
signs of wood, a physician by becoming sensitive to the signs 
of disease. […] Everything that teaches us something emits 
signs; every act of learning is an interpretation of signs or 
hieroglyphs.77
We can never learn what something is in and of itself. This fails 
in principle. Instead, we must learn how, where, when, and why 
something works, which is to become sensitive to the signs 
something emits. Such is the final meaning of jealousy as the 
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ousy makes the Proustian lover stumble upon an unexpected 
universe of closed vessels, so could Deleuze’s treatment of jeal-
ousy introduce us to an unexpected Deleuze, both in terms of 




The Drama of Ressentiment: 
The Philosopher versus the Priest
Sjoerd van Tuinen
Following the terrorist attack on Charlie Hebdo on January 7, 
2015, Slavoj Žižek took a stance against the consensus that the 
assailants were fundamentalists. A true fundamentalist, after all, 
is deeply convinced of the superiority of his own way of life and 
therefore indifferent toward the non-believers’ way of life. When 
a Tibetan Buddhist encounters a Western hedonist, he may note 
that the hedonist’s search for happiness is self-defeating, but he 
will not condemn him for this. Today’s pseudo-fundamentalists, 
by contrast, are deeply bothered, intrigued, fascinated by the 
sinful life of global consumerism. In fighting the other, they are 
in fact fighting themselves, and this is what makes them all the 
more passionate. The terrorists, Žižek argues, are driven not by 
self-confidence but by ressentiment: 
How fragile the belief of a Muslim must be if he feels threat-
ened by a stupid caricature in a weekly satirical newspaper? 
[…] The problem with fundamentalists is not that we consid-
er them inferior to us, but, rather, that they themselves secret-
ly consider themselves inferior. This is why our condescend-
ing politically correct assurances that we feel no superiority 
towards them only makes them more furious and feeds their 
resentment. The problem is not cultural difference (their ef-
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fort to preserve their identity), but the opposite fact that the 
fundamentalists are already like us, that, secretly, they have 
already internalized our standards and measure themselves 
by them.1 
Ressentiment, according to Friedrich Nietz sche, is the feeling 
of vengefulness.2 According to Gilles Deleuze’s succinct defini-
tion, it is a reaction which “ceases to be acted in order to become 
something felt (senti).”3 It results from one’s impotence to either 
change or forget the cause of one’s suffering. As interiorized suf-
fering, it turns outward only in the form of moral indignation. 
For a long time, it was thought that the ressentimental need for 
recrimination and compensation was the main drive behind 
the French Revolution and subsequent emancipatory processes. 
Eventually these processes would have led, despite their secret 
inauthentic motivation as it were, to a mature, i.e., post-histori-
cal, post-ideological, and post-political democracy in which all 
soil on which ressentiment grows has been erased. Except that, 
the rise of populism, fundamentalism, anti-intellectualism, 
scapegoating, and the whole culture of naming, blaming, sham-
ing, and claiming by people who experience themselves as vic-
tims despite living in affluent societies have put the question of 
ressentiment back on the agenda. 
1 Slavoj Žižek, “Slavoj Žižek on the Charlie Hebdo massacre: Are the worst 
really full of passionate intensity?,” New Statesman, January 10, 2015, http://
www.newstatesman.com/world-affairs/2015/01/slavoj-i-ek-charlie-hebdo-
massacre-are-worst-really-full-passionate-intensity. In this article, Žižek 
writes “resentment” but means ressentiment. Adam Smith defined resent-
ment as a social passion of injustice. Ressentiment, by contrast, equals a 
degenerated and inauthentic resentment. See Sjoerd van Tuinen, ed., The 
Polemics of Ressentiment (London/New York: Bloomsbury, forthcoming 
2017).
2 Friedrich Nietz sche, On the Genealogy of Morals, ed. Walter Kaufmann, 
trans. Walter Kaufmann and Reginald J. Hollingdale, published together 
with Ecce Homo, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1989), 37.
3 Gilles Deleuze, Nietz sche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 111. My emphasis.
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If in the current post-emancipatory condition everybody 
can see again the actuality of the notion of ressentiment, it is not 
up to philosophy to prove its relevance or sum up the different 
forms in which it appears. On the contrary: the problem is that 
our understanding of the various forms of ressentiment is hardly 
ever based on more than some trivial everyday psychology. Lib-
eral conservative discourse is symptomatic in this respect, as it 
suffices to reduce any emancipatory movement — from Jacobin-
ism to feminism and populism — to its base motivation in jeal-
ousy, frustration, or some other passion deemed pathological 
and/or irrational in order to disqualify it. Of course, this dis-
course is not exactly new. Just as Nietz sche despised socialism or 
anarchism as secularizations of a Judaic-Christian ressentiment 
(and in this way dismissed the French Revolution as “a pathetic 
and bloody piece of quackery”4), later philosophical sociologists 
and anthropologists from Max Weber and Max Scheler to René 
Girard see modern egalitarian struggles as expressions of a dan-
gerously regressive envy. Žižek rightfully wonders whether this 
“obsessive-compulsive urge to find beneath solidarity the envy 
of the weak and thirst for revenge […] is sustained by a disa-
vowed envy and resentment of its own, the envy of the universal 
emancipatory position.”5 But is his own position really differ-
ent? Does he not also frame the situation around Charlie Hebdo 
from a majoritarian point of view, such that the scary and atten-
tion seeking “other” turns out to be actually very much like us, 
only less authentic and more deprived?6 And in this way, does 
4 Friedrich Nietz sche, Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality, eds. 
Maudemarie Clark and Brian Leiter, trans. Reginald J. Hollingdale (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 211.
5 Slavoj Žižek, Violence: Six Sideways Reflections (London: Profile Books, 
2009), 287.
6 Wendy Brown, for example, has made the classical argument that in 
the multiculturalist mantra of race, class, gender, sexuality, ressentiment 
invariably names class difference but rarely articulates it as such. Thus 
while she agrees with Žižek that identity politics and its discourse of 
injustices other than class covers up the subject’s investment in the internal 
standards of existing societies, such that no difference is counted as a real 
difference, her analysis has the merit of taking this argument out of the 
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he not reinforce the very opposition his diagnosis is supposed 
to overcome?7
In fact, the problem of ressentiment is much more obstinate 
than is generally acknowledged. In his On the Genealogy of Mor-
als, Nietz sche himself was very explicit about the fact that for 
him ressentiment was not a psychological (or historical, or even 
biological) problem, but first of all a philosophical problem, the 
problem of a philosophical clinic.8 This explains why in his work, 
the critical unmasking of ressentiment rarely takes the form of a 
personal reproach or of the attempt to outsmart his opponents 
by psychopathological means. Whereas Nietz sche would un-
doubtedly agree with Žižek that such recriminating uses of the 
notion bespeak a ressentimental moralism of their own, part of 
the problem is precisely how to prevent this diagnosis from re-
gressing into a never-ending blame game. Following Deleuze’s 
leading thesis in Nietz sche and Philosophy, everything happens 
as if Nietz sche has not been taken seriously enough as a phi-
losopher (i.e., as a “pedagogue of the concept”). Warning us like 
no other of the “modern conformism” in our use of Nietz sche, 
Deleuze conveys a very “demoralizing” message: it is crucial to 
emphasize the radically “extra-moral” character of the concept 
of ressentiment, since this is precisely what has been compro-
mised and betrayed right after Nietz sche. Whereas we can easily 
speak the truth that belongs to phenomena of ressentiment, the 
practical meaning and affective direction of this truth (its sens) 
is usually not as critical as we think it is. As Deleuze, always wary 
of the puerility and artificiality of truth judgments, writes: “We 
always have as much truth as we deserve in accordance with the 
blame structure of a liberal order that alternately denies the real grounds 
of ressentiment or blames those who suffer from it for their own condi-
tion. Cf. Wendy Brown, “Wounded Attachments,” Political Theory 31, no. 3 
(1993): 390–410.
7 Sjoerd van Tuinen, “A Thymotic Left?: Peter Sloterdijk and the psychopoli-
tics of Ressentiment,” Symploke 18, nos. 1–2 (2010): 47–64, at 61.
8 Nietz sche, Genealogy of Morals, 55–56.
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sense of what we say. Sense is the genesis or the production of 
the true, and truth is only the empirical result of sense.”9
Ressentiment, then, is one of those thorny issues that con-
stantly threaten to compromise the one who speaks about it. 
There is no intrinsic good sense in the application of its concept 
and no universal criterion, but only, as we will see, a polemi-
cal sense. It is precisely its conflictual politics that is forgotten 
when, for example, leftist intellectuals blame rightwing popu-
lists for pursuing a vulgar politics of rancor, or when the latter 
blame the traditional leftist elite for being stuck in the past. In 
fact, the more we tend to think we have overcome our ressenti-
ment, the more we should wonder whether our own discursive 
position is not itself infected by the very moralizing ressentiment 
which we like to think we have acquired the right to dismiss. 
In what follows, I will practice Deleuze’s method of dramatiza-
tion in order to distinguish two almost opposed senses in which 
the concept of ressentiment has been put to use: a speculative 
sense and a nihilistic sense. Whereas the former is typical for the 
conceptual persona of the philosopher, the latter corresponds to 
that of the priest. I will argue that while there is no a priori rule 
and no final argument that can mediate or solve their conflict, 
the former acquires the highest or best consistency between 
theory and practice in the concept of ressentiment.
The forgetting of the priest
Nietz sche proposed the concept of ressentiment in order to trace 
the origins of Western nihilism. While the “morality of mor-
als [Sittlichkeit der Sitte]” is constituted in principle, although 
hardly ever in fact, by the spontaneous activity and creativity 
of nobles, ressentiment is only the local and surreptitious illness 
of slaves. If this typological difference between aristocrats and 
slaves is first of all a hierarchy in principle, then because in his-
tory it tends to be blurred, distorted or even reversed by ressenti-
9 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994), 154.
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ment, which fictionalizes a reversal of values in which weakness 
turns into merit, baseness into humility, passivity into patience, 
or more generally good into Evil and bad into Good. 
How does ressentiment become capable of this historical re-
versal, given the slaves’ essential impotence to act? This is the 
genealogical question par excellence and Nietz sche’s answer 
is extremely original: the victory of reactive forces over active 
forces is due to the calculating genius of a third type, the (Paul-
ine) priest. The role of the priest is that of a healer or redeemer 
who suffers from, and relies on, the same illness he is supposed 
to heal. By a constant appeal to bad conscience, he turns the 
outward recriminations inward and thus pacifies ressentiment, 
whereas a constant appeal to pity enables him to seduce and re-
duce even the most noble forces to passivity and thus dissemi-
nate ressentiment ad infinitum. In protecting the weak against 
the strong, the priest thus leads the “slave revolt in morality,” 
that moment when “ressentiment itself becomes creative and 
gives birth to values,”10 in other words, when it constitutes a 
global culture of its own. From the genealogical point of view 
the priest is the most important type, because without him it 
is not clear why the whole of life would succumb to passivity. 
While ressentiment is the source of slave morality, it takes an 
artist capable of giving an adaptive and regulative form to pas-
sive matter for the fictional reversal of values to bring about real 
effects.11 It is thus up to the priest to usher in the long history of 
a postponed and imaginary revenge, even if this revenge will 
ultimately acquire a secular form in the modern ideal of uni-
versal equality, just as the place of the priest will be taken up by 
demagogues, politicians, journalists, psychotherapists, and all 
the more anonymous media of contemporary biopolitics.
Authors such as Scheler and Girard also see an intrinsic rela-
tion between ressentiment and modernity, but following in the 
10 Nietz sche, Genealogy of Morals, 36. 
11 Friedrich Nietz sche, The Anti-Christ, published together with Ecce Homo, 
Twilight of the Idols, eds. Aaron Ridley and Judith Norman, trans. Judith 
Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 21–22; Deleuze, 
Nietz sche and Philosophy, 125–26.
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footsteps of Max Weber’s criticism of Nietz sche, they reverse 
the causal relation. Whereas vengefulness would be of all times, 
they argue, ressentiment could only become a formative power 
because of egalitarian ideals that constantly confront us with 
a discrepancy between principle and fact, and thus encourage 
rancor as a universal human right. Whereas the “untimely” 
originality of Nietz sche’s genealogical method lies in emphasiz-
ing the necessity of millennia of slow cultural preparation and 
consolidation, Scheler and Girard turn Nietz sche’s genealogical 
tracing of democratic ideals to ressentiment into a much more 
immediate and determinate, yet also much more trivial and cir-
cumstantial connection: only in modern democracies and its 
egalitarian cultivation of the frustration of the unprivileged over 
the persistence of inequality could ressentiment have its disrup-
tive and militant effect on social order. Instead of the progenitor 
of modernity, the culture of ressentiment would thus be its child. 
It is no longer ressentiment that fictionalizes egalitarian ideol-
ogy, but egalitarian ideology (what Žižek calls “our standards”) 
that generates ressentiment.12
Unsurprisingly, it is this inverted perspective that lies at the 
basis of most modern understandings of ressentiment, in which 
Nietz sche features less as philosophical authority than as half-
madman, half-malevolent genius.13 But the price for this new-
found realism is a blindness to the problem that necessitated 
Nietz sche to invent the concept of ressentiment in the first place, 
i.e., the slave revolt in morality, in which the priest plays a cru-
cial role. We either openly deny (Weber, Scheler, Girard, Charles 
Taylor) or at least ignore (John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, Marc 
Angenot, Marc Ferro, Norbert Bolz) the priestly nature of every 
culture of ressentiment. Instead, we get a retroactive revaluation 
12 Max Scheler, Ressentiment, trans. William W. Holdheim (New York: 
Schocken Books, 1972); René Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel: Self 
and Other in Literary Structure, trans. Yvonne Freccero (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1976).
13 Nicholas Birns, “Ressentiment and Counter-Ressentiment: Nietz sche, 
Scheler, and the Reaction Against Equality,” Nietz sche Circle, http://www.
nietzschecircle.com/RessentimentMaster.pdf. 
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of the mediating role of Christianity modelled on, and often also 
put forward as a model for, civil society.14 The Christian love 
of one’s neighbor does not turn ressentiment into a formative 
power, but precisely prevents it from becoming so. After all, in 
Christ we are all equal. Only in modernity is the patient waiting 
for the Last Judgment transformed into the impatience of the 
Last Man who wants to be compensated for every suffering and 
every perceived injustice here on earth. Only here does ressenti-
ment become something that can no longer be repressed.
From a Nietz schean point of view, the later confusion of the 
causality of ressentiment with its ideological consequences and 
the subsequent forgetting of the priest can usually be recog-
nized by two methodological consequences. Firstly, it implies 
the depoliticization of the concept of ressentiment by empiri-
cal psychology and neurosciences, which focus on emotions of 
individuals instead of socio-political passions. Secondly, this 
depoliticization of ressentiment comes at the price of its subse-
quent sociological moralization, according to which the ressen-
timent of individuals threatens the public order instead of being 
an intrinsic part of it. But aren’t psychologization and moraliza-
tion precisely the modus operandi of the priest as identified by 
Nietz sche? Is this not exactly how the neo-liberal pacification 
of the loser as guilty individual, the discrete management of de-
pressed egos, proceeds, arguing that if you were not successful 
on the market, you have nobody to blame but yourself?15
14 The exception here is Žižek, for whom the ressentiment of Holocaust 
victims (rather than that of the Charlie Hebdo attackers) appears to be 
affirmable as the very persistence of the negative (i.e., as a contradictory 
“authentic ressentiment,” see Žižek, Violence, 159) instead of having to be 
negated itself.
15 For a historical development, see Sjoerd van Tuinen, “Physiology versus 
Psychology: The Priest and the Biopolitics of Ressentiment,” in Inside. 
Outside. Other. The Body in the Work of Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault, 
eds. Ann-Cathrin Drews and Katharina D. Martin (Bielefeld: Transcript 
Verlag, forthcoming 2016). Drawing on a distinction from What Is 
Philosophy?, the priest and the philosopher are both psychosocial types 
and conceptual personae. Psychosocial types are historical constellations. 
They are defined by what they render perceptible, the three movements 
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We should remember that the Genealogy of Morals is a po-
lemic with priestly modes of thought, and that it opens not 
simply by rejecting previous attempts to locate the source of 
Western morality in ressentiment made by Paul Rée or Eugen 
Dühring, but by displacing their inquiry to these moral theo-
rists themselves.16 It is their rancor, mistrust, impotence, disap-
pointments, ideals, habits, hatred, and tastes, in other words, the 
typical symptomatology of their will to power, that Nietz sche is 
interested in. By itself, as a mere historical fact, the problem of 
ressentiment is not interesting. It becomes so only “on the soil of 
this essentially dangerous form of human existence, the priestly 
form.”17 The relevance of an inquiry into ressentiment lies exclu-
sively in the non-trivial struggle against the priests who derive 
their power from its cultivation, and as we should now add, its 
interpretation and evaluation. This leads us to a fourth type, the 
one with which Nietz sche identifies himself: the philosopher, or 
the true genealogist. For Nietz sche, the meaning we attribute 
to ressentiment constitutes the very conflict that separates the 
philosopher and the priest as radically incommensurable per-
spectives of evaluation. Who has the right to wield the concept 
of ressentiment and on the basis of which principle?
of the formation of territories, vectors of deterritorialization and the 
process of reterritorialization relative to a social field (Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham 
Burchell [New York: Columbia University Press, 1994], 68). Different from 
psychosocial types, this chapter deals with conceptual personae. These are 
not physical or mental territories and movements of deterritorialization, 
but properly spiritual or transcendental conditions of enunciation. They 
are not relative movements, but problematic powers or affinities that are 
absolute, belonging only to the element of thought. “These are no longer 
empirical, psychological, and social determinations, still less abstractions, 
but intercessors, crystals, or seeds of thought” (ibid., 69). Even if concep-
tual personae belong by right to thought and only to thought, they are 
inseparable from psychosocial types that belong to a historical milieu and 
render perceptible the drama of de- and re-territorialization of a concept. 
The two constantly refer to each other and combine without ever merging 
(ibid., 70).
16 Nietz sche, Genealogy of Morals, 24–25.
17 Ibid., 33.
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Transcendental typology
Every genealogical discussion requires a certain agonal, dra-
matic or perspectivist sensibility: not for the relativity of truth, 
but for the truth of the relational, which takes into account the 
affects of the one who uses the concept of ressentiment no less 
than those of the one to whom it is applied. As Peter Sloterdijk 
puts it in his essay on cultural struggle (Kulturkampf), Die Ver-
achtung der Massen: 
Nietz sche’s theorem of ressentiment as flight of the weak into 
moralizing contempt for the strong […] until today has re-
mained the most powerful instrument for the interpretation 
of the social-psychological relations in mass culture — an 
instrument of which it is admittedly not easy to say, who 
could or should wield it. It offers the most plausible descrip-
tion of the behavior of the majorities in modern societies, 
but also its most polemogenous interpretation — polemog-
enous, since it reduces the psychic dispositions of individuals 
who attest themselves morally first-rate motives to reactive 
and detractive mechanisms of antiverticality on the level of 
their intimate drives — such that between “truth” and “plau-
sibility” a relation of mutual exclusion sets in. It is plausible 
nonetheless, as it attests to the quasi-omnipresent need for 
degradation of humiliated self-consciousness which empiri-
cally speaking effectively belongs to it.18 
Plausibility is disconnected from truth, as Nietz sche already 
knew, whenever truth becomes a moral, i.e., universalizable or 
absolute aim in itself. For truth itself then becomes marked by 
the ressentiment of the slave who denies the irreducible “differ-
end” between higher and lower points of view. “[D]ifference,” 
18 Peter Sloterdijk, Die Verachtung der Massen: Versuch über Kulturkämpfe in 
der modernen Gesellschaft (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2000), 
56.
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Nietz sche writes, “engenders hatred.”19 As a consequence, the 
plausibility of the diagnosis of ressentiment, the real efficacy of 
the perspectival truth of ressentiment, must be proven in anoth-
er way than merely in the form of a claim to empirical knowl-
edge. It does not suffice to know the difference in point of view; 
what is crucial is that it is actually and continuously being made 
by the genealogist himself. Genealogy, as Deleuze emphasizes, 
means both the origin of value and the value of the origin.20 Or 
as Sloterdijk puts it: every attempt to “make a difference” and 
resist ressentiment implies a cultural struggle over the legitimacy 
and origin of differences in general.21 
The problem of genealogy, then, is the necessity of distin-
guishing between high and low, active and ressentimental appli-
cations of the concept of ressentiment, independent from estab-
lished values and empirical distributions between rich and poor, 
capitalist and proletarian, elite and mass, man and woman, and 
so on. “We cannot use the state of a system of forces as it in fact 
is, or the result of the struggle between forces, in order to decide 
which are active and which are reactive.”22 High and low are not 
just empirical values but refer to a difference in the conditions 
with which their evaluation takes place. After all, if difference is 
at the origin, the origin itself already includes the inverted im-
age of its own genealogy23 — for example, the caricaturized form 
of evolution, whether dialectical (German) or utilitarian (Eng-
lish), or indeed the modernist discourse around ressentiment. 
This is why, even where we are dealing with a single fact such as 
ressentiment, the philosopher and the priest do not interpret and 
evaluate it in the same way. Rather, they each perceive the ver-
19 Friedrich Nietz sche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the 
Future, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), 213n17.
20 “The difference in the origin does not appear at the origin — except 
perhaps to a particularly practiced eye, the eye which sees from afar, the 
eye of the far-sighted, the eye of the genealogist” (Deleuze, Nietz sche and 
Philosophy, 5).
21 Sloterdijk, Die Verachtung der Massen, 95, 84.
22 Deleuze, Nietz sche and Philosophy, 58.
23 Ibid., 56.
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sion of ressentiment that corresponds to their point of view. The 
difference between the philosopher and the priest, as Nietz sche 
announces already in the preface to the Genealogy of Morals, is 
therefore transcendental or “a priori.”24 It is a critical difference, 
a difference of imagination that is hard to discern within the fact 
of ressentiment, since it is also constitutive of this fact. Or better 
still: it is made in the fact itself, such that, strictly speaking, we 
do not even speak of the same fact at all. “To have ressentiment 
or not to have ressentiment — there is no greater difference, be-
yond psychology, beyond history, beyond metaphysics. It is the 
true difference or transcendental typology — the genealogical 
and hierarchical difference.”25 The difference can only be discov-
ered when we dramatize the fact of ressentiment and effectively 
construct its concept as a multiplicity of becomings, or put dif-
ferently, when instead of asking what it is, we ask who it is that 
claims its truth and what passions are involved.
This is why Deleuze emphasizes Nietz sche’s typological ap-
proach, which aims to characterize in each thing and in each 
passion a principle of internal genesis and qualitative difference. 
Passions are always mixtures of high and low tendencies, such 
that the noble is constantly translated and reduced by the servile, 
and the servile is continuously reversed and transmuted by the 
noble. But whatever the factual mixtures, the fact that the two 
types do not communicate in the same way effectively proves 
that they continue to differ in principle. They are different vec-
tors of feeling: while the slave is one of negation, the noble is 
one of affirmation.26 If, in addition to the noble and the slave, 
24 Nietz sche, Genealogy of Morals, Preface 16, 20.
25 Deleuze, Nietz sche and Philosophy, 33.
26 Types are neither empirical portraits to be compared against an original, 
nor ideal types in the Weberian sense. Rather, they are ensembles of forces, 
which are physiological, but also psychological, political, historical, and 
social. Deleuze therefore insists that we make a difference between the 
type of the will to power (quality) and the relations of force (quantity), 
the former being the sufficient reason for the latter and as such insepa-
rable from, but by no means identical with them (Deleuze, Nietz sche and 
Philosophy, 44). Between them there is no simple opposition (this already 
betrays the one-sided perspective of negation of difference), but rather a 
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we also need to distinguish the type of the philosopher and the 
priest, this is because only the philosopher has an interest in the 
art of typology. The very artificiality or imaginary character of 
the types is precisely what enables him to distinguish the deep 
distances between the grounds on which the passions become 
empirically visible and truths are produced. And it is this origi-
nal and originary contrast that must be restored every time the 
passions are interpreted and evaluated — it is the very condition 
of their philosophical enunciation. Only on the basis of the dis-
tinct type can we diagnose the sense of a mixture: when does 
ressentiment become a problem (at the beginning of history or 
at its end), in what form does it come about (frustrated revenge 
or envy), and in what order (as consequence or as principle of 
justice)? 
Right and fact
Following Nietz sche and Deleuze, the delicate but rigorous art 
of the philosopher is to diagnose and evaluate our present be-
comings by differentiating between high and low, noble or base, 
and to keep them apart “to all eternity [für alle Ewigkeit].”27 To 
diagnose is therefore not just to produce an empirical truth 
about an actual state of affairs, but also, as in medical diagno-
sis, to propose a strategy of healing and self-overcoming — in 
other words, to construct a type or symptomatology and negoti-
ate a new vital relation to it. Inseparable from the becomings 
that insist in the diagnosed, the diagnosis must itself have the 
power of a performative: “The diagnosis of becomings in every 
passing present is what Nietz sche assigned to the philosopher as 
physician, ‘physician of civilization,’ or inventor of new imma-
nent modes of existence.”28 In this sense, philosophers such as 
contrast: “two things can be thought as being really distinct without be-
ing separable, no matter how little they may have requisites in common” 
(Gilles Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, trans. Tom Conley 
[Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press], 55).
27 Nietz sche, Genealogy of Morals, 138.
28 Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 113.
92
deleuze and the passions
Baruch Spinoza or Epictetus are interested in the becoming bet-
ter or active of empirically given affections and passions. Since 
becoming is not only polar (active or passive) but also complex 
(a becoming-active of reactive forces or a becoming-reactive of 
active forces), they would never demand from those to whom 
the diagnosis applies that they give up or repress their specific 
passions. For it is these passions which, no matter how negative 
or sickening, enable the latter to become. An immanent diag-
nosis must therefore always be both affirmative and speculative. 
It cannot be content to remain at the level of critical judgment, 
but has to effectively encounter them in a kind of mutual inclu-
sion or co-presence. It must risk an inventive perspective that 
renders visible our actual passions at the same time as those vir-
tual passions that can be associated with their becoming. This is 
how Nietz sche, in Ecce Homo, discusses the art of perspectival 
reversal by which we not only learn to evaluate healthy modes 
of living from the perspective of the sick, but also to distance 
ourselves from our illnesses from the fuller perspective of the 
healthy.29 The point is that between the two points of view, there 
is no reciprocity or commensurability, or indeed no pity. A true 
change of perspectives is already a becoming, a construction of 
force relations according to a vital mode of evaluation. While 
the schizophrenic movement from health to illness or from ill-
ness to health appears to be double, in reality it is a single move-
ment, a single act of thought. As such it is itself the sign of a 
virtual health superior to every actual affective state (Nietz sche’s 
“great health”).30 Health, after all, is never a static state, but al-
ways also a dynamic act of counter-effectuation: a Genesung, 
both healing and genesis.
With respect to ressentiment, too, this means that its over-
coming implies a pure becoming, or in other words, a difference 
that is actively made with respect to every status quo. It is never 
29 Friedrich Nietz sche, Ecce Homo, published together with Genealogy of 
Morals, 222–23.
30 Gilles Deleuze, Pure Immanence: Essays on A Life, trans. Anne Boyman 
(Brooklyn: Zone Books, 2005), 58.
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sufficient to merely establish the individual fact of ressentiment. 
Like every passion, it possesses a “grey zone” where it becomes 
indiscernible from a whole spectrum of contrasting individua-
tions. Ressentiment, as Bernard Stiegler writes, “is the nihilistic 
face of a combat that must be led within becoming, with it, but 
in order to transform it into a future.” Every becoming is at least 
duplicitous, such that the worst lies within the best and con-
versely. “The larger question is, therefore: what must actually be 
combated, that is, what must one do, after one recognizes the 
scourge of ressentiment?”31 The diagnosis itself must be drama-
tized in the virtual presence of a superior tenor of life, such that 
ressentiment becomes that which we cease to embody, not that 
in which we are locked up. After all, it is never the lower class 
or the poor who have ressentiment, but the slaves, that is, those 
lacking the potential of becoming. Ressentiment is without a 
doubt bad, but it is not Evil and this means that, instead of judg-
ing over it, we need to expose its contagious effects in such a 
manner that we give it the opportunity to morph into something 
else. As Deleuze and Guattari put it in What Is Philosophy?: “A 
mode of existence is good or bad, noble or vulgar, complete or 
empty, independently of Good and Evil or any transcendent val-
ue: there are never any criteria other than the tenor of existence, 
the intensification of life.”32 Only the generous affirmation of this 
dramatic occasion that is the neutral event of ressentiment ena-
bles us to distinguish between true and false physicians of civi-
lization, or indeed between the philosopher and the priest. The 
point is not that the physician must himself be free of ressenti-
ment, but rather that he must re-activate or repeat the difference 
between the noble and servile becomings that insist in ressenti-
ment and return them to the level of a drama of thought where 
one is the intermediary of the other.33 This hierarchy is precisely 
31 Bernard Stiegler, The Decadence of Industrial Democracies: Disbelief and 
Discredit, Volume 1, trans. Daniel Ross and Suzanne Arnold, (Cambridge/
Malden: Polity Press, 2011), 55.
32 Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 74.
33 This is why Deleuze contrasts the theater of repetition with the theater of 
representation (Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 10).
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the genealogical difference that eternally returns in whatever 
exists at a certain moment and never ceases to select the noble 
from the ressentimental — its eternal return is the very test of 
their becoming, the only hammer with which the philosopher 
can crush the “re-” of ressentiment and reintegrate the feeling 
with the wider activity of the world in a becoming-active. 
The priest, by contrast, is unable to repeat the original genea-
logical difference and possesses only a representation of it. As 
a consequence, he must derive the sense of ressentiment from 
its empirical appearance. For Scheler, for example, ressentiment 
is the lived state of Jews, dwarves, cripples, women, and social 
democrats, who are forced to repress their envy and frustra-
tion by the socio-political order of Wilhelmine Germany. Even 
if he is factually correct, the real interest of this diagnosis lies 
in his defense of the values of a heroic-Christian class society.34 
His diagnosis, in other words, produces no new difference and 
merely identifies and consolidates already differentiated facts. 
Half a century later, Girard makes an empirically different but 
formally similar point. Consumer societies set free an unbridled 
cultivation of envy and ambition, and thus generate a constant 
experience of lack and insatiability. The only way to curb this ex-
plosion of ressentiment is to repress or forbid our desires by the 
transcendent mediation of the Law modeled on the Decalogue 
(“thou shalt not covet your neighbor’s wife” etcetera).35 Again, 
we find an exclusively negative representation of our ressenti-
ment with no active differentiation between noble and base be-
comings. Worse still, the egalitarian conception of desire rules 
out the very possibility of such a difference (“admit it, in the end 
we all want the same anyway”).36
34 Max Scheler, Ressentiment, trans. William W. Holdheim (New York: The 
Free Press, 1961), 96, 133, 177. See also Birns, “Ressentiment and Counter-
Ressentiment.”
35 René Girard, I See Satan Fall Like Lightning, trans. James G. Williams 
(New York: Orbis Books, 2001).
36 For a more extensive critique of the positions of Scheler and Girard, see 
Sjoerd van Tuinen, “Links of rechts ressentiment? Pedagogie van een 
concept,” Krisis 1 (2013): 60–71.
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From a genealogical perspective, then, the priest’s diagnosis 
of ressentiment is neither plausible nor interesting, precisely be-
cause its truth obliterates the difference in the origin and pre-
vents it from changing the facts.37 In his hands, ressentiment is 
reduced to a conceptual readymade. Like the positivist histo-
rian, he is the passive inheritor of forms from the past, but re-
mains blind to the real forces that produced this form and that 
will continue to develop it in the future. Content with having 
identified the truth of ressentiment’s existence, his hybris is to 
betray the consistency of its becomings by replacing it with his 
own law of its mediation and repression. Incapable of seeing dif-
ference at the origin, the priest does not believe in any positive 
future for ressentiment but merely invests in the perpetuation of 
the actual fact as legitimation of his own image of justice.38 Lack-
ing all sense of cultural elevation, however, this can only be a re-
verse image, the least imaginative or speculative one. Thus even 
when the priest is correct to debunk the idea of social or politi-
cal justice — and as a consequence the cause of political desire 
and struggle in general — as the ideological mask for the secret 
revenge of “those who came off badly [die Schlechthinwegge-
kommenen],” as Dühring thought, he still sees it topsy-turvy, on 
the basis of a reactive interpretation of the facts.39 For such a 
reduction is too “English,” as Nietz sche would say, that is, too 
utilitarian. It relies entirely on established values and existing 
categories of recognition and stays methodologically blind for 
37 Christoph Narholz makes a similar point on (lack of) “interest” as tran-
scendental criterion with respect to Weber’s reading of Nietz sche and res-
sentiment in his essays on the sociology of religion. See Christop Narholz, 
Die Politik des Schönen (Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2012), 22.
38 Tyranny and tragedy, according to Stiegler, are the two forms in which 
consistence is reduced to existence. (Bernard Stiegler, Uncontrollable 
Societies of Disaffected Individuals: Disbelief and Discredit, Volume 2, 
trans. Daniel Ross [Cambridge/Malden: Polite Press, 2013], 35). Follow-
ing Deleuze (and Gilbert Simondon), Stiegler understands the plane of 
consistency as the schematism of the transcendental imagination, produc-
ing an image of a real drama that remains unrepresentable and without 
analogy yet accompanies every actualization in the imagination (ibid., 77).
39 Deleuze, Nietz sche and Philosophy, 73–75.
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the difference in principle between high and low, which is now 
reduced to a historical difference between principle and fact.40 
As a consequence, the priest fails to acquire the diagnostician’s 
“right” to wield the concept of ressentiment at the same time that 
he exhausts its critical power of problematization in “shameful 
compromises”41 with the present and reduces those to whom it 
applies into guilty subsistence.
For the presence of ressentiment to be made interesting again 
for thought, we must re-dramatize its genealogical difference 
and thus turn it into a singularity that bears within itself the 
possibility of its transformation. Dramatization is the art of dif-
ferences that matter, a matter of conceiving of difference differ-
entially. An active genealogy speculates on the plasticity of those 
it addresses under the guidance of the eternal return’s authority 
of the best.42 Nietz sche himself sets the example with his concept 
of bad conscience, which he puts forward in relation to a new 
conceptual persona, the priest, and in relation to a new image of 
thought based on the will to power understood from the point 
of nihilism, the will to truth.43 Instead of declaring man guilty 
of being as ignoble to have interpreted his own suffering as a 
desirable penal state, he says that it is here that man becomes in-
teresting, “more questionable, worthier of asking questions; per-
haps also worthier — of living?”44 In this way, he affirms his own 
distance to the perspective of the priest at the same time that he 
reclaims the concept of ressentiment. Everything happens as the 
philosopher enters into an athletic competition where what is 
at stake is who can see furthest, who can stretch his perspective 
to comprehend not just more facts but also other perspectives, 
until finally, the other is no longer rejected, but affirmed as the 
40 Nietz sche, Geneaology of Morals, 17–18.
41 Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 108.
42 For Stiegler, the tragic or dialectic spirit, like the priest, sees ressentiment 
as a fault (faute), whereas it is only a flaw (défaut) or imperfection (the best 
as relativization and dynamization of perfection) (Stiegler, The Decadence 
of Industrial Democracies, 55, 58).
43 Deleuze, What Is Philosophy?, 83.
44 Nietz sche, Genealogy of Morals, 113.
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other within the self. It is precisely through his struggle with 
the priest that the philosopher disentangles ressentiment from 
its internalization in guilt and conceives of it as a mere imper-
fection under the horizon of the self-overcoming of man. If, as 
Deleuze argues, the inherited passion of the modern philoso-
pher is shame, “the shame of being human,” then in the case of 
ressentiment we should say that the philosopher’s shame over 
the priest’s lack of shame constitutes the “pathos of distance” 
that entitles him to discover in man the project of a future.45
Conceptual personae
The purpose of our dramatization has been to learn to differ-
entiate, with Nietz sche, between philosophical and priestly 
manners of diagnosing ressentiment. The two types function 
as markers or references whenever the sense of the concept of 
ressentiment is to be determined. Everything happens as if the 
concept, even before it was first created, was already internally 
divided between different, asymmetrical modes in which it can 
be thought and exercised. The actual concept is signed Nietz-
sche, but the problem it answers to retains a pre-individual and 
impersonal problematic, a multiplicity of unknown movements 
of thought that insist one in the other. This is why Deleuze and 
Guattari emphasize that Nietz sche’s concept of ressentiment is 
inseparable from the various conceptual personae that form 
its “intercessors,” its real thinking subjects of enunciation or 
“thought-events” by which the concepts come alive and become 
oriented.46 Conceptual personae are the powers of imagination 
that function as navigators and compass in the determination 
of the undetermined concept. For if the will to power together 
with the eternal return of difference is Nietz sche’s plane of im-
manence (and the critique of the will to truth is his image of 
45 On shame as the inherited sentiment of the philosopher, see Sjoerd van 
Tuinen “Populism and Grandeur: From Marx to Arafat,” in This Deleuzian 
Century: Art, Activism, Life, eds. Rick Dolphijn and Rosi Braidotti, 87–114 
(Amsterdam: Brill | Rodopi, 2014).
46 Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 64–65. 
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thought), this plane must include not only repulsive concepts 
such as ressentiment and bad conscience, but also the pretensions 
of those who understand the will to power only from the point 
of view of nihilism. As a persona in the Nietz schean dramaturgy 
of ressentiment, the priest is the negative mirror image of the 
philosopher, a minimal power of imagination that immediately 
turns against its “author” by fixating the thought-movement in 
an empirical judgment.47 But precisely by being affirmed as im-
manent, he is nonetheless integrated in a transcendental field 
of thought which, distributed over a proliferating plurality of 
irreducible and sometimes apparently mutually exclusive points 
of view, has a compelling and all the more powerful objective 
structure — a polemical and dramatic consistency — all of its 
own: “another always thinks in me, another who must also be 
thought.”48 
What orients us in this spastic schizophrenia of thought and 
distinguishes the philosopher from the priest cannot be the sub-
jectivity or mentality of the thinker. Rather, what distinguishes 
them is their respective “pathos” and their mutual sympathies 
and antipathies. Whereas knowledge and ethics are already sub-
jective manners of inhabiting and imagining the world, pathos 
precedes all subjectivity and constitutes the place in the world 
47 Ibid., 65, 83. 
48 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 199–200. Philosophy, Deleuze and 
Guattari write, proceeds “blow by blow” (Deleuze and Guattari, What Is 
Philosophy?, 76), in a constant combat with all the other personae that are 
enfolded within its own plane of consistency. Hence philosophy’s affinity 
with schizophrenia, or the stammering of the Idiot as yet another persona 
that forms an internal condition for the reality of a thought movement. 
If the coherence of the drama is a witch’s ride, the personae are the mari-
onettes of the philosopher’s delirium. “I am no longer myself but thought’s 
aptitude for finding itself and spreading across a plane that passes through 
me at several places. The philosopher is the idiosyncracy of his conceptual 
personae. The destiny of the philosopher is to become his conceptual 
persona or personae, at the same time that these personae themselves 
become something other than what they are historically, mythologically or 
commonly (the Socrates of Plato, the Dionysus of Nietz sche, the Idiot of 
Nicholas of Cusa)” (ibid., 64, 70).
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that the subject comes to occupy.49 It is the singularly embodied 
experience that defines a perspective, the implicit condition for 
there to be any empirical fact at all; it is the “being-potential 
of the concept,”50 an “instinctive, almost animal sapere — a Fiat 
or a Fatum that gives each philosopher the right of access to 
certain problems, like an imprint on his name or an affinity 
from which his works flow.”51 Whereas the priest, like a scien-
tist, registers and knows ressentiment on the basis of its gener-
al recognizability or form and therefore lacks the taste for its 
relevance for the becoming of (a) life, the wisdom (sapientia, 
which Nietz sche equals to its etymological root in sapio, taste) 
of the philosopher consists of a taste for what is worthy of know-
ing (wissenswürdig).52 “Philosophy does not consist in knowing 
and is not inspired by truth,” as Deleuze and Guattari repeat in 
the manner of the pragmatists, “Rather, it is categories like In-
teresting, Remarkable, or Important that determine success or 
failure.”53 The criterion of thought is not adequacy to the given, 
but the efficacy of an act of thought that hierarchizes the given. 
The only criterion for its failure or success is the movement it 
49 Friedrich Nietz sche, The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an 
Appendix of Songs, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 
1974), 252.
50 Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 69, 77–79.
51 Ibid., 79. Or as Deleuze wrote more than twenty years earlier: “There is 
something irreducible in the depths of the spirit: a monolithic bloc of Fa-
tum, of decision already taken on all problems in their measure and their 
relation to us; and also a right that we have to accede to certain problems, 
like a hot-iron brand imprinted on our names” (Deleuze, Difference and 
Repetition, 200).
52 Friedrich Nietz sche, Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, trans. Mari-
anne Cowan (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1962), 43.
53 Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 82. Dramatization is therefore 
the method of philosophical pragmatism: “A true idea, in the pragmatic 
sense, is an idea that changes something in a satisfactory way in the mind 
of the person thinking it. The true idea is not only what one believes, does, 
or thinks; it is what makes us believe, makes us act or makes us think. 
Pragmatism is thus at the same time a method of evaluation of truth. […] 
In effect, truth is now evaluated in function of a value that exceeds it: the 
Interesting” (David Lapoujade, William James: Empirisme et pragmatisme 
[Paris: Seuil, 2007], 74).
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implies. Hence whereas the priest always speaks with calm rea-
son, the philosopher’s taste for exceptions finds its element in 
something that is all but reasonable.54 If both the philosopher 
and the priest refer to the empirical fact of ressentiment, and yet 
only the former can lay claim to the full complexity of its prob-
lem, this is because he is inspired by a pathos of distance. Not 
only is there no logos without pathos; the philosophical pathos 
situates us within a polemos, that is, a rivalry of taste. Variety 
and conflict are not shortcomings of thought, but the original, 
primitive form of dramaturgy that belongs to philosophy and 
distinguishes it from its rivals. To formulate general rules and 
categories of thought, by contrast, already comes down to the 
end of taste. For this reason, dialectics, from Socrates to Hegel, 
is bad taste in philosophy.55 Inspired precisely by the pathos of 
the priest, it is a taste for judgment, not for the problematization 
of becomings. Dialectics is never a real mediation as it reduces 
conflict to the general criteria of true knowledge, conflating the 
plane of immanence and the personae that occupy it within a 
propositional form without a real thought-movement. The taste 
of the philosopher, by contrast, acquires its validity and apodic-
ticity only through its medial position, through enveloping into 
but also away from the competing becomings against which it 
has to be measured itself. Always beginning “from the middle,” 
taking effect through shocks and proceeding in bursts, only the 
philosopher has the “power of decision”56 to give ressentiment 
its proper name, even if the word has been abused by so many 
coming before or after him.57
54 Nietz sche, Gay Science, 77.
55 Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 80.
56 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 199.
57 If the body is the domain of becomings before they are fixed by discourse 
and words, the task of the philosopher is to reach for the body and de-
termine the consistency of its becomings, and thus give the body its first 
name. Cf. Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlin-
son and Robert Galeta (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 
172–73.
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In this sense of “[t]he lordly right of giving names,”58 we 
may conclude that while the priest is the heteronym of Nietz-
sche, a character who thinks in Nietz sche, Nietz sche is only the 
pseudonym of the priest. The priest is a necessary co-pilot or 
wingman59 in the flight of the concept surveying the plane of 
immanence, but he does not explain the becoming of Nietz-
schean philosophy. Whereas the priest consumes the concept 
of ressentiment as a psychological readymade (recognizing res-
sentiment everywhere) and reverses its critical sense (passing a 
moral judgment by identifying it with envy), he lacks the pathos 
that was necessary to invent the concept in the first place. While 
the philosopher offers the belief, orientation, or sense for com-
batting ressentiment, the priest merely possesses its truth and in 
this way continues morality, even in the criticism of morality 
itself.60 Just as philosophy is folded over a sensual analogy, that 
je ne sais quoi that is the drama of the body in its silent and 
obscure becomings, the priest is its clear but confused abjec-
tion, the betrayal of the body’s potential of becoming-other, or 
indeed, of the very justice and consistency of its passions. The 
priest, in other words, is the very embodiment of the risk of phi-
losophy’s moralization.
58 Nietz sche, Genealogy of Morals, 26.
59 Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 78.




The Affective Economy: 
Producing and Consuming Affects in 
Deleuze and Guattari
Jason Read
The thought of Gilles Deleuze (and Félix Guattari) bears an 
ambiguous relation with respect to the “affective turn” in social 
and political thought that it supposedly helped initiate. This am-
biguity touches on the very role and meaning of affects. From 
Deleuze’s writings on Friedrich Nietz sche and Baruch Spinoza 
through the collaborations of Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 
Deleuze and Guattari insist on the central role of the affects, joy, 
sadness, fear, and hope, as structuring individual and collective 
life. In that sense, Deleuze and Guattari are rightfully hailed 
as central figures in a turn toward affect. However, if, as some 
argue, the “affective turn” is a turn toward the lived over the 
structural and the intimate over the public, then Deleuze and 
Guattari’s thought has a much more complex relation to affects. 
The broader polemical target of Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-
Oedipus, beyond the specific polemics with psychoanalysis, is 
any explanatory theory that would reduce social relations to ex-
pressions of individual passions and desires. Deleuze and Guat-
tari’s claim that there is only “desire and the social, and nothing 
else” is oriented against such individualistic accounts of not only 
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social relations but subjectivity as well.1 Moreover, Deleuze and 
Guattari’s theory of capitalism argues that it reproduces itself in 
and through the encounter of abstract quantities of money and 
labor power, and as such is a social relation that is indifferent 
to the beliefs and meaning that we attach to it. Thus, if affect is 
central to Deleuze and Guattari’s thought, it is necessary to add 
the caveats that affect must be thought of as anti-individualistic 
rather than individualistic, as social rather than intimate, and as 
impersonal, reflecting the abstractions that dominate life.
The caveats with respect to affect are as much strengths as 
they are limitations. Which is to say that it is not a matter of sim-
ply reconciling the concept of affect with Deleuze and Guattari’s 
critiques of Oedipal explanations and theory of capital, but of 
producing a concept of affect which is both anti-individualistic 
and adequate to the real abstractions and structural complexi-
ties of contemporary capitalism. If affect is to be the basis of a 
critical theory of contemporary society it must be radically sep-
arated from individualist accounts of social relations, accounts 
that have become increasingly pervasive in a neoliberal self-help 
culture, on the one hand, and attuned to the “real abstractions” 
of contemporary capitalism, on the other. Affect must be a way 
of grasping the abstractions that determine individual and col-
lective life, rather than a retreat into an interior free of them. 
Intensive affects and extensive emotions
Deleuze’s engagement with affects is framed by two different 
philosophers: Spinoza and Gilbert Simondon. It was Spinoza 
who recognized both the ontological dimensions of affects, de-
fining everything by its capacity to affect and be affected, and 
the political and social dimension of affects; they do not ori-
ent mere individual striving but do so only in and through the 
encounters and relations with others. Political collectives are 
1 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizo-
phrenia, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (Minneapo-
lis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 29.
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defined more by common structures of feeling than common 
notions and ideas. The central task of politics, any politics, is 
then of organizing and defining the affects. Affects are thus nec-
essarily both anti-humanist, defining all of existence in various 
ways, and transindividual, passing in and through relations with 
others. Deleuze’s definition, or use of affects, exceeds Spinoza in 
that he adds another distinction: between the intensive order of 
affects and the extensive order of emotions. This definition is 
close to Simondon, as we will see below, for whom affects cor-
respond to the intense and metastable dimension of existence, 
defined by tensions and transformations, while emotions are 
more defined and individuated. It is thus no surprise that this 
distinction has been read by affect theorists, such as Brian Mas-
sumi, to correspond to a distinction between affect, understood 
as an impersonal intensity, and emotion, understood as a sub-
jectivized and individuated feeling. As Massumi writes: 
An emotion is a subjective content, the sociolinguistic fix-
ing of the quality of an experience which is from that point 
onward defined as personal. Emotion is qualified intensity, 
the conventional, consensual point of insertion of intensity 
into semantically and semiotically formed progressions, into 
narrativizable action-reaction circuits, into function and 
meaning. It is intensity owned and recognized. It is crucial to 
theorize the difference between affect and emotion.2
While such a distinction may help orient Deleuze’s thought of 
affect, it is completely absent from Spinoza’s work. Spinoza’s use 
of the term affect (affectus in Latin) is absolutely and rigorously 
consistent; affects define not only the different states of human 
subjective life, from the basic joy and sadness to the complex 
and ambivalent affects of jealousy and ambition, but define eve-
rything, every finite thing has a capacity to affect or be affected. 
Affects are less some uniquely human attribute, making us a 
2 Brian Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation (Dur-
ham: Duke University Press, 2002), 28. 
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kingdom within a kingdom, but the general rule of existence; 
that of being modified or affected by encounters and relations, 
of which human life is only a particularly complex instance. 
For Spinoza we are constituted and individuated through our 
affects; the affective composition differs from individual to in-
dividual, but this individuation does not take the form of a dis-
tinction between affects and emotions.
Despite these terminological differences it is thus possible to 
understand affect in Deleuze as reconciling two different prob-
lems: Spinoza’s emphasis on the political organization of affect, 
and Simondon’s emphasis on affects as individuation. Simon-
don’s thought is oriented around a central problematization of 
the individual. Individuation has to be considered as a process 
and not the default state of being. This process moves from a 
milieu that is considered pre-individual, made up of tensions 
and relations, to a process of individuation that increasingly en-
compasses different levels and aspects, biological, psychic, and 
social. The social is then not a negation of individuation, but its 
condition. Transindividuality lies in the fact that the social is not 
so much a suppression of individuality, a loss of the individual 
in the collective, but its transformation and condition. Within 
this relation the distinction between affect and emotion figures 
twice. First in that affects are less individuated than emotions; 
while emotions are the emotions of specific subjects relating to 
specific objects, affects constitute more of an inchoate sense or 
sensibility. Second in that affects are intensive while emotions 
are extensive. The passage from affects to emotions is part of 
general individuation, and as such it necessarily passes through 
the constitution of collectivity. As Simondon writes:
If one is able to speak in a certain sense of the individuality 
of a group or such and such a people, it is not by virtue of a 
community of action, too discontinuous to be a solid base, 
nor of the identity of conscious representations, too large and 
too continuous to permit the segregation of groups; it is at 
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the level of affective-emotional themes, mixtures of repre-
sentation and action, that constitute collective groups.3
The individuality of the collective, if it is to have any individu-
ality at all, must be sought at the level of particular affects and 
emotions, particular ways of feeling and perceiving the world, 
which is often tied to particular objects. In place of the rigid dis-
tinction between affect and emotion, in which one is social, the 
other individual, Simondon argues that both individuals and 
collectives are constituted by affects and emotions. Individuals 
individuated as subjects and the individuation of collectivity, the 
constitution of definite collectives, are both constituted through 
the pre-individual dimension of affects, and their increasing in-
dividuation into emotional evaluations. Collectives are defined 
by their “structures of feeling.”
Despite the terminological difference of affect and emotion, 
both Spinoza and Simondon see affect as something that pass-
es between the pre-individual and the transindividual (even if 
these specific terms are missing from the former). For Simon-
don affects are part of the metastable milieu that remains, even 
as individual emotions and perceptions are constituted. The af-
fective dimension carries over from the pre-individual consti-
tuting a kind of indetermination at the heart of individuation, 
an indetermination that demands a social dimension in order 
to be at least partially resolved. In a similar fashion, Spinoza’s 
affects are pre-individual, they are less determinate states of in-
dividuals and properties of objects than passages and transfor-
mations, increases and decreases of power. Joy is nothing other 
than a passage from a lesser to a greater perfection and sadness 
is only the opposite. Affects are intensities, transformations of 
states, rather than determinate conditions. These states cannot 
be separated from their supposed opposites, from the ambiva-
lence of the affects; sadness cannot be rigorously separated from 
joy, hate from love. As much as the affects are less determined 
3 Gilbert Simondon, L’individuation à la lumière des notions de forme et 
d’information (Grenoble: Jérôme Million, 2005), 248.
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states than an index of their transformation, initiating a process 
of the constitution and destruction of individuation, they are 
necessarily transindividual. Or, more to the point, it is because 
the affects are always situated in the increases and decreases of 
power that they are necessarily transindividual. For Simondon 
the progression of individuation that takes place between affects 
and emotions necessarily passes through the transindividual as 
affects coalesce around perceptual points of view and relations.4 
While in Spinoza it is not that one passes from the pre-individ-
ual affects to individuated emotions, but the basic affects of love 
and hate enter into increasingly individuated combinations as 
they shape the affective composition of an individual. As Spi-
noza writes, “each affect of each individual differs from the af-
fect of another as much as the essence of one from the essence 
of the other.”5 The different essences are nothing other than the 
different compositions and combinations of affects. Affects and 
emotions are the transindividual intersection between individ-
ual and collective individuation. 
The difference of terminology between affect and emotion 
risks obscuring other, more salient, differences between Simon-
don and Spinoza. Spinoza’s relational account of the various 
affects is oriented around a fundamental distinction, the fun-
damental axiological distinction of an increase or decrease in 
power.6 It is this distinction that initially distinguishes joy and 
sadness, and is carried over into the various permutations of 
love and hate. This is not to suggest that this duality constitutes 
some kind of core that all of the affects could be reduced to, so 
all that matters is joy or sadness, increase or decrease in power. 
There is a constitutive tension between the basic orientation of 
joy and sadness and the constitutive complexity of the myriad 
ways sadness and joy are combined and articulated. Second, this 
duality of joy and sadness is divided again in the split between 
4 Simondon, L’individuation, 261. 
5 Baruch Spinoza, Ethics, trans. Edwin Curley (London: Penguin Classics, 
1996), III.P57.
6 Hasana Sharp, Spinoza and the Politics of Renaturalization (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 2011), 40.
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the joyful passive affects and the sad passive affects, between 
those affects which are joyful, reflecting an increase of power, 
but have an external cause, and those that have their own inter-
nal determination.7 At the level of affects one divides into two. 
This complicates the initial axiology of joy and sadness, intro-
ducing the idea that there is a negative dimension to passive 
joys, a possibility that they can be excessive, and a positive di-
mension, or at the very least a utility, to such passive sad affects 
as fear and humility. Spinoza’s definition of the affects is situated 
within the ethical horizon of becoming active.
Between Simondon and Spinoza we have the basic coordi-
nates that orient Deleuze’s thoughts on affect. Affects are situat-
ed within the process of collective and individual individuation, 
constituting the basis of both collective relations and individual 
subjectivity. The axis of the individual and collective is in turn 
bifurcated by the axis dividing the becoming active from be-
coming passive. Which is to argue that affects are the conditions 
of both subjection and transformation, situated between power 
and individuation. 
Consuming affects 
Anti-Oedipus, the first of the two volumes of Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, opens with a citation of the fundamental politi-
cal question of Spinoza’s work, “Why do men fight for their ser-
vitude as if it was salvation?”8 Spinoza’s answer to this question 
necessarily involves the affects of fear, ambition, and hope as 
they structure both political life and individual desires. Thus, 
it is somewhat odd to note that affect does not appear in Anti-
Oedipus, at least by name. Affect appears between the lines in 
terms of both the general problems outlined above, and, more 
importantly, Anti-Oedipus shifts the basic problem of servitude 
7 Laurent Bove, La stratégie du conatus: affirmation et résistance chez Spinoza 
(Paris: Vrin, 1996), 130. 
8 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 29. 
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and salvation in Spinoza’s thought from politics understood as 
the rule of tyranny to political economy. 
In Anti-Oedipus, affect is introduced first under the name 
of Stimmung, or mood. While the term Stimmung suggests a 
reference to Martin Heidegger, who philosophers such as Éti-
enne Balibar and Antonio Negri have recognized as the other, 
often opposed, philosopher of affect, the reference is to Nietz-
sche by way of Pierre Klossowski. Either way, the fundamental 
effect suggests a broader basis for a philosophy of affect. What 
ties these different and disparate philosophies together, is the 
assertion of the unavoidable affective or emotional dimension 
of all thought and practice, as a fundamentally orienting dimen-
sion of thought. Deleuze and Guattari situate Stimmung, the in-
tensities of affect, with the third synthesis; that of conjunctive 
synthesis of consumption. A few provisional conclusions can 
be drawn from this placement (without necessarily engaging 
Deleuze and Guattari’s entire reading of syntheses). First and 
foremost: affects are consumed and this consumption comes af-
ter the synthesis of the production and the recording of desire. 
Deleuze and Guattari locate the subject on this synthesis. The 
subject comes after the production of desire and the recording 
of desire, caught in the tension between the forces that consti-
tute the world and their inscription. As Deleuze and Guattari 
write, 
Thus this subject consumes and consummates each of the 
states through which it passes, and is born of each of them 
anew, continuously emerging from them as a part made up of 
parts, each one of which completely fills up the body without 
organs in the space of an instant.9
Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of subject can be compared 
to Spinoza’s assertion that we do not want something because 
it is good, but we call it good because we want it, desire it, and 
strive for it. Our affects come after history, a history of produc-
9 Ibid., 41. 
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tion and recording, that determines them, and our awareness of 
affects comes even after that. Subjectivity is secondary to, and 
unaware of, the process that produces it. It is situated between 
desiring production and the body without organs, between the 
process of production and its product; a product that in turn 
appropriates the various processes of production. Phrased dif-
ferently, we could say that affects, intensities are always situated 
between the process of individuation, the production and prac-
tices that produce and exceed individuation, and its product, 
the individual, between the conditions of individuation and in-
dividuation itself. Affect is the instability and tension of the rela-
tion of individuation and production, and as such it can always 
misrecognize its conditions. As Deleuze and Guattari cite one of 
Karl Marx’s more prosaic statements, “we cannot tell from the 
mere taste of wheat who grew it; the product gives us no hint 
as to the system and the relations of production.”10 Deleuze and 
Guattari draw profound insights from this statement, connect-
ing it to the idea of commodity fetishism, a process of produc-
tion. This is the condition for Oedipal subjectivity; a subject that 
continually misrecognizes the condition of its production, see-
ing itself as the product of the family rather than the historical 
process which has produced it. 
What does it mean to consume affect, or think of affect as 
consumption, and how does it relate to both the theory of capi-
tal and the critique of Oedipus? Deleuze and Guattari’s particu-
lar rewriting of the distinction between pre-capitalist and capi-
talist economic formations focuses on the role of the family in 
social production and reproduction. As Deleuze and Guattari 
argue, the various social formations that precede capitalism all 
have as their defining characteristic the fact that the very re-
lations that produce and reproduce individuals are directly in-
tertwined with the praxis and politics of social reproduction. 
Familial relations are directly both political and economic. It is 
only in capitalism, in the massive privatization of desire, that 
there is a separation of reproduction from social production. 
10 Ibid., 24. 
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Capital puts to work deterritorialized flows of labor; it is thus 
indifferent to the specific marking or memories of individuals. 
As Deleuze and Guattari write:
The alliances and filiations no longer pass through people but 
through money; so the family becomes a microcosm, suited 
to expressing what it no longer dominates. In a certain sense 
the situation has not changed; for what is invested through 
the family is still the economic, political, and cultural social 
field, its breaks and flows. Private persons are an illusion, im-
ages of images or derivatives of derivatives.11
Of course the family still continues to reproduce social relations, 
but it does so, paradoxically, through its separation and privati-
zation. The family becomes an intimate space that represents 
social relations rather than reproducing them, all of society is 
seen through the idea of the father and the mother. Presidents 
and dictators become father figures and nations become moth-
erlands: all of history and society is folded back into the family. 
This representation is itself a kind of reproduction, but one that 
has been privatized and depoliticized because it is outside of the 
conditions of social production.
Capitalism is defined by social production that passes 
through axioms of abstract quantities, flows of money and labor 
that are the real relations of alliance and filiation, rather than 
codes. Codes have become private matters, searches for mean-
ing. This split between production and reproduction constitutes 
a very particular affective relation as well, which Deleuze and 
Guattari summarize as, “the age of cynicism, accompanied by 
a strange piety. (The two taken together constitute humanism; 
cynicism is the physical immanence of the social field, and piety 
is the maintenance of a spiritualized Urstaat […]).”12 These two 
affects, cynicism and piety, correspond to the division of social 
production and reproduction. In the first, in the axioms of capi-
11 Ibid., 264. 
12 Ibid., 225. 
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tal, we have a social order that reproduces itself without mean-
ing or code. Axioms merely set up a relation between two quan-
tities, a flow of labor and a flow of money. One does not believe 
in, or justify, the rate at which labor is exchanged for money — it 
simply is. Cynicism is an affect attuned to the indifference of the 
axioms that produce and reproduce social life, the recognition 
that the flows of the market mean nothing, have no justification, 
than their brute effectivity. Piety is reserved for the home, for 
the intimate sphere of reproduction that becomes the source of 
all the pleasure and pain. Capitalism’s affective economy of cyni-
cism and piety is thus distinguished from the savage economy of 
cruelty and the barbarian economy of fear, both of which were 
public despite all of their cruelties. Deleuze and Guattari’s divi-
sion of affective life between cynicism and piety is given a con-
temporary update by Paolo Virno, who writes:
It is no accident, therefore, that the most brazen cynicism 
is accompanied by unrestrained sentimentalism. The vital 
contents of emotion — excluded from the inventories of an 
experience that is above all else an experience of formalisms 
and abstractions — secretly returns simplified and unelabo-
rated, as arrogant as they are puerile. Nothing is more com-
mon than the mass media technician who after a hard day at 
work, goes off to the movies and cries.13 
What connects these two theories of affect in contemporary 
society is that what is depleted from any affective investment 
in public life, in the activities of work and politics, returns in 
private life. 
What ties together cynicism and piety, indifference and sen-
timentality, is that each affect is passive. These affects are passive 
in two senses. First, the conditions of their production are else-
where, outside of the familial space in which they are produced. 
13 Paolo Virno, “The Ambivalence of Disenchantment,” trans. Michael Turits, 
in Radical Thought in Italy: A Potential Politics, eds. Michael Hardt and 
Paolo Virno, 13–34 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2006), 18.
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Secondly, the conditions of the production of affects cannot be 
acted on. The axioms remain outside the sphere of politics, of in-
dividual and collective action. They are each passive, but in dif-
ferent senses. Cynicism, the affect attached to the working of the 
economy, confronts an economy that is perceived as being indif-
ferent to human actions, while piety attaches itself to the family, 
which is perceived as being absolutely ahistorical. Far from see-
ing the privatization of desire and affects as liberation, as setting 
it free from the collective structures and relations, Deleuze and 
Guattari see the privatization as their subjection. To be passive 
is to be acted on, without acting in turn. The Spinozist critique 
of passivity is coupled with Marx’s critique of fetishism: it is not 
just that we are passive in the face of the structures and relations 
that determine us, but unable to comprehend them, relating 
them back to ideal representations, the family, the father’s love, 
rather than material conditions. Representation, especially the 
representation that passes through the interiorized conflicts and 
codes of the family, making the entire outside world an allegory 
for it, is the ultimate repression of production, of the productive 
powers of desire. 
The genealogy of Oedipus is one in which intensity, what 
Deleuze and Guattari refer to as the “immense germinal flow,” 
desiring production in all of its multiple connections and mul-
tivalent associations, is eventually interiorized, extended into 
representations. The process begins in the first coding of desire, 
the mnemotechnics that breed and constitute a “man that can 
keep promises,” and culminates in the private home. Affects 
have lost their intensity, their productivity and multiplicity, to 
become grounded in the family, to become representations of 
the world rather than its production. There is nonetheless a ten-
sion in Anti-Oedipus between a genealogy of the specific affects 
of cynicism and piety, affects that reflect the split between pro-
duction and reproduction in capitalism, and a general critique 
of the reduction of the entire level of affect to consumption and 
representation, the reduction of intensity to extension, and pro-
duction to representation. In the former the rise of Oedipus and 
capital is associated with particular “sad affects”; those of cyni-
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cism and piety, while in the latter it is a matter of not so much 
the particular constitution of affects, than a general reduction 
of affects to consumption, to representation, and privatization. 
Capturing affects
Of the many conceptual and rhetorical changes that underlie 
the shift from Anti-Oedipus to A Thousand Plateaus, perhaps 
one of the most striking is the loss of Oedipus as a target of cri-
tique. The elimination of the entire polemic against Sigmund 
Freud and psychoanalysis shifts fundamentally the status of af-
fect. Affect is no longer associated with consumption, and thus 
with the privatization of desire, but part of a general dimension 
of the micropolitics of society. The ninth plateau on “Micro-
Politics of Segmentary” resumes some of the central themes of 
Anti-Oedipus’s social theory, only now they are presented less as 
a genealogy of Oedipal subjectivity and more as a general theory 
of the micro-politics of all of society.
The first task of any such theory is to differentiate between 
the molecular and the molar. These terms do not address scale, 
with the molecular constituting the private spaces of home or 
family, and the molar addressing the state and its institutions. 
The molecular is not more individual than the molar, and the 
molar is not more collective than the molecular. Rather, the mo-
lecular and the molar constantly intersect at all levels of society 
and subjectivity, framing two different ways of perceiving, two 
different politics. As Deleuze and Guattari write:
In short, everything is political, but every politics is simulta-
neously a macropolitics and a micropolitics. Take aggregates 
of the perception or feeling type: their molar organization, 
their rigid segmentarity, does not preclude the existence of 
an entire world of unconscious micropercepts, unconscious 
affects, fine segmentations that grasp or experience differ-
ent things, are distributed and operate differently. There is a 
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micropolitics of perception, affection, conversation, and so 
forth.14
The terminology of the molecular and the molar was already 
at work in Anti-Oedipus, specifically in the final, programmatic 
section dedicated to schizoanalysis, but it operated in tension 
with the genealogy of Oedipus, and an ironic conception of his-
tory in which savagery, barbarism, and capitalism culminate in 
Oedipus, a kind of motley painting of everything ever believed. 
A Thousand Plateaus could be understood as a culmination 
of the positive project of schizonanalysis over the polemical one, 
as the critique of Oedipus, of psychoanalysis, which gives way 
to the construction of an ontology and politics of assemblages, a 
nomadic politics. It is in many ways an an-Oedipal book rather 
than an anti-Oedipal book, which not only does not need to 
kill any fathers — Oedipus, Freud, Jacques Lacan — but also no 
longer pays tribute to any lineage, any filiation. In place of the 
multiple debts to Marx, Nietz sche, and even Antonin Artaud 
and Franz Kafka, we get a series of nomadic borrowings and 
deterritorializations from various fields and disciplines from 
ancient history to ethology and the study of birdsongs. While 
such a distinction captures much of the shift of tone and style 
between the books, it does not fully capture what is at stake. Ed-
uardo Viveiros de Castro has offered two points of reorientation 
that shed light on the shift between the two volumes. The first 
is the shift from production to becoming. As Viveiros de Castro 
argues: “The concept of becoming effectively plays the same ax-
ial cosmological role in A Thousand Plateaus that the concept of 
production plays in Anti-Oedipus.”15 Desiring production is re-
placed by the various becomings, woman, animal, etc. This shift 
from production to becoming marks another shift, one in which 
filiation is no longer the privileged term of an ontology of social 
14 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Min-
nesota Press, 1987), 213. 
15 Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, Métaphysiques Cannibales (Paris: Presses 
Universitaire de France, 2009), 133.
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relations, but alliance takes its place. In the first volume, filia-
tion, the intense germinal influx of desire and production, was 
what every society must repress, and emerges in the productive 
capacity of capital. Alliance is always the inscription, the coding 
of this intensity into determinant subjects goals and desires. It 
is only once filiation is coupled with alliance that we get social 
reproduction, the rule of the relations of production over the 
forces of production. While in the second volume it is alliance, 
the alliances between humans and animals, the nomads and the 
outside, that constitutes the basis for becoming and transforma-
tion. Filiation, the lines of descent, are always those of the state, 
of memory and authority. This shift could be understood as a 
shift of critical targets, even politics, from the critique of capi-
tal, which appropriates the power of filiation, appearing as the 
quasi-cause of capitalist production, to the critique of the state, 
which subordinates alliance to the state as a condition of be-
longing. The task of Anti-Oedipus was to think a production ir-
reducible to teleological and instrumental logics of production, 
breaking production from the “mirror of production,” while the 
task of A Thousand Plateaus (at least some of the latter plateaus) 
is to think exchange irreducible to possessive individualistic 
foundations of the social order. Thus, the first volume endeav-
ored to break the production, an intensive filiation, free from 
its subordination to the inscription of dominant orders and 
relations, the domination of dead labor over the living, while 
the second endeavors to break alliance, an alliance of becom-
ing, free from the filiation of the state. There is a general shift of 
valorized terms from production and filiation to becoming and 
alliance, a shift which has ontological and political effects.
Returning to the question of affect, it is now possible to ask 
what do these shifts of focus, alliance and filiation, production 
and becoming, relate to, and resituate the idea of affect. We have 
already seen how Anti-Oedipus juxtaposes the productive nature 
of desire, of affect, from its consumption in the family, effectively 
drawing a line of demarcation between two filiations, one inten-
sive and productive, the other extensive and consumptive. What 
line of demarcation separates becoming from alliance organized 
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under the categories of the state? For Deleuze and Guattari this 
distinction has to do with an apparatus of capture. An apparatus 
of capture functions through two terms, through direct com-
parison and monopolistic appropriation.16 Direct comparison 
reduces the various activities to one homogenous activity in the 
case of labor, or the various objects to instances of one homog-
enous object in the case of the commodity. Monopolistic ap-
propriation, on the other hand, is not a secondary accumulation 
imposed upon this comparison but its necessary precondition. 
As Deleuze and Guattari write:
Surplus labor is not that which exceeds labor; on the con-
trary, labor is that which is subtracted from surplus labor and 
presupposes it. It is only in this context that one may speak of 
labor value, and of an evaluation bearing on the quantity of 
social labor, whereas primitive groups were under a regime 
of free action or activity in continuous variation.17 
It is the monopoly, the appropriation by force, which constitutes 
the very ground for the comparison of different activities, differ-
ent objects, making them interchangeable.
The point of contrast to this apparatus of capture is becom-
ing. Becoming establishes a relation, between man and woman, 
humanity and animals, but it is never a relation predicated on a 
shared identity, is never an exchange. “A becoming is not a cor-
respondence between relations. But neither is it a resemblance, 
an imitation, or, at the limit, an identification.”18 A becoming is 
a transformation, but not one that passes in and through dis-
cernible identities, not a matter of some thing becoming some 
thing else, but is a transformation at the level of the pre-indi-
vidual, a reorganization at the level of the very conditions of 
individuation. If capture passes through hierarchy and identity, 
revealing the secret unity that connects identity to hierarchy, 
16 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 444. 
17 Ibid., 442. 
18 Ibid., 237. 
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then becoming passes through immanence and transforma-
tion, undoing both identity and hierarchy. This is why becom-
ings pass through the very hierarchies that place men above 
women, humans above animals, undoing them by challenging 
the very identity of man and woman, human and animal. The 
examples of becoming are drawn from the history and mythol-
ogy of transformations, where humans take on the qualities of 
animals and vice versa, transformations that exceed imitation 
or resemblance. Becomings are alliances, but strange alliances 
that constitute neither resemblance nor identity. The apparatus 
of capture makes the disparate similar by subjecting them to the 
same standard and the same rule; in contrast to this, becoming 
makes the similar different, even from itself, undoing all stand-
ards and all hierarchies of comparison. 
It is in this context, in the distinction between capture/
exchange and becoming, that we get a definition of affect. As 
Deleuze and Guattari write, “For the affect is not a personal feel-
ing, nor is it a characteristic; it is the effectuation of a power of 
the pack that throws the self into upheaval and makes it reel.”19 
Affects are tied to becomings, to transformations. If we then 
wanted to think of affects in terms of an opposition to emo-
tions, it is possible to argue that emotions are affects rendered 
comparable and exchangeable. Thus, we could place affects and 
emotions alongside the opposition between free action and 
work, in which the second term is the comparison and capture 
of the latter. Emotions, then, are not only more individuated, 
more discrete and determined, they are comparable and more 
exchangeable. From this perspective to have an emotion is to 
have a determinate feeling (sadness, joy, etc.), while affects are 
less discernible feelings than indices of transformation. These 
discernible emotions constitute a common point of compari-
son, a common ground of experience between interchangeable 
subjects. Despite the fact that Spinoza argued that there are as 
many loves and hates as there are objects to love and hate, and 
as many lovers and haters, revealing the nominalist multiplic-
19 Ibid., 240. 
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ity underlying the oppositions of love and hate, we continue to 
speak of love and hate, jealousy and envy, as if they were always 
the same thing, constituting a common ground of comparison 
and experience. It would also be possible to argue that these two 
different organizations of feeling refer to two fundamentally dif-
ferent planes: on the first, that of affects, there are only relations 
of movement, change and transformation, while on the second, 
that of emotions, there is always a reference to a hidden plane of 
transcendence. Emotions always seem to refer us back to some 
transcendent idea of human nature, an idea that is all the more 
pernicious in remaining entirely hidden. 
The opposition between affect and emotion then would re-
fer back to the underlying opposition of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
work, the opposition between immanence and transcendence. 
Fredric Jameson has criticized Deleuze and Guattari, especially 
the later Deleuze and Guattari of A Thousand Plateaus, of de-
parting the material analysis of the production of desire for an 
increasingly moral distinction between concepts such as virtu-
al/actual, immanent/transcendent.20 However, this opposition 
is less a stark binary between good and bad terms that one can 
select or choose, than it is a relation of production and repre-
sentation, organization and its capture. It is necessary to see the 
hierarchy and transcendence that constitutes the apparatus of 
capture as nothing other than a product of the organization of 
immanent relations. Frédéric Lordon and André Orléan have 
coined the term “immanent transcendence” to characterize the 
production of the transcendent by the immanent.21 Their prima-
ry point of reference is Spinoza, whose ethics and politics could 
be understood as an examination of how it is that the organiza-
tion of striving produces multiple ideals of transcendence, from 
20 Fredric Jameson, “Marxism and Dualism in Deleuze,” The South Atlantic 
Quarterly 96, no. 3, special edition A Deleuzian Century?, ed. Ian Bu-
chanan (1997): 393–416, at 411. 
21 Frédéric Lordon and André Orléan, “Genèse de l’État et Genèse de la 
monnaie: le modele de la potential multitudios,” in Spinoza et les sciences 




the state to God. These are not empty illusions, but actually re-
organizations of desire functioning like feedback loops — the 
points of resonance that Deleuze and Guattari discuss. We or-
ganize our lives around these concepts, making them effectively 
true. The same point could be raised with respect to emotions; 
once an affect is labeled, recognized, and made a common point 
of comparison, it functions as an ordering principle for future 
affects. Affects become the raw material for a socially recognized 
system of emotions. From this perspective it then becomes even 
easier to relate these affects to “ideal” and transcendent modes 
of causation — the taste of wheat tells us nothing of the condi-
tions that have produced it. 
Such a reading of the distinction between emotion and affect 
corresponds to the shift in the definition and deployment of axi-
oms in the second volume of Capitalism and Schizophrenia. In 
the first volume axioms were stressed in terms of their indiffer-
ence to meaning and belief as social reproduction was in some 
sense divorced from the reproduction of the family. Axioms 
were juxtaposed to both the collective meaning of codes and the 
private meaning of recoding. The affective tenor of axioms was 
that of cynicism, of an indifference to meaning and belief. This 
affective evacuation was coupled with the recoding of various 
forms of piety and nostalgia. In the second volume, however, 
the emphasis shifts from an opposition between axioms and 
codes to one internal to axioms; it is an opposition between the 
denumerable sets that axioms act on and manipulate, and the 
nondenumerable sets that exceed them. As Deleuze and Guat-
tari write:
What characterizes the nondenumerable is neither the set 
nor its elements; rather, it is the connection, the “and” pro-
duced between elements, between sets, and which belongs 
to neither, which eludes them and constitutes a line of flight. 
The axiomatic manipulates only denumerable sets, even in-
finite ones, whereas the minorities constitute “fuzzy,” non-
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denumerable, nonaxiomizable sets, in short, “masses,” multi-
plicities of escape and flux.22 
The nondenumerable relates to the becomings that exceed cap-
ture and subjectification. Axioms can be added or subtracted for 
every identity, but cannot contend with the passages and trans-
formations which exceed identity. Affects are the moments of 
transformation, the increases and decreases of power that pass 
between the determinable and identifiable emotions; they are 
pre-individuated, to use Simondon’s terminology, or ambivalent 
in Spinoza’s sense. Affects exceed the defined and denumerable 
states. However, as such they risk being simply epiphenomenal, 
vanishing moments of transformation that pass between deter-
minate states. 
The opposition of affect and emotion then returns us to what 
could be considered the question of revolution as understood 
by Deleuze and Guattari. It is not a matter of consolidating all 
of these various affects and intensities of change and transfor-
mation into a new code or axiom, referring them back to some 
higher unity of organization, but of constituting a politics of 
becoming, a minor politics of transformative possibilities. In 
Anti-Oedipus there was a search for the figure of this transfor-
mation, the schizo, the revolutionary etc., while A Thousand 
Plateaus searches for the nomad, the minority, the becomings 
that pass beneath identities and relations. The overall project 
remains fundamentally the same. However, there is a difference 
in that the first book gives this rupture a subjective figure, even 
a persona, hence the “schizo,” while in the second the schizo 
not only disappears almost entirely, but the emphasis is on the 
minority, the becoming, that which exceeds representation and 
axiomatization. This difference of focus could be seen as some-
thing of an improvement, removing the awkwardness of arguing 
for something that could be considered pro-schizophrenia. The 
minor politics of the nondenumerable set avoid such awkward 
identifications. However, the difference of focus also raises the 
22 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 470. 
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question as to what extent a politics can bypass figures, codes, 
and emotions altogether? Is it possible to constitute a politics of 
affects that would not require reterritorialization in new emo-
tions, a new structure of feeling. 
Affective consumptions and productions
The concept of affect and its attendant concepts and provoca-
tions shift in the two volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 
In the first, the genealogy of affect pivots around a central con-
ceptual opposition, that between production and consumption, 
but this general distinction between production and consump-
tion, also constitutes a specific genealogy of affects, of the cyni-
cism and piety that constitute the affective composition of capi-
tal. In the latter volume, the conceptual distinction shifts from 
production and consumption to becoming and its capture, and 
the genealogy of affects, to an opposition between affects, un-
derstood as indices of transformation, and emotions, under-
stood as determined and subject to capture. History gives way to 
categorical distinctions, even a morality of good and bad. This 
is Jameson’s critique.
Rather than read the transitions and transpositions of affect 
from Anti-Oedipus to A Thousand Plateaus as either a linear 
trajectory of improvement, in which the concept is developed, 
or denigration, in which original insights are lost, I prefer to 
read the two different texts as each posing distinct and differ-
ent problems. These different problems can be understood as 
a genealogy of affects in the first text, in which each particular 
epoch or era of social production can be considered to have a 
dominant affect, or affects. In this case cynicism and piety, ra-
tionalism and sentimentality, are the particular affective com-
position of capital, of a mode of production defined by the sepa-
ration of production and reproduction. (To which I could add, 
but it really deserves more than a parenthesis, that these two 
different tasks constitute a gendered division of labor, with the 
gendering of cynicism as the masculine affect par excellence, 
while sentimentality is feminized. This division cuts through 
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culture as well as economy, constituting various genres of enter-
tainment, from cynical anti-heroes of action films to the senti-
mentality of lifetime movies.) There is much to be said for such 
an understanding of contemporary capital, making it possible to 
understand not only the current fatalism that defines economics 
but also the sentimentality that defines contemporary politics. 
From this perspective political candidates can be understood by 
precisely how they articulate and embody this combination of 
cynicism and sentimentality, deferring to the market while pos-
ing for the right photo ops, and shedding tears at the right mo-
ment. However, such a division also risks being too historicist, 
too oriented toward a hegemonic structure of feeling. Against 
this conception A Thousand Plateaus provides a necessary cor-
rective. The later volume’s emphasis on affect as the outside of 
emotion makes it possible to label the hegemonic structures 
of feelings as emotions, as recognized, comparable, and public 
structures of feeling, reserving the term “affect” for the transfor-
mations that pass between and under these states, never being 
named or conceptualized. It is through these affects that change 
happens, not just the change of passing from one emotion to an-
other, but becoming, the transformations that disrupt and undo 
the existing emotional order. 
The first offers us a history of affects, a history that situates af-
fects within the divide between axiom and code, the abstractions 
that govern life and the codings that constitute its experience, 
while the second posits affects in terms of their untimely be-
comings that exceed historical determination. Both are required 
to not only make sense of the stabilizations and uncertainties 
of the present moment, but to ultimately transform it. In order 
to change the present it is necessary to identify the dominant 
structures of feeling, the cynicism and sentimentalisms, but also 
to trace the affects and becomings that pass between them, that 








[A concept] has nothing to do with ideology. A concept is full 
of critical and political force of liberty. It is precisely its power 
as a system that brings out what is good or bad, what is or 
is not new, what is or is not alive in a group of concepts.
 — Gilles Deleuze1
Introduction: Ideology… what ideology?
Fifty years after the publication of Reading Capital by Louis Al-
thusser and his students, the political landscape is unrecogniz-
able. We are immersed in economic parlance, from politicians, 
experts, and intellectuals: everyone claims to know best how to 
control the deficit, how to regulate the banking systems, how to 
stop the flows of tax evasion, etc. Although the press has per-
haps been too quick at pointing out the resurgence of Karl Marx 
and Marxist thought in the wake of the economic crisis, we are 
nonetheless witnessing a certain turn to political economy in 
continental philosophy. It is as if critical theory had forgotten 
1 Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations: 1972–1990, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 195), 32.
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about the economic order and on waking up to a totally dis-
organized and deeply unequal world, it suddenly found itself 
being accused by some of being compromised by the capitalist 
machinery, and by others as being speculative or naive. But this 
situation is hardly new; the end of the 1970s — with the rise of 
a discourse against the “totalitarian left” and preparations for 
the neoliberal shock therapies — also saw a resurgence of the 
problems of economic reason and ideology. When we charge 
critical theory of being compromised by putting forward crea-
tivity or acceleration as the ideology of neoliberal capitalism, we 
denounce (or regret) that ideology was not taken into account. 
Pierre Macherey notes that Michel Foucault’s conscious distanc-
ing from Marxist parlance meant that “the concept [of ideol-
ogy] did not have to be taken into account”2 since it had lost 
its substance, its facility to diagnose 1970s’ political economy. 
Instead, Foucault deliberately wanted to create new concepts to 
overcome the Marxist regime of discourse. Not simply to reject 
the predominance of capital over labor, but to supplement the 
analysis with a more refined understanding of political real-
ity (discipline, governmentality, and biopolitics). Furthermore, 
Foucault aimed to move away from the ideology/science dialec-
tic, dominant in the French left in the 1960s–1970s.3 I argue that 
the discussion of ideology is not only implicitly present in the 
work of Foucault and that of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, 
2 Pierre Macherey, Le sujet des normes (Paris: Éditions Amsterdam, 2014), 
216.
3 In the section entitled “Knowledge [savoir] and ideology” in Archaeology 
of Knowledge, Foucault attempted to overcome explicitly this opposition. 
“It can be said that political economy has a role in capitalist society, that 
it serves the interests of the bourgeois class, that it was made by and for 
that class” or “ideology is not exclusive of scientificity” (Michel Foucault, 
Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. Alan M. Sheridan Smith [London: Rout-
ledge, 2002], 204, 205). Étienne Balibar comments on Marx’s difficulty in 
seeing the “Bourgeois political economy” as ideology given its scientificity 
(and the absence of abstraction or inverted reality), but Marx overcame 
this difficulty by writing “a critique of political economy.” See Étienne 
Balibar, The Philosophy of Marx, trans. Chris Turner (London/New York: 
Verso Books, 2007), 54–6.
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but a central aspect of their work. In order to do so I reconstruct 
their position vis-à-vis ideology to understand more broadly 
their engagement with political economy and the critique of the 
images of capitalism.
By contrasting too starkly between the subjective (ideology) 
and the objective (science), the irrational and the rational, polit-
ical economy fails to take into account the production of desire 
in capitalism. This is problematic, since the abstraction of de-
sire — taking place alongside the abstraction of labor — should 
not be taken for granted but rather be put at the center of a re-
newed ideology critique. By integrating desire with the infra-
structure, “[l]ibidinal economy is no less objective than political 
economy,” write Deleuze and Guattari.4 To establish a libidinal 
economy is another way of doing a critique of political economy 
and demonstrating the noological production of science, with-
out falling into the extreme opposite position that places desire 
as the irrational force to be celebrated: 
[t]here is an unconscious libidinal investment of desire that 
does not necessarily coincide with the preconscious invest-
ments of interest, and that explains how the latter can be per-
turbed and perverted in “the darkest organization,’ below all 
ideology.5 
The darkest organization here is what I want to revisit as “nool-
ogy,” and I will define this project as the re-materialization of 
ideology critique.
My interpretation of Deleuze and Guattari’s work here fol-
lows and complements Macherey’s recent studies on ideology 
that attempt to think ideology today (by reading Foucault), that 
is, when after Daniel Bell and others, the end of ideology was 
4 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizo-
phrenia, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (Minneapo-
lis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 345.
5 Ibid., translation modified.
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proclaimed.6 Macherey’s position is particularly interesting 
since he does not want to discard this disappearance of ideology 
and instead makes a parallel between the discourse on the end 
of ideology and Foucault’s work on the society of norms. Ideol-
ogy has become both ubiquitous and imperceptible, and critics 
have either given up in front of ideology since it is most adapta-
ble, invisible, and indiscernible, or worse they have also believed 
that ideology had vanished, as if contemporary societies were 
post-capitalist and post-materialist. Macherey’s rhetorical ques-
tion is: “is only a society without ideology possible?”7 In ask-
ing this question and arguing for the persistence of the theme 
of ideology, he does not claim that society should be or can be 
without ideology, but that the problem is not posed correctly. It 
should be posed in terms of normalization and discipline rather 
than ideology and repression.
As Alberto Toscano has recently argued (following Guil-
laume Sibertin-Blanc), the new concepts introduced by Foucault 
often supplement the Marxist critique of political economy: it 
is capital that conditions biopolitics, and therefore requires “a 
revision in the very notion of ‘ideology.’”8 Deleuze and Guattari 
understood this move very early on and integrated it into their 
work. They argue that alienation and subjection should not be 
understood in terms of ideology and ideological structures, but 
by drawing the diagrams of the technologies of power and the 
emergence of the normalizing power. For instance, in 1973, they 
explain:
Ideology has no importance here: what matters is not ideol-
ogy, and not even the “economic/ideological” distinction or 
6 Pierre Macherey, Études de philosophie “française”: De Sieyes à Barni 
(Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2013), 63–110; Macherey, Le sujet des 
normes, 213–352.
7 Macherey, Études, 96.
8 Alberto Toscano, “What Is Capitalist Power? Reflections on ‘Truth and 
Juridical Forms,’” in Foucault and the History of Our Present, eds. Sophie 




opposition; what matters is the organization of power. Be-
cause the organization of power, i.e., the way in which desire 
is already in the economic, the way libido invests the eco-
nomic, haunts the economic and fosters the political forms 
of repression.9
For them, ideology as understood and commonly used by Marx-
ists in the 1960s and 1970s prevented an understanding of the 
organization of power, the becoming-state of all organizations, 
and particularly that of the French Communist Party (PCF) that 
aspired to duplicate and replicate the Soviet Communist Party 
apparatus by using its scientific propositions. For Deleuze and 
Guattari, the Marxist use of infrastructure (the material condi-
tion) and superstructure (culture, ideas, desire, and ideology) 
prevents the integration of desire and affects into a critique of 
political economy, when diagnosing the material constitution 
of humans, particularly in relation to employment and work. 
They briefly introduced the concept of “noology” at the end of 
A Thousand Plateaus, in the 12th and 14th plateaus, almost as 
an afterthought, to leave the book as an open book and an open 
system: “Noology, which is distinct from ideology, is precisely 
the study of images of thought, and their historicity.”10
A noological model is concerned not with thought contents 
(ideology) but with the form, manner or mode, and function 
of thought, according to the mental space it draws and from 
the point of view of a general theory of thought, a thinking 
of thought.11
9 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Desert Islands and Other Texts: 
1953–1974, ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Michael Taormina (Los Angeles: 
Semiotext(e), 2004), 263, emphasis in the original.
10 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Min-
nesota Press, 1987), 376.
11 Ibid., 499–500.
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It is not what one thinks or what a class thinks that matters, 
but how they think it, in what assemblages thought takes place, 
and for what purpose. For the moment, it is enough to remark 
that they intend to collapse the two-level analysis of ideology 
critique, and rather analyze the wiring of thought. I will un-
pack these two quotations along two lines: first by showing that 
Deleuze and Guattari did not radically discard ideology-critique 
but transformed it by adding new problems (particularly that of 
affects and desire), and second, by pointing to the potentials of 
a noology critique, when we understand noology as a re-mate-
rialized understanding of ideology.12 Although I am taking these 
two quotations from A Thousand Plateaus as the starting point 
of my argument, I will mostly focus on Anti-Oedipus and the 
critique of familialism in this essay to show their engagement in 
ideology critique.
To introduce the context of noology critique as their trans-
formation of ideology critique, we need to note that for Deleuze 
and Guattari, it is on the one hand a continuation of the project 
of the reversal of Platonism started by Deleuze in Difference and 
Repetition, but on the other hand to resist an anti-Platonism 
that is equally idealist — placing thought above everything else, 
before the body, a thought without the body but also a body 
without thoughts, or a body without organs. The increasing 
forms of mental alienation today, linked to a cognitive and affec-
tive capitalism, have only furthered the division of mental and 
physical labor rather than abolished it. Everyone is a proletar-
ian, and by using the expression “proletarian ideology,” Marx-
12 This is also what Fredric Jameson perceived in his chapter on Deleuze: the 
noology critique project is to expose the ideology of dualism (and Jameson 
finds the contemporary resurgence of ethics as a specialized discipline as 
paradigmatic). See Fredric Jameson, Valences of the Dialectic (London/
New York: Verso Books, 2009), 181–200. Another contribution worth sign-
aling is Jason Read’s brilliant article on noology that focuses on commod-
ity fetishism and abstract labor. Read is in dialogue with Marx’s later work 
(when the thematic of commodity fetishism replaces that of ideology). See 
Jason Read, “The Fetish is Always Actual, Revolution is Always Virtual: 




ists have largely displaced the meaning and the role of ideology. 
Marx and Friedrich Engels never used this expression since the 
very concept of ideology always already refers to the dominant 
“worldview.”13 I simplify a much longer story here, but this “vac-
illation” of the concept of ideology led many Marxists to adopt 
largely idealist views.14 To take one example out of many, we can 
refer to the Marxist cinema historian, Georges Sadoul, as com-
mented on by André Bazin. Bazin notes that in writing about 
the origins of cinema, Sadoul had forgotten about the technical 
invention of cinema and argued for “a reversal of the historical 
order of causality, which goes from the economic infrastructure 
to the ideological superstructure,”15 as if “cinema is an idealis-
tic phenomenon. The concept men had of it existed so to speak 
fully armed in their minds, as if in some platonic heaven […].”16 
The idealist use of ideology consists here in thinking that ideas 
invented cinema and that scientists and technicians had almost 
no role to play, that cinema was not born in the experiments 
with technical objects. The idealist conception of ideology re-
duced ideology-critique to a battle of ideas, forgetting the affec-
tive and the material formation of ideology itself.
13 Étienne Balibar makes this important point that historically the “prole-
tarian worldview” is “inseparable from the goal of constructing a party,” 
that is an institution with a formal structure, and not simply some vague 
ideas of class consciousness (that is also absent from Marx). Yet can any 
party exist without a general theory of thought? (Étienne Balibar, Masses, 
Classes, Ideas: Studies on Politics and Philosophy Before and After Marx, 
trans. James Swenson [London: Routledge, 1994], 153).
14 “The current uses of the term ideology, Marxist and non-Marxist […] 
tend to fall back to one side or other of a classic demarcation line between 
the theoretical […] and the practical” (Étienne Balibar, The Philosophy of 
Marx, trans. Chris Turner [London/New York: Verso Books, 2007], 45).
15 André Bazin, What is Cinema?, vol. 1, trans. Hugh Gray (Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press, 2005), 17.
16 Ibid.
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Ideology is dead, long live noology!
I want to propose the hypothesis that the notion of noology is 
useful to understand the transformation, rather than the denial, 
of ideology during the 1970s and 1980s in the work of Deleuze 
and Guattari. A crucial aspect of this transformation is their in-
sistence that “desire is part of the infrastructure.”17 The signifi-
cance of this statement and what it implies can be summed up 
in two points. First, Deleuze and Guattari attempted in Anti-
Oedipus to supplement the critique of political economy with a 
critique of libidinal economy, yet they are cautious to note that 
these should not be confounded and merged, but that their dif-
ferentiating investments should be integrated into the analysis. 
I argue, largely following Macherey, that by integrating desire 
into the infrastructure, they intend to flatten or collapse the in-
frastructure/superstructure in order to re-materialize ideology 
critique (as noology critique). The second point is that Deleuze 
and Guattari want to save desire from ideology, and show that 
in fact there is an economy of desire, or that desire is part of the 
economy. They explicitly refer to Pierre Klossowski’s The Liv-
ing Currency (1970) on this point, to make evident the associa-
tion of desire with ideology (“two kinds of fantasy”), for desire, 
drives and affects “creat[e] within the economic forms their own 
repression, as well as the means for breaking this repression.”18
17 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 104. This is again emphasized in an 
interview, see Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, “On Anti-Oedipus,” in 
Deleuze, Negotiations, 19. Frédéric Lordon has recently developed this 
problem forcefully in Willing Slaves of Capital: Spinoza and Marx of Desire, 
trans. Gabriel Ash (London/New York: Verso Books, 2014). For Lordon, 
the desires of the workers are captured by the “master-desire” of the 
employers. Even though Lordon makes clear that the bosses (patrons) are 
not only employers, and so the worker-employer opposition found in this 
book for the most part differs from Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding 
of the production of desire.
18 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 63. See also, Pierre Klossowski, The 
Living Currency, trans. Daniel W. Smith, Vernon W. Cisney, and Nicolae 
Morar (London: Bloomsbury, forthcoming 2016).
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Readers of A Thousand Plateaus will certainly remember the 
bold and provocative statement “there is no ideology and never 
has been.”19 Yet, far from denying ideology itself this statement 
was intended to be performative and dramatic, much like a slo-
gan, as Robert Porter has astutely described it.20 As we will see 
further, for Deleuze and Guattari, once ideology is transformed 
into “noology,” the power relations and the technical wiring of 
thought become evident and the evasive understanding of ide-
ology as “ideology-cloud”21 disappears. This transformation is 
made possible by integrating Foucault’s work, as a point of no 
return, but also by continuing the critique of images of thought 
that occupied a central place in Deleuze’s early work from Ni-
etzsche and Philosophy to Difference and Repetition, and later in 
Cinema 2: Time-Image and What Is Philosophy?. In the English 
preface to Difference and Repetition written in 1986, Deleuze 
adds that the project of the image of thought (noology) remains 
for him “the most necessary and the most concrete.”22 In What 
Is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari conclude that the image 
of thought is the plane of immanence, it is the image of “what 
it means to think” and the image of “the uses of thought” in a 
particular society at a given moment: “[t]he image of thought 
retains only what thought can claim by right.”23 Every society 
produces an image of thought, and the new image of thought 
never fully replaces the old image, but superposes the old one 
19 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 4.
20 Robert Porter, “From Clichés to Slogans: Towards a Deleuze-Guattarian 
Critique of Ideology,” Social Semiotics, 20, no. 3 (2010): 233–45, at 239.
21 I am using Michel Pêcheux’s expression “ideology-cloud” (idéologie-nuage) 
as discussed by Macherey, see Le Sujet des normes, 290–98. The other 
notion that Pêcheux introduced in his general theory of ideology in 1968 
was “ideology-cement” (idéologie-ciment), which implies the proximity 
and materiality of ideology as opposed to the floating weightlessness of the 
“ideology-cloud.”
22 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994), xvii. Again in 1988, in an interview with 
François Ewald for Le magazine littéraire, Deleuze explains that noology 
should be the program of philosophy. See Deleuze, Negotiations, 148–49.
23 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tom-
linson and Graham Burchell (London/New York: Verso Books, 1994), 37.
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as a new layer or stratum. Thus, Deleuze and Guattari refer to 
noological time as “a stratigraphic time”:
A stratum or layer of the plane of immanence will necessar-
ily be above or below in relation to another, and images of 
thought cannot arise in any order whatever because they in-
volve changes of orientation that can be directly located only 
on the earlier image […].24
Noologies do not arrive in sequence, the old one replacing the 
new one, rather, they accumulate over time; they are part of a 
process of sedimentation. Noology is the project of both diag-
nosing the current and the older strata (the images below), and 
constructing new layers of sedimentation. The production of 
new images of thought is particularly difficult and painful since 
it requires a certain violence to overcome the shared indiffer-
ence attached to the activity of thinking.25
The new category of noology is necessary in their endeavor 
to leave behind the equivocation and the ambivalence attached 
to the notion of “ideology.” I argue that it was not simply to re-
but the Marxist tradition that both Foucault and Deleuze-Guat-
tari adopted new terminologies: the organization of power or 
the “art of government” for Foucault, and noology for Deleuze 
and Guattari. This practice of using new terms (noology) to 
contribute to the re-elaboration of a classic concept (ideology) 
is not unique in Deleuze and Guattari. We can compare this to 
their treatment of the notion of “utopia,” suggesting that it can 
be replaced by Samuel Butler’s “Erewhon,” a term that refers si-
multaneously to “No-where” and “Now-here.”26 Concepts are 
perishable and can be mutilated, they need to be re-activated 
24 Ibid., 58.
25 I have attempted to explain this aspect of Deleuze’s thought in Benoît Dil-
let, “What is Called Thinking? When Deleuze Walks Along Heideggerian 
Paths,” Deleuze Studies 7, no. 2 (2013): 250–74.
26 “[I]n view of the mutilated meaning public opinion has given to it, perhaps 




or remodeled to fit the new state of affairs. Just as Deleuze re-
ferred to Charles Péguy’s expression that events can rot or de-
compose when losing their dynamism, concepts too can rot.27 
Every concept derives from a necessity but these are historically 
determined, and there is a historicity of concepts.
We can admit indeed, given the conditions of formation, 
that “ideology” is not a very good concept […] [but] are 
there concepts that can be considered “good all the way” and 
that did not need to be safeguarded against recuperations 
[dérive]?28 
This effort of updating ideology-theory by Macherey should be 
welcome and pursued, hence my modest contribution to this 
debate here.
Familialism
When one is looking for ideology in Anti-Oedipus, “familialism” 
first comes to mind. Familialism could be defined as both the 
reduction by psychoanalysts of the forms of mental and social 
disorder to the Oedipal complex, as well as the strict naturaliza-
tion of the family-structure that conditions this interpretative 
framework. Polemically, Deleuze and Guattari write about the 
Oedipal complex: “In reality it is a completely ideological begin-
ning, for the sake of ideology.”29 For them, the Oedipal complex 
is not false, since such a position would be equally problem-
atic and ideological, but participates in ideology (“for the sake 
of ideology”), and ultimately, in capital. The whole project of 
Anti-Oedipus was therefore “the denunciation of Oedipus as the 
“inevitable illusion” falsifying all historical production.”30 Their 
critique of ideology could not be clearer here. Yet we should not 
27 Deleuze, Negotiations, 170.
28 Macherey, Études, 87.
29 Ibid., 101.
30 Gilles Deleuze, Two Regimes of Madness, ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Ames 
Hodges and Michael Taormina (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2006), 309.
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rush to the thought that the Oedipal schema is a falsifying pro-
duction because it is repressing the individual, or because indi-
viduals desire it. This is the mistake that certain authors made 
by attempting to argue for a Freud-Marx synthesis. Reich and 
others were too quick at identifying “social repression [répres-
sion] and psychic repression [refoulement] at the cost of a series 
of illusions and led to hypostasize ‘sexual liberation’ as the ob-
ject of the struggles of emancipation.”31 Contrary to these forms 
of Freudo-Marxism, Deleuze and Guattari treat familialism as 
an image of thought, and in doing so they will therefore argue 
that Oedipus does exist and, even more surprisingly, they will 
claim that the material existence of Oedipus is universal:
Yes, Oedipus is universal. But the error lies in having believed 
in the following alternative: either Oedipus is the product of 
the social repression-psychic repression system, in which 
case it is not universal; or it is universal, and a position of de-
sire. In reality, it is universal because it is the displacement of 
the limit that haunts all societies, the displaced represented 
[le représenté déplacé] that disfigures what all societies dread 
absolutely as their most profound negative: namely, the de-
coded flows of desire.32
In this remarkable passage, Deleuze and Guattari emphasize that 
the error of Oedipus will not disappear so easily given its mate-
rial existence in society, particularly in relations with “universal 
history.” But what is “universal history” and what is its relation 
to noology? Universal history should be understood as the con-
tingent integration in all societies of two limits: the absolute 
limit of schizophrenia as the dazzling and anarchical creative 
production of the unconscious, and the relative limit of capital 
that is integrated within the social to produce its immanent dy-
31 Guillaume Sibertin-Blanc, Deleuze et l’Anti-Œdipe: La production du désir 
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2010), 82.
32 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 177.
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namism.33 Capitalism is ultimately hypocritical since it portrays 
itself as a moderate mechanism of distribution of wealth (via the 
notorious trickle down effect for instance) while functioning on 
the constant displacement of its limits: “things work well only 
providing they break down, crises [are] ‘the means immanent to 
the capitalist mode of production.’”34
The overall objective of Anti-Oedipus is to show the corre-
spondence and the analogy at work between familialism and 
capital. Capitalism can only constantly displace its limits by re-
integrating new roles for “daddy-mommy-me.”35 In other words, 
the Oedipal noology is found not only at the level of psychoana-
lytic practice but, more crucially, at the level of the socius: it is 
the historical production of reality that is abstracted. Therefore, 
to study familialism noologically means to study its social insti-
tutions and its social (re)production, both in terms of content 
(related to bodies) and expressions (related to signs). Deleuze 
and Guattari want to “revamp the theory of ideology by saying 
that expressions and statements intervene directly in productiv-
ity, in the form of a production of meaning or sign-value.”36 Put 
differently, the only theory of ideology that they would agree 
with is one that studies the intervention of expressions and 
functions in the mode of libidinal and economic production. 
Such a general theory of ideology (as noology) would account 
for the images that create an adhesion to the capitalist system.
By taking a closer look at Anti-Oedipus, one finds this re-
vamped theory of ideology beginning with what Deleuze and 
Guattari call the axiomatic. They refer to the capitalist axiomatic 
as the organization of rules (axioms) that underlie the capitalist 
33 This thesis about the internal limit of capitalism that is constantly dis-
placed is interpreted from Deleuze and Guattari’s reading of Marx’s Capital 
book III. They write: “If capitalism is the exterior limit of all societies, this 
is because capitalism for its part has no exterior limit, but only an interior 
limit that is capital itself and that it does not encounter, but reproduces by 
always displacing it” (Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 230–31).
34 Ibid., 230.
35 Ibid., 51.
36 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 89.
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machinery, but this axiomatic is far from being static. On the 
contrary, it is extremely plastic and adaptable to new situations 
and forms of contestation: “How much flexibility there is in the 
axiomatic of capitalism, always ready to widen its own limits 
so as to add a new axiom to a previously saturated system!”37 
Deleuze and Guattari use the term axiomatic rather than ideol-
ogy since it explains the operability of capitalism and the per-
formativity of the capitalist axioms. The axiomatic constantly 
metamorphoses, or to be more precise, it is composed of layers 
of sedimentation, in which a new layer always covers a previous 
one. There is a constant movement forward, and the new axiom 
that supplements and modifies slightly the orientation of the 
capitalist axiomatic attempts to overshadow the previous axiom: 
“memory has become a bad thing.”38 The capitalist axiomatic has 
also emptied out the meaning of language and transformed it 
into a domain of “order-words”:
Above all, there is no longer any need of belief, and the capi-
talist is merely striking a pose when he bemoans the fact that 
nowadays no one believes in anything any more. Language 
no longer signifies something that must be believed, it indi-
cates rather what is going to be done.39
Language is turned into a functional realm in which there is no 
room for enlarging sympathies. The axiomatic noologically in-
tends to replace the social by the space and time of capital but 
“one must not think that it replaces the socius” since the social 
machine and the technical machines are two different types of 
machines.40 In these extracts, Deleuze and Guattari conduct 
their ideology critique without falling prey to a cynicism that 
refuses to critique capitalism and its inner workings, but em-
phasize the disappearance of belief that underlies the capital-






ist axiomatic. In short, while classical and orthodox Marxists 
argued that ideology distorted reality and led workers to forget 
about the material production of their lives, Deleuze and Guat-
tari on the other hand demonstrate that ideology in the 1970s 
was characterized by the privation of those distorted realities 
(beliefs); ideology had become ideology-cement instead of ide-
ology-cloud.41
Once all beliefs disappear, hope disappears, friendship and 
the family disappear, cynicism grows, and the social reproduc-
tion works through images that come to govern our existence. 
These images are the functions of thought that circulate in the 
socius:
We have repudiated and lost all our beliefs that proceeded by 
way of objective representations. The earth is dead, the desert 
is growing: the old father is dead, the territorial father, and 
the son too, the despot Oedipus. We are alone with our bad 
conscience and our boredom, our life where nothing hap-
pens; nothing left but images that revolve within the infinite 
subjective representation. We will muster all our strength so 
as to believe in these images, from the depths of a structure 
that governs our relationships with them […].42
This new economy of images appears in the ruins caused by 
cynicism and in the extreme faith in objectivity. Yet this ob-
jectivity is not sufficiently denounced, as Deleuze and Guattari 
note, for not being objective, but, on the contrary, for passing 
for objectivity. They critique the idea of general equivalence on 
which capitalism rests by demonstrating that “capitalists and 
their economists” assert that “surplus value cannot be deter-
mined mathematically.”43 The same capitalists do everything “in 
favor of the very thing they are bent on hiding: that it is not the 
41 “The unidimensional society has taken away ideology’s capacity to create 
illusions” (Macherey, Le sujet des normes, 324).
42 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 308.
43 Ibid., 228.
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same money that goes into the pocket of the wage earner and 
is entered on the balance sheet of a commercial enterprise.”44 
In this passage, Deleuze and Guattari present a concrete noo-
logical study, they uncover the institutionality and materiality 
of thought (the notorious “confidence of the market”). The in-
stitutional organization of the distribution of money that is sup-
posedly rational and mathematic is in fact largely based on a 
dissimulation operated by the financial system: “one is correct 
in speaking of a profound dissimulation of the dualism of these 
two forms of money, payment and financing — the two aspects 
of banking practice.”45 In their noology critique, Deleuze and 
Guattari therefore find the hidden formula of the two forms of 
money that are mediated by the bank: ideology is located in the 
financial institutional system itself.46 The paradox of money is 
that, on the one hand, we take money as being the most objec-
tive fact in our lives, but on the other, we know that it operates 
through “contingent rules” that are abstracted from our lives.47
To take an example, we can refer to the current “mediamac-
ro” in place in the United Kingdom that equates government 
budgets with household budgets (“keeping the books”) so that 
the ideological message of austerity “one should not spend more 
than one has” gets largely integrated into the doxa: everyone (in-
dividuals and firms) have to tighten their belts.48 To equate indi-
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid., 229, emphasis in the original.
46 Read comments on Deleuze’s distinction between an arithmetical and 
a differential understanding of surplus-value introduced in one of his 
Vincennes courses in December 1971: the first one is quantifiable while the 
second one refuses equivalence. The differential understanding emphasizes 
the construction of the equivalence between a unit of money and a unit of 
knowledge: “there is an encounter between a flow of money and a flow of 
knowledge” (Read, “Fetish is Always Actual,” 91).
47 Martijn Konings, The Emotional Logic of Capitalism: What Progressives 
Have Missed (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015), 3.
48 I borrow the term “mediamacro” from Simon Wren-Lewis, to refer to the 
vulgarized discourse on macroeconomics largely present in the UK media. 
See Simon Wren-Lewis, “The Austerity Con,” London Review of Books 37, 
no. 4, February 19, 2015, 9–11.
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vidual household budgets and government budgets is extremely 
misleading and clearly participates in a political project.49
Yet, this apparent objectivity of capital, Deleuze and Guat-
tari note, is “by no means a failure to recognize or an illusion 
of consciousness,” but rather the productive essence of financial 
capitalism itself.50 It is precisely because the desire for money 
is a desire for one’s own powerlessness that the dissimulation 
is productive and not deceptive or distracting.51 The difference 
between the absolute limit that schizophrenia represents (all 
structures break down in schizophrenia; it is a dissolution of the 
subject and productive work) and the relative limit of capitalism 
lies in the process of re-integrating the decoded flows of desire 
in an axiomatic.52 As I explained earlier, the construction of this 
axiomatic is a constant process of adding new axioms, much 
like sedimentation: one function (axiom) does not fully replace 
the former function but only adds a new dimension to conjure 
and to push back the moment of the ultimate breakdown (the 
absolute limit). This is why “the bourgeois is justified in saying, 
not in terms of ideology, but in the very organization of his axi-
omatic: there is only one machine,” and not two classes with op-
posing interests.53 The notorious slogan of neoliberalism “there 
is no alternative” is not a mere ideological statement but an or-
ganization of the axiomatic, since the axiomatic is defined by its 
singularity that gathers all axioms and binds individuals into a 
single social machine. The “bourgeois” works at the noological 
level of functions and the axiomatic, that is in a post-ideological 
49 This can be compared to Paul Krugman’s oft-cited argument that business 
and economics should be differentiated. See Paul Krugman, “A Country Is 
Not a Company,” Harvard Business Review, January–February 1996, 40–51.
50 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 239.
51 “[T]he flow of merchant capital’s economic force and the flow that is deri-
sively named ‘purchasing power’ — a flow made truly impotent [impuis-
santé] that represents the absolute impotence [impuissance] of the wage 
earner as well as the relative dependence of the industrial capitalist” (ibid., 
238–39).
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world making up the social machine. Once again Deleuze and 
Guattari want to contrast an analysis that takes into account 
noology, functions, and the axiomatic on the one hand, with 
the ill-suited dogmatic Marxist framework that focuses on class 
consciousness, false consciousness, thought-contents, beliefs, 
and the “superstructure” on the other. It is precisely because 
beliefs and ideology have vanished that the Marxist ideology 
theory (although Deleuze and Guattari portray a rather crude 
version of it) is no longer relevant.
Images of capital and images of images
Having discussed how Deleuze and Guattari transformed the 
project of ideology critique into a project that takes into account 
desire, not as an immaterial and weightless substance but in its 
materiality, we can now go as far as to conclude that they aimed 
to study the material inscriptions of ideology: transforming ide-
ology critique into geology or physics.54 At this point, we need 
to come back to the loss of belief and the reign of images to 
understand how Deleuze provides an answer to questions about 
the capitalist exploitation of abstract desire in Cinema 2: The 
Time-Image.
There are at least two reasons why the turn to images is cru-
cial here. First, instead of representation it is the materiality of 
images that interests Deleuze, the circulation of these images, 
continuing in a way Benjamin’s early reflections on the repro-
ducibility of images. Second, the analyses of images continue 
the noology project, of studying the historicity of the images of 
thought.
Social reproduction is established with image-functions, 
and just as philosophy has conceptual personae, capitalism has 
“figures.” Through the production of these figures and roles es-
54 “But in reality, the unconscious belongs to the realm of physics; the body 
without organs and its intensities are not metaphors, but matter itself ” 
(Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 283).
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tablished within the axiomatic, individuals become functions 
integrated in the axiomatic:
[Individuals] are nothing more or less than configurations or 
images produced by the points-signs, the breaks-flows, the 
pure “figures” of capitalism: the capitalist as personified capi-
tal — i.e., as a function derived from the flow of capital; and 
the worker as personified labor capacity — i.e., a function de-
rived from the flow of labor.55
Deleuze and Guattari conclude that, through the mechanism of 
social reproduction in place in familialism, private persons are 
secondary, they are “images of images,” images of the second 
order.56 The familialist images operate by copying the images of 
capital. This is why they call these private images, “images of im-
ages” or “simulacra.”57 In capitalism the images of the first order 
are generated to capture the flows of desire by capital. Desires 
are captured and abstracted to fit in one of the images produced 
by capitalism: “[C]apitalism fills its field of immanence with im-
ages: even destitution, despair, revolt — and on the other side, 
the violence and the oppression of capital — become images of 
destitutions, despair, revolt, violence, or oppression.”58 It is also 
because of the withering of belief that the old understanding of 
ideology as belief system does not work anymore for neoliberal 
societies (after the 1970s). Beliefs have been “flattened” by the 
axiomatic, to use a word that is recurrent in this third chapter of 
Anti-Oedipus. An entire “psychology of the priest” is organized 
by the images of capital that are reproduced by their simulacra 
in the family structure (the father as the capitalist, and so on).59 
But contrary to what we may think at first, there is no contra-




59 “Father, mother, and child thus become the simulacrum of the images of 
capital (“Mister Capital, Madame Earth,” and their child the Worker), with 
the result that these images are no longer recognized at all in the desire 
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diction between the withering of belief and the extreme mor-
alization of society.60 Bad conscience is socially organized and 
reinforced by the images and the melodrama. In the economy of 
images, the bad passions are strictly dominating:
[D]epression and guilt [are] used as a means of contagion, 
the kiss of the Vampire: aren’t you ashamed to be happy? fol-
low my example, I won’t let you go before you say, “It’s my 
fault.” O ignoble contagion of the depressives, neurosis as the 
only illness consisting in making others ill […] the abject de-
sire to be loved, the whimpering at not being loved enough, 
at not being “understood” […].61
In the vacuity of belief and the reign of images, the role of 
schizoanalysis in Anti-Oedipus and of cinema in Cinema 2: The 
Time-Image, would be to produce images against the images of 
capital. The struggle against the economy of sad passions cannot 
be launched at the level of positive messages and content, but 
rather at the material level, in the physics of thought, to change 
the image of thought (what it means to think): “[I]mages are 
not in our head, in our brain. The brain is just one image among 
others.”62 It is an image of thought to conceive the brain as a 
recipient of images, while in fact the organization of the brain is 
co-constituted with the exteriorizations. The image of the brain 
shapes how thought processes take place, what limitations one 
puts on one’s thought. Deleuze would argue that the powers 
that be have an interest in keeping a socially accepted image of 
the brain as a calculating machine that fits the homo economi-
cus. Noology critique operates from inventing new human and 
non-human assemblages instead of clinging to old structures 
of thought. There is no contradiction between the micro and 
that is determined to invest only their simulacrum. The familial determi-
nations become the application of the social axiomatic” (ibid.)
60 On this paradox, see Mark Alizart, Pop théologie: protestantisme et postmo-
dernité (Paris: Presses Universitaire de France, 2015).
61 Ibid., 268–69.
62 Deleuze, Negotiations, 42, translation modified.
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macro levels, instead the flattened understanding of ideology 
takes into account the relations between all levels. “It is not that 
our thinking starts from what we know about the brain but that 
any new thought traces uncharted channels directly through its 
matter, twisting, folding and fissuring it.”63 Thinking is a micro-
physical operation in the brain, rather than an immaterial prod-
uct. But this microphysics does not mean that noology forgets 
about the hierarchization and verticalization at work in socie-
ties — familialism and hyle morphism are examples of such rela-
tions of domination. 
What is fundamental in noology critique is that it does not 
and cannot work without inventing new forms of thought. The 
production of new images in cinema is an example of such a 
production for Deleuze to “restore our belief in this world.”64 
Deleuze distinguishes here between a cerebral cinema and a cin-
ema of control.65 While the latter produces clichés and melodra-
mas, the former creates new types of images (through lectosigns 
and noosigns) in the chain of images. What interests Deleuze in 
cinema is how certain images attempt to break from clichés (or 
the “images of images”) that private individuals are subjected 
to in the capitalist axiomatic. Since we are embedded in the 
dark world of images of images (simulacra), we can only rework 
these types of images by standing behind the camera, from the 
depth of the cave, instead of succumbing to these:
On the one hand, the image constantly sinks to the state of 
cliché […] [and] it is a civilization of the cliché where all the 
powers have an interest in hiding images from us […]. On 
the other hand, at the same time, the image constantly at-
tempts to break through the cliché, to get out of the cliché.66 
63 Ibid., 149.
64 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and 
Robert Galeta (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 172.
65 This is particularly well contrasted in his letter to Serge Daney (Deleuze, 
Negotiations, 68–79).
66 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 21.
The project of creating “images” — and therefore brains (“give 
me a brain”67) — in cinema allows for the possibility of breaking 





Passion, Cinema,  
and the Old Materialism
Louis-Georges Schwartz
At the end of the twentieth century, cinema underwent regime 
change, not death. Cinema has become universalized in the 
form of gently used media. Its leading edge subordinates both 
movement and image to hostility, and articulates affect through 
a new set of images and signs. In the past, cinematic affect was 
transindividual, molecular, and social; the new regime express-
es affect as a molar ready made imposed on individuals by the 
economy. The films themselves make it clear that these changes 
erupted from recent capitalist restructuring of both production 
and the markets. As a method for understanding the interaction 
of cinema and capital, I will force Gilles Deleuze’s Cinema 1 and 
Cinema 2 to become a draft, a draft of his lost project Grandeur 
de Marx and analyze affect in today’s image regime with Alex 
Rivera’s Sleep Dealer (2008). 
In Cinema 1 and Cinema 2, Deleuze describes a passionate 
art that narrates a consciousness which must either suffer the 
world or change it. If consciousness cannot recreate the world 
according to its desires, the world as it is degrades and confuses 
consciousness while weakening bodies. Under each regime, the 
labor-capital relation determines labor’s capacity to act. The 
movement-image presents an active consciousness moving 
rationally through a comprehensible world to solve problems, 
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accomplish goals, and execute programs. The time-image, on 
the other hand, presents a passional consciousness, stunned by 
the world situation, and looking for the determinations of its 
circumstances. Deleuze’s two cinematic regimes irrupt dialecti-
cally from the levels of subsumption before and after World War 
II. The third period is determined by the non-relation between 
surplus populations and surplus capital in our time. Real sub-
sumption was a fact of labor’s life but workers’ victories were 
in struggles over absolute surplus value, the length of work, not 
its intensity. The prewar movement-image developed during an 
era dominated by struggles in the capitalist core over the for-
mal subsumption of labor: over the length of the working day 
and the right to vacations and holidays. The movement-image 
lost salience, and the time-image replaced it once Taylorization 
had been completed and introduced even in semi-peripheral 
countries such as Italy. It expresses the real subsumption of la-
bor, in which capital controls every aspect of the labor process 
and workers struggle over hourly wages and working condi-
tions. With the twenty-first century comes Cinema Hostis and 
full subsumption, in which the difference between labor and 
being available for labor becomes increasingly indiscernible: 
every aspect of social reproduction has been included in capi-
tal’s circuits of exchange. The ever rising organic composition of 
capital — the ratio of machine work to human labor — leads to 
structural unemployment, relative surplus population that can-
not be absorbed into the waged labor force, and a working class 
seeking to abolish itself. 
Each cinematic period expresses affect through its own signs 
within the mood appropriate to the exigencies of the economic 
situation from which the regimes spring. The cinematic regimes 
not only have specific affective signs; between the three periods, 
the forms of affective expression change. The movement-image 
suffers the world with anxiety. Its differentiated affects crystalize 
in subjects who are necessary to the disciplined movements en-
tailed in the production and circulation of commodities. Within 
the passionate boredom of the time-image, subjects have them-
selves become commodities which encounter affects externally 
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in whatever-spaces that are abstracted by the pure sensation 
of time passing. Cinema Hostis’s mood of enmity can only re-
peat itself in the form of weaponized affects used by parties to 
a struggle. 
Economy has lain waste to the world and exterminated every 
form of life opposing production and exchange. Economy cre-
ates subjects with interests which it sets to work against one an-
other and has only ever been an organization of hostility. The 
emergence of enmity in cinema can be verified by consulting 
various recent dossiers on contemporary film such as Neolib-
eralism and Global Cinema, edited by Jyotsna Kapur and Keith 
Wagner. The articles in that collection describe “ghostly land-
scapes filled with wandering souls and the scattered body parts 
of shattered dreams, suppressed rage, disappointments, and 
despair,”1 a poetics of 
[t]he violence of things over the living, of the lifelong depen-
dence on debt, of mannequin bodies that real people aspire 
for, and finally the power of money to control not only the 
quality of life, but the right to life itself […].2
They find a cinema that links the hospital “character attitudes” 
to “architectures of urban space” in order to map “the destabiliz-
ing of community in an age of survivalist capitalism.”3
1 Xudong Zang, “Market Socialism and Its Discontent: Jia Zhangke’s Cin-
ematic Narrative of China’s Transition in the Age of Global Capital,” in 
Neoliberalism and Global Cinema: Capital, Culture and Marxist Critique, 
eds. Jyotsna Kapur and Keith B. Wagner, 135–65 (London: Routledge, 2011), 
137.
2 Jyotsna Kapur, “The Underdevelopment of Development: Neoliberalism 
and the Crisis of Bourgeois Individualism,” in Neoliberalism and Global 
Cinema: Capital, Culture and Marxist Critique, eds. Jyotsna Kapur and 
Keith B. Wagner, 197–216 (London: Routledge, 2011), 198.
3 Keith B. Wagner, “Fragments of Labor: Neoliberal Attitudes and Archi-
tectures in Contemporary South Korean Cinema,” in Neoliberalism and 
Global Cinema: Capital, Culture and Marxist Critique, eds. Jyotsna Kapur 
and Keith B. Wagner, 217–38 (London: Routledge, 2011), 218. 
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Perhaps to bring cinema’s recent hostile mood out most 
clearly, one only needs to recollect the quizzical looks on Paris-
ian’s faces when the participants in Chronique d’un été (Edgar 
Morin and Jean Rouch, 1961) asked them whether they were 
happy. In 1959, it seemed an absurd question, a question out of 
synch with the film’s abstracted spaces and circulating subjects. 
The out of joint question created a fractured horizon keeping 
Chronique d’un été’s concrete durations from harmonizing, al-
lowing the film to depict the cracks of the past between the cob-
blestones over which the characters walk, as well as the shad-
ows of intensified struggle to come. Today one cannot imagine 
anything but the most soiled clichés of Sarkozy administration’s 
“happiness index” from a film organized around that question. 
According to Deleuze, in the movement-image, affects well 
up after movements of perception, waves of sound and light, 
have flowed from a world to a subject. Affect appears when 
that movement, temporarily enclosed in the subject, and no 
longer a motion between points A and B, becomes a twinge of 
pure quality. Affect eventually further sublimates into thought 
or flows out to the world. Although the movement-image’s af-
fects crystalize within subjects, they result from a-human and 
transpersonal movements initiated outside that subject. Affects 
individuate themselves inside the sensory motor arc linking per-
ception, a center of indetermination and the incurved horizon 
of the world. In the movement-image affects express themselves 
on subjects’ surfaces, on their faces, resulting in what Deleuze 
calls the affection-image. The affection-image has a sign of com-
position, the facial close up, and a genetic sign, the any-space-
whatever. 
The regime of the movement-image expresses the chrono-
topes of an era during which surplus value extraction rates were 
high enough for labor to constitute itself as a subject capable of 
executing a program. Movement-images depict the form of time 
needed by the working class in order to revolutionize its struggle 
over the length of the working day. In an essay entitled “Three 
Temporal Dimensions of Class Struggle,” George Caffentzis 
elaborates on the two forms of time proper to capital: the linear 
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time used to measure production and the circular time used to 
track the reproduction of capital.4 Both forms measure move-
ment. When labor appears as part of capital, it too must rely on 
those forms of temporality. Gilles Dauvé and Karl Nesic’s de-
scription of this period as “programmatist”5 implies that labor 
needed forms of time that measure the movements of produc-
tion: a circular time to orient itself within the capital’s expanded 
reproduction, and a linear time to articulate its programs. In this 
period labor needed a temporality capable of linking perception 
to moving bodies, functioning as centers of indetermination 
and subjectivity, a temporality within which the actions of those 
bodies could meet their objects in the world. If the production 
process determines the essence of the labor-capital relation it 
does so by determining the time of social relations. 
In the facial close up, affect appears as a mobile impulse on 
a sensory nerve. The facial close up composes affects from the 
relations between facial features and distributes those affects 
along a spectrum between the active pole of desire and the re-
flective pole of wonder. The tight framing of the close up ab-
stracts the face from its spatiotemporal coordinates, allowing 
films to express pure qualities independently of situations with-
in which qualities are realized. A face with features that break 
its outline expresses the extreme of desire while a stilled, plate-
like face expresses wonder. Writing about this period of formal 
subsumption, Jason Read shows that capital creates a mode of 
subjectivity immanent to the abstract labor power that it pro-
duces.6 Individual, “free,” skilled, servile workers and cooperat-
ing subjects born of industry were both results of the contradic-
tory movement of capital’s antagonisms, and its distribution of a 
range of affects between subjects. 
4 George Caffentzis, In Letters of Blood and Fire: Work, Machines, and the 
Crisis of Capitalism (Oakland: PM Press, 2013), 82–87.
5 Gilles Dauvé and Karl Nesic, “Love of Labour? Love of Labour Lost…,” 
End Notes 1 (2008): 104–52.
6 Jason Read, The Micro-Politics of Capital: Marx and the Prehistory of the 
Present (New York: SUNY Press, 2003), 62.
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Charlie Chaplin’s Modern Times (1936) exemplifies affection-
image compositions in the movement-image regime. Chaplin’s 
Tramp character goes from factory to prison to home, mechani-
cally stumbling upon one enclosed space after another. Chap-
lin’s comedy comes from responding to situations with inappro-
priate movements, including the micro-movements of his face, 
thus transforming the situation in unexpected ways. Despite the 
relatively low number of close ups in Modern Times, the Tramp’s 
face remains disconnected from the space around it, separated 
by its different make up and the abnormal connection between 
his expression and the actions. By crystallizing the “wrong af-
fect” the Tramp space makes the determinations of other char-
acters’ expressions intelligible. He makes the audience wait to 
see how he will escape the difficulties each presents to him, sus-
pending the laughter in the passionate element of anxiety. 
The Tramp’s face moves inappropriately. When the lunch 
signal sounds while he tries to rescue a fellow worker trapped 
in the gears of a huge machine, the Tramp gets his colleague’s 
food, eats, and feeds the other worker with a calm and beatific 
expression of enjoyment rather than the expected resolved or 
panicked look. When the Tramp accidentally inhales some co-
caine hidden in a saltshaker while in jail, his face is a spasm of 
desire, unlike the faces of the other prisoners and the guards, 
who do not know the reason for his over-stimulation. Perceiv-
ing the factory, the jail, and the home overwhelms the Tramp, 
and an affect uncorrelated with his situation wells up in him. 
The Tramp’s irrational affect exposes the process of industrial 
subjectification, and eventually forges a way out. 
In the film’s conclusion, the Tramp and his lover find them-
selves excluded from all enclosures, homeless, and unemployed, 
abandoned on the side of the road. In a close medium shot their 
two faces pass through series of expressions from surrender to 
determination in an accelerated coda of facial expressions. The 
lovers’ faces finally become smiling masks expressing their new-
ly found power to take the road out of the metropolis toward the 
abstracted horizon of the industrial US’s mythical road. 
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As Read’s work demonstrates, subsumption’s affects emerge 
from the latent possibilities in the flows and axioms specific to 
that period of capitalism as opposed to new affects capable of 
transforming the image regime within which they function. 
Nonetheless potential for the new emerges in the affection-im-
age’s genetic sign. 
Deleuze points out that close-ups sometimes include a frag-
ment of space to the side of the face, removed from its spatio-
temporal coordinates. Any space can be framed as a provision-
ally closed set of relations, just as the face can.7 Such abstracted 
whatever-spaces function as the affection-image’s genetic sign, 
causing semiotic mutations and articulating a different image 
regime. Subjects disappear in whatever-spaces, and affect ap-
pears externally as an abstracted set of relations enduring a pas-
sage of time. The time-image emerges as the increased use of 
whatever-spaces changes cinematic affect from an expression 
crystalized within a subject into the time of relations in general, 
opening it to non-human qualities, and further sublating affect 
into powers of thought. 
The second cinematic regime, the time-image, expresses the 
period of real subsumption after World War II, when Taylori-
zation had been completed in the core and older industries in 
which the work had not been automated and made technical 
had been bombed out of existence and rebuilt. Capital now 
possessed and controlled the techniques of labor as well as its 
forms, and workers sought to escape the plane of capital rather 
than transforming it from within. Instead of measuring move-
ments internal to capitalism, the time-image rendered time in 
a pure state. 
The massive and uneven destruction of capital in the Sec-
ond World War led to a shift in the labor capital relation, which 
caused the movement-image to lose salience in the capitalist 
semi-periphery during a new round of primitive accumula-
7 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson 
and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1986), 108.
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tion. This phase, in which the bourgeoisie takes what it needs 
for capitalism to function by any means necessary, formed the 
base from which modern cinema erupted. Italy provides a clear 
example of this process, which explains much about its postwar 
cinema and perhaps also explains the Italian fascination with 
phrases such as “consumer capitalism,” “social reproduction,” 
“biopower,” “biopolitics,” and “the social factory.” When the cy-
cle of restructuring initiated by postwar primitive accumulation 
ended, and the factories started to shrink, Italian insurrection-
ists still believed the revolutionary mass must be composed of 
productive laborers, and so they decided that exchange and re-
production must produce somehow surplus value, even if such 
a supposition was questionable. 
After the war, the modernization of Italian agriculture drove 
peasants from the south into vast, ghettoized labor pools in the 
brogate, or peripheral slums, of northern cities. This migra-
tion spewed out immigrants who became Australians or, like 
Antonio Berruti, minor characters in the Paris of films such as 
Breathless (Jean-Luc Godard, 1960). Modernizing agriculture 
meant that many fewer laborers were required to grow the same 
amount of produce and livestock; the resulting migration to in-
dustrial centers transformed Italian peasantry into a proletariat 
with a massive unemployed layer. “Between 1950 and 1967, […] 
more than a third of the Italian population moved from one dis-
trict to another.”8 The proletarianized reserve labor pools were 
forced to work to live, yet capital did not require all of their 
labor. In capitalism reserve labor pools must provide for their 
own continued existence because capitalism deprives potential 
workers of the means of reproduction in order to force them 
to be available as laborers — the definition of proletarianization. 
In the abode of production the real subsumption of labor ac-
celerated with the Marshall Plan that fueled Italian hyper-de-
velopment. Pier Paolo Pasolini would remark that he saw the 
assembly line implanted throughout Italy in a ten-year period. 
8 Ernest Dowson, “The Italian Background,” Radical America 7, no. 2 (1973): 
7–14, at 8.
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Every aspect of proletariat’s existence was now determined and 
regulated by capital. Labor began to realize that only by “leav-
ing the plan(e) of capital, and never ceasing to leave it,” “a mass 
becomes increasingly revolutionary and destroys the dominant 
equilibrium […].”9
In the time-image, characters attempt to find a way off the 
planes subsuming them by thinking the determinants of the 
situations that trap them. The stunned characters cannot re-
act to incoming movements effectively and float on the forces 
that determine them. They become perceivers, or what Deleuze 
calls “spiritual automata,”10 instead of agents. Rendered semi-
catatonic by the banal intolerability of the post-war world, these 
perceivers see far but are only capable of small acts. The seers 
must find a subtle way to reconnect with the world, just as labor 
had to find a way to sustain itself where capital had alienated it 
from all means of production. The determinations of the time-
image’s situations offer a way out, a potential for autonomy. 
Once cybernetics’ controlling networks had replaced the dis-
ciplinary enclosures of formal subsumption, full subsumption, 
became possible in the capitalist core. Once economy engulfed 
all bodies and minds, creating a networked subjectification, 
characters began to rely on the structure of the market the way 
we depend on the physical laws to move through space. 
The members of society are thus violently isolated, “individ-
ualized,” subjected to personalized (and hence inquisitive) 
abstract measurements that appear natural (or scientific) or 
appear to be the intrinsic property of “progressive” technical 
systems (or the technical objects of those systems). If persons 
are thingified, transformed into simple elements of account-
9 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism And 
Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Min-
nesota Press, 1987), 472.
10 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and 
Robert Galeta (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 169–70.
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ing, technical things (or commodities) become, conversely, 
not just alive but dominating.11
As Read points out, under real subsumption the very affect of 
labor belongs to capital.12 The restructuring of capital means 
changes in its flows of people, changes in the axioms that de-
termine subjects and social relations. Capital increasingly dis-
guised the capitalist relation itself, appropriating all formal and 
embodied human knowledge to its own appearance as some-
thing inherently productive, while making labor appear as re-
dundancy. The omnipotence of capital bored us; it left us with 
nothing to do but withdraw ourselves. The time-image express-
es real subsumption as an almost empty, subtractive cinema that 
makes the processes of capture, of abstraction, and domination 
perceivable, revealing a political order born of the power of 
economy and its categorizations — one that reduces human ac-
tion to labor and relative surplus populations to bare life. 
The cuts marking off the whatever-spaces that endure the 
time-images affects separate rather than connect shots. The 
characters in the films are too overwhelmed to become subjects 
and the affects refer to collective bodies that are ripped away 
from themselves and their worlds. Like the serial edits, bodies 
in the time-image assert their presence separately from the sub-
jectivities connected to them or the space around them; they 
occupy an isolated space interrupting the image often enclosing 
away from other, normal bodies. 
In Roberto Rossellini’s Europa ’51, Irene perceives the Roman 
slums as indifferent spaces, the abstraction of the streets and in-
teriors standing into contrast with the cartographic specificity 
of the bourgeois home. In her family, she works as a redundant 
housewife with a waged staff who she manages instead of do-
ing domestic labor directly. The unwaged existence of the poor 
11 Jacques Fradin, Economy, Ecumenes, Communism: Economy as the Dev-
astation of Ecumenes, Communism as Exit from Economy, trans. Robert 
Hurley (No New Ideas, n.d.), 20, http://no-new-ideas-press.tumblr.com/
post/126683784621/economy-is-constituted-and-develops-through-the
12 Read, The Micro-Politics of Capital, 2.
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and destitute women marks Europa ’51’s Rome as a space of bare 
life, the mode of human beings unable to sustain citizenship: 
the formless being. Irene’s mother mentions bare life’s essential 
figure when she warns her daughter that communists will end 
up in concentration camps if war breaks out again. Irene sees 
the factory she visits as the yard for a camp, haunting the edges 
of the film with the figure. Giorgio Agamben points out that 
since World War II camps have become the nomos of the mod-
ern metropolis, figuring the transformation of political space 
into zones of force.13 Variations on camp space, whatever-spaces, 
separate themselves from any world. Women enclosed within 
the forced labor of private reproduction incarnate bare life in 
societies of control, a status that paradoxically confers on their 
potential refusal of that labor, the power to end the reproduc-
tion of capitalism. 
Through the banal, bored subjectivity of a stunned house-
wife, Europa ’51 expresses a revolutionary desire: the desire to see 
the world just as it is in order to destroy its mediations. Irene’s 
desire surges within the difference between a zone marked as 
expressing the actual contradictions of social reproduction in 
post-war Italy, her home, and a fantastical zone presented as a 
virtual alternative mode of reproduction, the slums. The film 
presents both spaces through Irene’s schematic, time-imaged 
perceptions. Her refusal of her family’s private reproduction 
of the bourgeoisie and her flight into collectivized proletarian 
social reproduction functions are not simply expressions of a 
desire to perform women’s work by other means. They are im-
pressions of an impersonal need for systemic change based on a 
change in her society’s mode of reproduction. 
Control and society both come to an end with the emergence 
of full subsumption. Under full subsumption, the organic com-
position of capital has risen to a point where capital cannot ex-
tract enough surplus value from labor to keep growing. It must 
start distributing extant value upwards by commodifying every 
13 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. 
Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 166–88.
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aspect of human existence and subjecting us to universalized 
exchange. Simultaneously capital accumulates wealth by dis-
possession through legal or military force, which is the contem-
porary form of primitive accumulation. In this phase, capital 
governs by abandonment. An asocial formation arises between 
numb bodies governed by a destituent power and unmediated 
violence.14 The penetration of economy into every aspect of life 
is more than legible in the HSBC Holdings advertisement reading 
“in the future, there will be no more markets waiting to emerge.” 
When living becomes indiscernible from exchange, nothing new 
will emerge. Various all too familiar features of the contempo-
rary economy have transformed what little time workers could 
use for their reproduction into time during which they must be 
available for work.15 Concretely this means: last-minute schedul-
ing practices in minimum wage jobs, the tendency toward in-
dependent contracting in higher waged sectors, the growth of 
the flat corporation, the use of communications technology to 
tether us to our bosses, etc. Meanwhile, the “universal market” 
in services has completely colonized the sphere of reproduction. 
In the period of empire, life is completely subordinated to the 
economy and movement and time to hostility. For Tiqqun, the 
Hostis names that which has taken the place of social relations 
at a certain moment of the moving contradiction — the lived 
economy that reduces us to bare life. The cinematic expression 
of this contradiction results in films in which each is the enemy 
of each and the camera is the enemy of all. 
The prehistory of Cinema Hostis includes the development 
of a specific form of reality television in which characters live 
together while being constantly recorded. As initially developed 
by PBS’s An American Family (1971), in reality television hostility 
sometimes breaks out between the characters and at other times 
between the characters and the intrusive recording apparatus. 
14 Giorgio Agamben, “For a Theory of Destituent Power: Public Lecture in 
Athens,” November 16, 2013, http://www.chronosmag.eu/index.php/g-
agamben-for-a-theory-of-destituent-power.html.
15 Jonathan Crary, 24/7: Late Capitalism and the Ends of Sleep (London and 
New York: Verso, 2013).
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This form originates along with the crisis that brings capitalism’s 
golden age to a close. It comes at the very moment when the 
final distinct elements of reproduction start to merge with the 
universal market as capital restructures, intensifying circulation 
in order to compensate for flat growth in production. 
Starting around 1989, declining rates of surplus value and the 
development of circuits of exhibition and exchange, such as VHS 
and cable, from which copyright owners could profit, fueled la-
bor strife over residuals between actors and writers, and stu-
dios. Labor strife then drove the development of diverse forms 
of reality television, a format that can do without either writers 
or actors. As the annual global mass of surplus value declined, 
the shows stimulated hostility between the charters by mak-
ing them compete to see who will be last to be excluded from 
the living arrangement as well as between the charters and the 
camera, intensifying and thematically presenting hostility in the 
capitalist ideological form of “competition.”
Rivera’s Sleep Dealer develops the affective signs of the Hos-
tis while mapping full subsumption from the perspective of the 
surplus populations it generates due to the high organic compo-
sition of capital. Full subsumption separates the proletariat from 
itself as flows of people increasingly swerve away from flows of 
money for which they compete. 
In Rivera’s film, Memo leaves his native Oaxacan farming 
village, which has been desiccated by a dam that privatized its 
water source. He goes to find work in a maquinaria in a border 
city, where the laborers remote operate construction robots in 
the US. Sleep Dealer develops the rift while mapping full sub-
sumption from the perspective of the surplus populations gen-
erated by the contemporary economy. Full subsumption means 
a high degree of automation, which means fewer waged workers 
and larger relative surplus populations. In addition to marginal 
profit from exchange, capital relies on dispossession as form of 
accumulation. The current hedge-fund driven land grab in Af-
rica illustrates the point. It is there that populations are driven 
off land that will be farmed mechanically, but they will never 
be absorbed into the economy, because industry has also been 
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mechanized. Paradoxically, full subsumption means that as 
capital integrates labor more completely, separations within the 
proletariat intensify as capital swerves its monetary flows away 
from people. 
The new restructuring of capitalist flows requires new axi-
oms that produce new types and forms of subjectivity. In Cin-
ema Hostis, affective rift is the degree zero image from which 
others differentiate themselves. A rift sets up an antagonism be-
tween characters defined exclusively in terms of their separation 
from each other, and over the course of a film, the camera takes 
up all the positions within the antagonism. Sleep Dealer doesn’t 
exactly set up an antagonism between two class subjects. Instead 
it sets up a complex antagonism among the workers themselves 
by using commodification to create a separation in the most 
intimate relationship in the film, that between Memo and his 
lover Luz. Although they seem in love, she sells her memories 
of being with him on an internet market. When Memo finds out 
that she sells her memories of him, their relationship swerves 
because a commodity is made for the purposes of selling. Memo 
can no longer read Luz’s intent in seeing him as a form of affec-
tion or attraction. It becomes a form of economy. Although the 
film establishes the possibility that workers can bond together 
as workers in the very beginning, the film divides those charac-
ters in an extreme way before uniting them in a palpably false 
manner. 
Cinematic rifts create a field of relations between bodies 
from a specified position within a totality of asocial relations. 
The rift’s signs of composition form a spectrum between the 
pole of visors and the pole of frones. Visors render percepts of 
living bodies from positions in an antagonistic field of economic 
relations, while frones render a technical image surveying that 
field. The part of the spectrum closer to frones allows commer-
cial films to use another recording device within the diegesis as 
an alibi for a film’s own enunciative hostility toward its char-
acters. The various hybrid visor-drone (hand held) cameras in 
the Blair Witch Project and Paranormal Activity function as a 
specification of hostile camera separate from the base level of 
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enunciation. Although a drone has a palpably technical essence 
that can be combined with a visor’s organic character, it does 
not form part of a neuro-image16 or an interactive-image.17 The 
drone’s image appears on the screens of the devices that keep us 
available for labor and turn all space and time into a potentially 
laborious chronotope mediating the economization of the social 
reflected in the Cinema Hostis. 
Luz’s traffic in her memories of being with Memo allows Ri-
vera to develop the rift in effort to allegorize different levels of 
the materiality of labor. Luz sells her memory on a network she 
plugs into through nodes on her body of the same kind as the 
nodes through which Memo controls the construction robots 
when he sells his labor time. A US military drone pilot who shot 
Memo’s father buys Luz’s subjective and semi-subjective shots 
from her perspective. Memo, Luz, and the pilot structurally 
belong to a decomposed class and the interests of each contra-
dict the interests of another. Sleep Dealer brings them together 
through the very commodity markets separating them. The pilot 
buys Luz’s memories to find Memo, and eventually helps him to 
destroy the dam that has privatized the water in Memo’s region, 
turning the farmers of his village into a surplus population. The 
film hastens to its close with Memo helping the pilot disappear.
In sum: Cinema Hostis’s first image-type, the rift, has two 
signs of composition: visors, shots from the point of view of a 
human enemy, and drones or lens genetic sign, a shot from the 
point of view of a diegetically displayed camera. Sleep Dealer 
combines visors with drones by having Luz sell her memories. 
She becomes both a human enemy and a hostile recording de-
vice. The clinamen is the rift’s genetic sign. A clinamen com-
bines multiple, antagonistic points of view in a single extended 
take, establishing each perspective through a reframing.
16 Patricia Pisters, The Neuro-Image: A Deleuzian Film-Philosophy of Digital 
Screen Culture (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012).








Fig. 1. Detail from the predella from the altarpiece of the Crucifi xion by 
Cornelis Engebrechtsz, ca. 1515–20, Lakenhal Museum in Leiden. Author’s pho-
tograph, used with kind permission of the Lakenhal Museum.








deleuze and the passions
At the olden pond,
A frog (of yore) jumps right in.
The sound of water.1
The sound of water. What’s it like? Is it a wee blip in the stillness 
of the old, jaded pond? Or is it a triumphal plop that shatters the 
slumbering silence? What affect unfolds here? Is it the frog that 
jitters to the onslaught of the cold mass of water while shot put-
ting itself over the pond and flails? Or is it the unwilling water 
that parts passionally, suffering, to make room for this unruly 
intruder? Who is undergoing whom, how, how long — there 
and here in the pond of our mind?
On November 4, 1995, another frog jumped: Gilles Deleuze, 
famous philosopher, lifetime professor, family man — sick man 
for all his adult life.2 He did not jump, however, into an idyl-
lic, shy pool of mucky green water, but (clap!) smashingly into 
pavement. His launching pad was not one of placid lily or firm 
ground, but a window. So let us start here, right on that window-
sill. The French press reported Deleuze’s suicide as a défenestra-
tion — “jumping out of a window” — thus expressing an unwin-
dowing, a sort of unframing. Il s’est défenestré, he jumped out 
of a window, he unwindowed, unframed himself. The language, 
still shaking from its own jolts and jumps, declares that suicide 
by leaping out a window was not only common within the mod-
ern urban architectural context of the country, of the Paris of 
its modern architect Georges-Eugène Haussmann, but also rec-
ognized distinctly in the typology of that “deadly sin” against 
the form of the society or state made lesser by it. Accordingly, 
1 Transliteration and translation are mine; the word in parentheses being the 
modern pronunciation of kahadzu (frog).
2 Black humor and irony aside, my use of the image of the leap is also an 
allusion — and in homage — to Deleuze’s own idea (with coauthor Félix 
Guattari) of various instantiations of the “leap” (saut) operative in art 
(from chaos to the composition), science (with bound feet onto calculus) 
and philosophy (across the fissure of hate and coexistent chaos among 
concepts). See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 




it seems to imply too that those who leap out of windows are 
foreclosing on themselves the “fenestral” openness to life — as 
sanctioned and drawn by the state political economy (cf. the 
iconic man jumping out of the North Tower of the World Trade 
Center on 9/11/01). To this anon will we return. One thinks of 
Émile Durk heim’s famous fin-de-siècle study on suicide as a sign 
of anomie or general passional disorder.3
The death of Deleuze is no easy topic — nor should it be. Even 
at the level of linguistic description, we are at a loss. In English 
we would say: “he killed himself.” But in the French press the 
same event is not given as “il s’est tué” (“he killed himself ”) but 
“il s’est donné la mort”: “He gave himself (or was given) death.” 
Is it a matter of giving death or taking away life, of donation 
or abreption? This is a tight conundrum, and scholars have 
done none too well with it. On the one hand, few scholars of 
this philosopher have chosen to discuss it at all. It is as though 
most thought it improper or embarrassing to slump to the low 
filth of biography — particularly an awkward one, when all that 
should count is the thought, the concept, the brilliant Nachlaß 
or Nachklang (not impact, please) of his works! Mind over body, 
I guess. Worse, they may have considered it scholarly suicide to 
be promoting the star of this philosopher of life — with how-
ever much nuance and finesse, when he himself seems to have 
chosen an abrupt, “unforced” death,4 maybe not quite unthink-
ingly, but desperately. It is too glaring of a contradiction (and 
blaring distraction), as it seems Deleuze’s death gives too much 
fodder to those bent on defaming any post-Nietzschean thought 
as just godless, “posty” nihilism. Or is this silence merely the old 
3 Émile Durkheim, Suicide: A Study in Sociology, trans. John A. Spaulding 
and George Simpson (New York: The Free Press, 1997 (original 1897)).
4 I say “seems” because in at least one reading of Baruch Spinoza’s treatment 
of suicide (Baruch Spinoza, Ethics, trans. Edwin Curley [London: Penguin 
Classics, 1996], IV.P20s), Spinoza appears to characterize the causes of sui-
cide as being external, thus taking away internal agency from the suicide. 
See Jason E. Smith, “A Taste for Life (On Some Suicides in Deleuze and 
Spinoza),” Parrhesia 10 (2010): 75–85, esp. 78–79, http://www.parrhesia-
journal.org/parrhesia10/parrhesia10_smith.pdf. Further discussion below.
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Kantian reserve erecting its own quiet wall between the public 
and private acts and utterances of a “dyophysite” citizen-philos-
opher?
Yet on the other hand, we have those, though few, who have 
been all quite sure, even eager, to defend the mode of Deleuze’s 
death either as consistent with his own (and Baruch Spinoza’s) 
philosophy, even an apotheosis of it (like Empedocles jumping 
into the Aetna), or at least as no cause for detraction from his 
thought. There is, for example, a recent essay by Finn Janning, 
who, intoning echoes of the felix culpa from the Easter Exsultet, 
calls Deleuze’s demise a “happy death”!5 To be sure, Janning is 
not being flippant. He argues that just as “a life worth living” is 
one with “the power to actualize its own will,” so Deleuze com-
mitted suicide once having realized that his was no longer that 
sort of life — i.e., as a way of asserting the amor fati (or “being 
equal to the event”) Deleuze had himself acknowledged as the 
“only ethic” and thus the last actualization of his will.6 For Jan-
ning, Deleuze was living out, embodying his own life affirming 
philosophy when he jumped out of that lucky window: “I am 
alive!” would be the translation. It seems fair to say that Janning 
is reading Deleuze’s death in the key of his works and see him 
as Spinoza’s Seneca, a model of inner life “immune” to outside 
forces (and yet at once driven to death from external force).7 In 
all this Janning is no doubt working from the strong monocular 
desire to see the philosopher and man as one.
In oblique contrast, Didier Éribon had insisted, in an ear-
lier essay titled “Sickness unto Life” published not long af-
ter Deleuze’s death, that Deleuze’s œuvre should not be reread 
through the key of his death — implying also the obverse.8 By 
way of caution he sites the egregious example of James Miller, 
5 Finn Janning, “Happy Death of Deleuze,” Tamara Journal of Critical Or-
ganization Inquiry 11, no. 1 (2013): 29–37.
6 Ibid., 29–31.
7 Spinoza, Ethics, IV.A. It is a complex argument Spinoza makes there. Here I 
am making use of Smith’s reading of Deleuze on Spinoza regarding suicide.




who through “fabricated quotes,” wayward translations, uncriti-
cal, and interpretive “extravagance,” sought to sensationalize 
Michel Foucault’s fateful tango with AIDS as the crowning touch 
to his late work,9 which Deleuze had called pensée artiste. In-
stead, he links the suicide of Deleuze to the descending physical 
frailty that presumably triggered it, and points out that it was 
that same frailty, which Deleuze had also called “stammering,” 
that had served as the very condition of possibility for Deleuz-
ian invention and creativity.10 For Éribon, there was a thread be-
tween the illness and the work, and between the illness and the 
death. C’est tout — but not the c’est tout of a Marguerite Duras, 
who thematized her own decline and death in a series of poetic 
scribbles leading down to the wispy, if still defiant, end.11 No, for 
Éribon this is a c’est tout simpliciter: Deleuze finished his last 
book, Negotiations, in 1995, and then jumped out. It was a blip 
in the “calm grandeur”12 of a “life of immanence,” so to speak. 
Finally there is Jason E. Smith’s tantalizing essay called “A 
Taste for Life (On Some Suicides in Deleuze and Spinoza).” I 
say tantalizing because, despite the obvious allusion to and tacit 
knowledge of Deleuze’s own suicide, Smith keeps quite mum 
on it. For that matter, in all his discussion of Deleuze’s study 
of Foucault and his epithet pensée artiste for the latter’s late, 
“experimental” production, he makes no mention of Foucault’s 
“knowing” engagement with AIDS either. Instead he buries his 
scholarly head in a careful exegesis of how Spinoza and Deleuze 
treated suicide. He only tells us (and competently) of the dif-
ference between affects and passions in Spinoza and Deleuze, 
of how Deleuze conceives the “intensive mode,” a mode of im-
9 Ibid., 39.
10 Ibid., 35 and 37, quoting from Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues, 
trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1987), 5.
11 See her C’est tout (1995), translated by Richard Howard as No More (New 
York: Seven Stories Press, 1998).
12 I use this Johann Winckelmannian phrase here to mark the stylistic or 
aesthetic choices made even in philosophy — what Deleuze and Guattari 
called goût (“taste”) in chapter 3 of their last collaboration What Is Philoso-
phy?.
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munity from external forces, as an auto-affection, etc. He goes 
as far as to mark his Spinozist-Deleuzian exegesis on suicide by 
detaching it from Serge Leclaire’s formulation, which is in part 
drawn from the Stoic tradition: “in order to live, I must kill ‘my-
self ’; or else I don’t really feel alive (this is no life!), therefore I 
commit suicide.”13 In Smith’s reading, Spinoza’s neo-Stoic con-
ception never saw suicide as dying “by oneself,” because it over-
estimates the intensivity of the will and neglects the extensive 
forces that perturb and overpower one. For that reason, and he 
quotes Georges Bernanos in his Nouvelle histoire de Mouchette, 
the suicide’s “last glimmer must be one of amazement, of des-
perate surprise.”14
Does this surprise, this “frightening suddenness”15 (again 
Bernanos), mark every suicide as a surd? Perhaps this is why 
Smith keeps silent over what he cannot know. Yet it is hard, at 
some point, not to be drawn into what Maurice Blanchot called 
the “pure form” of the “second death” — the (impossible) mean-
ing of the event, a noetic postmortem.16 For one thing, to segre-
gate Deleuze’s life from his philosophy of life is not merely to ac-
knowledge his plural selves, but rather to territorialize — against 
13 Smith, “A Taste for Life,” 83, quoting from Leclaire’s book on Robert Bres-
son’s film Mouchette, A Child is Being Killed, trans. Marie-Claude Hays 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 4. Notice the similarity of this 
syllogism to Janning’s reading of Deleuze’s “self-donating” death.
14 Smith, “A Taste for Life,” 83, quoting from Georges Bernanos, Nouvelle 
Histoire de Mouchette (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1937), 169.
15 Ibid.
16 See for a further discussion of the treatment of this notion, together with 
that of death, in Blanchot and Deleuze: Harumi Osaki, “Killing Oneself, 
Killing the Father: On Deleuze’s Suicide in Comparison with Blanchot’s 
Notion of Death,” Literature and Theology 22, no. 1 (2008): 88–101, esp. 
89–91. Osaki points out Deleuze’s own engagement with Blanchot’s ideas 
on death in his Logic of Sense, referenced also by Colombat shortly after 
Deleuze’s death, which Colombat interprets in terms of Blanchot’s “second 
death” (André Pierre Colombat, “November 4, 1995, Deleuze’s Death as an 
Event,” Man and World: An International Philosophical Review 29 [1996]: 
235–49). Cf. also Socrates’ account in The Republic IV of the man who 
cannot resist going over to the other side of the road to inspect a dead man 




his insistence not to — reality.17 Moreover, his death is there, 
staring at us, almost as his last challenge to those who would 
still learn from him: “I won’t tell you what this means, but don’t 
ignore it, mon ami(e); think it through for yourself, teach your-
self!” After all, jumping out of a window, unlike Seneca or others 
slitting their veins in a cozy bath or even those hanging them-
selves, is a very public act. It is a form of self-display, indeed 
exhibition, even as it also disfigures one’s countenance and form. 
You might call it a public self-erasure, a piece of installation art 
that self-destructs, no less than a suicide bomber.18
Still, we should not be content with treating Deleuze’s death 
as just or mainly a matter of biographical interpretation — as 
“window dressing” on the edifice of a conceptually consistent19 
or exemplary life. Rather we should see in it a further occasion 
to deterritorialize thought, in homage and continuity to his plu-
ralizing, multiplicative monism, to his singular multiplicity of 
selves. By multiplicity here I don’t mean Deleuze the thinker of 
life and its affirmation versus Deleuze the morbid or moribund 
depressive, but rather Deleuze(s) alive and dead. I am interested, 
taking his idea of becoming animal, in Deleuze the frog, the frog 
that jumps through earth, air and water, frogs being amphibi-
ous between different modes of becoming in life and death. In 
an auto-affective sense this Deleuze-frog is also its own Hermes 
Psychopompos, Hermes Conductor-of-Souls who leads them 
down to Hades — on the way to which, as in Aristophanes’ com-
edy The Frogs, one meets many (other) frogs.20
Now as Smith points out, death for Spinoza is construed, not 
as the death of the individual, but rather impersonally, corpore-
17 I say territorialize over and against differentiate or “differenciate” in the 
Deleuzian sense.
18 Naturally I mean no moral equivalency by this comparison.
19 By “consistent” I mean it not merely in the conventional sense of free of 
self-contradiction, but in the Deleuzian sense of “consistant” as a quality 
of philosophic concepts that are forged out of elements that stand up and 
give the concept a solid, autopoetic consistency.
20 See his Frogs, where Dionysus and his half-brother Heracles are met by a 
chorus of frogs on the lake (possibly Acheron, Lake of Woe) on his way to 
Hades to meet Euripides.
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ally; as the change of proportion between motion and rest for a 
body.21 This is to be understood as an instantiation of a greater 
substance, Nature (or God), at work. It is also very much central 
to and a limit case for his doctrine of affects and passions and 
hence also Deleuze’s own appropriation of it. The distinction be-
tween Spinoza’s three chief affects, appetitus or cupiditas, laetitia 
and tristitia, as a matter of the determination of action in higher 
and lower degrees of perfection (as increased or decreased pow-
er to act) is very much relevant to this proportional calculus of 
motion and rest. If death, including anything we call suicide, is 
thus conceived, then we may talk about its affective valences, 
both what leads to it and what it affords affectively.
At the same time, this affective discourse should not be cir-
cumscribed within the individual, in this case Deleuze. This is 
the unfortunate flaw in Janning’s analysis of his “happy death.” 
Let’s look at it again. He predicates it on Albert Camus’ central 
question of whether life is worth living, even as he tries to work 
Deleuze’s defenestration into a Durkheimian context of social 
integration. He sees Deleuze’s life as one of creating and pro-
ducing concepts, and since Deleuze toward the end of his pant-
ing breath could no longer do so, his life had effectively already 
ended, and was thus not worth living, worth being perhaps a 
problem in itself. A bit crass maybe? Yet to me this coarse read-
ing is also the point of aperture to the social, the economic and 
political. Remember the “charm” Deleuze spoke of as consisting 
of “a sort of awkwardness, a delicacy of health, a frailty of con-
stitution, a vital stammering”?22 Éribon both regards this as the 
anchor of invention and creativity, and links it to what Deleuze 
says in an interview from 1990: “One’s always writing to bring 
something to life, to free life from where it’s trapped.”23 
21 Spinoza, Ethics, II.P13.
22 Éribon, “Sickness unto Life,” 35, quoting from Gilles Deleuze and Claire 
Parnet, Dialogues, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 5.
23 Ibid., 35, quoting from Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations: 1972–1990, trans. 
Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 141.
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As we all know, Deleuze and Félix Guattari published their 
Anti-Oedipus in 1972 not only as a frontal attack on Jacques La-
can, but also as a quixotic lunge at the juggernaut of capitalism 
and capitalist affects. From then on, Deleuze was always draw-
ing schizoid lines of flight from the regnant political economy 
and its traps and constructing new assemblages for life. At the 
same time, his works, his interventions, were always and already 
part of and reintegrated into the capital he sought to resist. We 
know, as Deleuze knew, what it is like as scholars and thinkers: 
People want articles, they want reviews, and if we are good they 
want interviews, talks, keynote addresses, public debates, and 
entire books or series. They want us to produce, produce and 
reproduce, and our existence becomes coefficient with produc-
tion, which then morphs into a debt that only multiplies itself. 
The more you produce, the more you owe. But if you don’t owe, 
you’re nothing.24 Deleuze was not innocent of this. He did write, 
and as a writer could not escape being encased in the structured 
frame of production.25 Yet he also studiously avoided debates 
and interviews, and he hardly traveled or cashed in on lecture 
circuits or posh American appointments.26 Janning’s analysis 
24 When I lived in Israel in 2001, I was amazed to hear Israelis voice the fol-
lowing observation: In other countries, people brag about how much they 
have; the more you have, the richer you are. Here in Israel you hear them 
shvits about how much they owe. The more you owe, the richer you are. 
Signs of a highly advanced capitalized economy indeed!
25 Cf. stained glass composition of Harm Kamerlingh Onnes in the Alge-
meen Handelsblad-Gebouw in Amsterdam. This remarkable modernist 
stained glass composition, commissioned for the hundredth anniversary 
of the Dutch business newspaper Algemeen Handelsblad in 1927–28 and 
formerly housed in its building in Amsterdam, shows the newspaper busi-
ness as a tightly hierarchical network, indeed machine, of specialized roles, 
from the delivery man to the writer, proofreader and printer to the editor 
and publisher (counting his money!). The personas are encased not only 
in twenty leaded frames, but also in a nexus of machinery pertinent to the 
trade. I evoke this work to illustrate the economic machine into which any 
writer, Deleuze included, is inserted, much like the Chaplin character in 
his film Modern Life.
26 To be sure, his choices may have been limited by his ill health and the 
concomitant difficulty of travel.
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offers no resistance to this dark side of creativity, and indeed 
capitulates to the logic of human capital: We live to produce, 
and by producing can live a “healthy, productive life.”27 The sin-
ister implication is, when we cease to produce, then our lives are 
over. Publish or perish!
The problem with Janning’s reading is that it assumes an ex-
clusionary doctrine of affects and affectivity. Either you have 
a joyful affect or a sad passion, not both, and either you are 
increasing your affective potency or letting it slip away — no 
mixing or blurring please! Spinoza may have sought geometric 
clarity in triangulating his affects — at least as a heuristic, and 
in titrating joy and sorrow he was also following the common 
image in his era of the Laughing and Weeping Philosophers.28
This “dyolysis” of affects was also played out in the musical 
production of his day. From the late 16th century on, music in 
Europe, perhaps in an attempt to control dissonance in highly 
chromatic compositions, shifted from the earlier system of the 
eight church modes to a binary one between the Ionian (major) 
and the Aeolian (minor) modes. In the theory and practice of 
the 17th into the 18th century, precisely when capitalism also un-
derwent its definitive launch through the Dutch and the English 
and their global exploits, the major mode came to be associated 
with happy affects and the minor with the sad, both under the 
regime of pre-established harmony (Leibniz). In this harmonic 
regime an amalgamation of the major and minor was strictly 
forbidden; only one main affect was allowed in each movement 
27 This is precisely what the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation claims as its 
goal for everyone in the world. See http://www.gatesfoundation.org.
28 A representative image here is the Democritus and Heraclitus by Cornelis 
Stangerus, 1662. This motif of the Weeping Heraclitus and the Laughing 
Democritus was quite popular in 17th-century Netherlands, the chief node 
of early global capitalism of the time, but had been established by Donato 
Bramante in 1477, following the ancient epithets for the two philosophers. 
The laughter of Democritus had been construed as the scoffing laughter of 
a disillusioned thinker, but in 17th-century art it seems to have been inter-




or piece.29 This polarity of tonal affect largely persisted in more 
learned musical Tonkunst until the end of tonality a century 
ago, though it has lingered in various other ways up through 
our day, in popular as well as high art genres.30 Franz Schubert 
was, however, a rebel against this dichotomy in the 19th cen-
tury, and constantly tried to subvert it by erasing the solidity of 
either tonal affect (e.g., Allegretto in C-minor, D. 915),31 while a 
century later Arnold Schönberg and his pupils would demolish 
it with their atonality,32 even as Béla Bartók, Charles Ives, Igor 
Stravinsky, and Darius Milhaud all vexed it with their experi-
ments in bitonality.33
Deleuze may have done something similar when he recon-
ceived Spinoza’s happy affects as passive affects (hence passions) 
along with the sad, and reserved the active affect only for what 
he called auto-affection, the affect immune from extensive force. 
Bill Clinton, in eulogizing the African-American historian John 
29 This same doctrine of affects applied to the development of the modern 
prose composition by single-thesis paragraphs.
30 This binary affectivity is also strongly reflected in the like/dislike disposi-
tive of internet culture, and in the dichotomous symbols for “happy” and 
“sad” :-) and :-( or :) and :( and their various emoji cognates used in emails 
and instant messaging today.
31 In fact, Schubert’s subversion of the tonal tradition went as far as to invert 
the conventional affects associated with the major and minor modes, at 
times making the major sound sad and wistful and the minor jolly — even 
jaunty. Evidence of this could be observed in the Andante of his Symphony 
No. 9 and Moment Musical No. 3. In this sense he was not only a master 
of tonality (as in full display in his String Quintet in C), but also its great 
ironist.
32 This first occurred in Schönberg’s free atonal works from 1908 to 1923, 
and then with his twelve-tone technique from 1921 on (preceded by an 
early experiment in the Third of Bartók’s Fourteen Bagatelles of 1908), with 
refinements by his pupil Anton Webern.
33 For early examples of the simultaneous bitonality in early Modernist com-
position, which roughly coincided with free atonality and the early devel-
opment of dodecaphony in the Second Viennese School led by Schönberg, 
cf. Bartók’s Fourteen Bagatelles (1908, the third of which also adumbrated 
dodecaphony), Ives’s Variations on America (1909–10), Stravinsky’s Rite of 
Spring (1913), and Milhaud’s Petites Symphonies (1917–22). In such works, 
the superposition of one key over another effectively disrupts the conven-
tional affective associations of tonal harmony.
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Hope Franklin (1915–2009), called him the “happiest angry man 
I know, and the angriest happy man I know.”34 Yet in being a co-
affective man and a forceful historian of resistance, Franklin was 
also rising above the passive affects.
Deleuze would have appreciated this. He thought of auto-
affection as “folding” or “straddling.”35 For him it was a strat-
egy not of reaction but of refusal and neutralization, much as in 
judo. He wrote to “free life from where it’s trapped,”36 and may 
have died also to escape the trap of capitalist production as a 
production of capitalist affects — either happy or sad, either pro-
ducing more or producing less — on the upswing or depressed, 
just like its market and its meds.37 Deleuze’s defenestration may 
be seen here not merely as an escape from the judgment of capi-
tal on an unproductive cripple, but as an unframing of its binary 
affective framework. It allows philosophy and philosophers, like 
the two great philosophers of change in Antiquity, to cry and 
to laugh — even at once, but in such passional Durcharbeit ar-
rive at an auto-affection that is still pathopoetic (cf. the gagaku 
work Etenraku 越天樂, or Transcelestial Joy).38 As Plato’s Eleatic 
Stranger says in The Sophist: “being (einai) is the power (dyna-
mis) to act (poiein) and undergo (paschein).”39 In other words it 
affects and is affected. The only word we need there to clarify the 
matter is hama, at once, which is also the temporality of auto-
affect. Only then can we see Deleuze’s terror of meeting striped 
terra firma deterritorialize and liquefy again.
34 Bill Clinton, at memorial service in Duke University Chapel, June 11, 
2009 (author’s recollection). A press report of the time simply related the 
expression as “[a]n angry, happy man. A happy, angry man,” (http://www.
blueridgenow.com/article/20090612/NEWS/906129983).
35 Smith, “A Taste for Life,” 76, referring to Deleuze, Negotiations, 98.
36 Éribon, “Sickness unto Life,” 35, quoting from Deleuze, Negotiations, 141.
37 This chain of binaries is in turn a motive component in the modern ideol-
ogy of progress, invented in the 17th century.
38 This is a classical Japanese piece descended from the Chinese court reper-
toire forged in the unlikely crucible of shamanistic music from the early 
Silk Road mixed with Confucian aesthetics of noble “apathy.”
39 Plato, The Sophist, 247d–e; translation mine.
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